Differentiation Games
Speaker
Gilad Bavly
Date
03/05/2016 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar
2016-05-03 11:00:00
2016-05-03 12:30:00
Differentiation Games
Abstract: We consider a class of games in which players with private information are motivated to differ in their actions. Two related questions are studied: (1) the existence of a “collision-free” equilibrium, in which no two players choose the same action; (2) the maximal social welfare. We give exact answers for some specific information structures, and a lower bound for the general case.
Economics building (No. 504), room 011.
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (No. 504), room 011.
Affiliation
Bar-Ilan University
Abstract
Abstract: We consider a class of games in which players with private information are motivated to differ in their actions. Two related questions are studied: (1) the existence of a “collision-free” equilibrium, in which no two players choose the same action; (2) the maximal social welfare. We give exact answers for some specific information structures, and a lower bound for the general case.
Attached file
תאריך עדכון אחרון : 02/05/2016
