Auctions with multi-member bidders
Speaker
Shiran Rachmilevitch, University of Haifa
Date
22/03/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2022-03-22 11:30:00
2022-03-22 13:00:00
Auctions with multi-member bidders
I consider an auction in which one of the bidders is a team consisting of several individuals. These individuals need to agree on a bid, and on splitting the payment to the auctioneer if they win the item. Under some conditions, a unique equilibrium is obtained under either a first-price or a second-price format. Under more permissive conditions the equilibrium need not be unique, but the symmetric equilibria of the first-price model are isomorphic to the symmetric equilibria of the second-price model. The free riding problem which stems from collective bidding is studied in detail.
Link to the paper and the seminar recording.
BIU Economics common room and will be Zoomed on https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
BIU Economics common room and will be Zoomed on https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839
Affiliation
https://sites.google.com/site/profshiranrachmilevitch/
Abstract
I consider an auction in which one of the bidders is a team consisting of several individuals. These individuals need to agree on a bid, and on splitting the payment to the auctioneer if they win the item. Under some conditions, a unique equilibrium is obtained under either a first-price or a second-price format. Under more permissive conditions the equilibrium need not be unique, but the symmetric equilibria of the first-price model are isomorphic to the symmetric equilibria of the second-price model. The free riding problem which stems from collective bidding is studied in detail.
Link to the paper and the seminar recording.
תאריך עדכון אחרון : 15/05/2022
