שלחו לחבר

(Job talk:) Repeated Games with Switching Costs: Stationary vs History Independent Strategies

Speaker
Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Aix-Marseille University
Date
07/12/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2021-12-07 11:30:00 2021-12-07 13:00:00 (Job talk:) Repeated Games with Switching Costs: Stationary vs History Independent Strategies Note the one-time change of place We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely on the previous action of the minimizing player, not the entire history. We provide a full characterization of the value and the optimal strategies. The strategies exhibit a robustness property and typically do not change with a small perturbation of the switching costs. Second, we consider a case where the minimizing player is limited to playing simpler strategies that are completely history-independent. Here too, we provide a full characterization of the (minimax) value and the strategies for obtaining it. Moreover, we present several bounds on the loss due to this limitation. joint with Xavier Venel and Anna Zseleva Link to the paper   To view the seminar recording click here   To view the seminar slides, click here BIU Economics Seminar room and will be Zoomed on https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839 אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
BIU Economics Seminar room and will be Zoomed on https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839
Affiliation
https://yevgets.wixsite.com/homepage
Abstract

Note the one-time change of place

We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely on the previous action of the minimizing player, not the entire history. We provide a full characterization of the value and the optimal strategies. The strategies exhibit a robustness property and typically do not change with a small perturbation of the switching costs. Second, we consider a case where the minimizing player is limited to playing simpler strategies that are completely history-independent. Here too, we provide a full characterization of the (minimax) value and the strategies for obtaining it. Moreover, we present several bounds on the loss due to this limitation.

joint with Xavier Venel and Anna Zseleva

Link to the paper

 
To view the seminar recording click here
 
To view the seminar slides, click here

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 07/12/2021