שלחו לחבר

Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs (Seminar-A-A-Distance)

Speaker
Omer Tamuz
Date
06/05/2020 - 12:30 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2020-05-06 11:30:00 2020-05-06 12:30:00 Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs (Seminar-A-A-Distance) Joint seminar with Technion--Israel Institute of Technology   Abstract: We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. Our main result is that, for the two agent case, a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility. For any number of agents, a related ``no trade'' condition likewise provides a characterization of feasibility. We use our characterization to construct joint belief distributions in which agents are informed regarding the state, and yet receive no information regarding the other's posterior. We study a related class of Bayesian persuasion problems with a single sender and multiple receivers, and explore the extreme points of the set of feasible distributions. (Joint research with Y. Babichenko I., Arieli, and F. Sandomirskiy) https://technion.zoom.us/j/92733645151 אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
https://technion.zoom.us/j/92733645151
Affiliation
California Institute of Technology
Abstract

Joint seminar with Technion--Israel Institute of Technology

 

Abstract: We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. Our main result is that, for the two agent case, a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility. For any number of agents, a related ``no trade'' condition likewise provides a characterization of feasibility. We use our characterization to construct joint belief distributions in which agents are informed regarding the state, and yet receive no information regarding the other's posterior. We study a related class of Bayesian persuasion problems with a single sender and multiple receivers, and explore the extreme points of the set of feasible distributions.

(Joint research with Y. Babichenko I., Arieli, and F. Sandomirskiy)

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 05/05/2020