שלחו לחבר

Instability of Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Under Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics

Speaker
Igal Milchtaich
Date
13/07/2021 - 12:30 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2021-07-13 11:30:00 2021-07-13 12:30:00 Instability of Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Under Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each action k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the action whose mean payoff was highest during the testing phase. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that, if the gains from defection are not too large, there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case k = 1 commonly studied in the literature. To view the seminar recording, click here. Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the 1st floor, and also in Zoom: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839 אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the 1st floor, and also in Zoom: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839
Abstract

We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each action k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the action whose mean payoff was highest during the testing phase. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma. By contrast, when k > 1 we show that, if the gains from defection are not too large, there exists a globally stable state in which agents cooperate with probability between 28% and 50%. Next, we characterize stability of strict equilibria in general games. Our results demonstrate that the empirically plausible case of k > 1 can yield qualitatively different predictions than the case k = 1 commonly studied in the literature.

To view the seminar recording, click here.

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 13/07/2021