Strategy-proof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle (Seminar-At-A-Distance)

Abstract: We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results in a mechanism that is strategy-proof in expectation, and dominates the random dictator mechanism in terms of utilitarian social welfare. We further improve the upper bound for three agents on a circle to 7/6 (whereas random dictator obtains 4/3); and provide the first lower bounds for randomized strategy-proof facility location in any metric space, using linear programming.

Joint seminar with the Technion--Israel Institute of Technology

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https://technion.zoom.us/j/620898525

Meeting ID: 620 898 525

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Meeting ID: 620 898 525