שלחו לחבר

Exit from Equilibrium in Coordination Games under Probit Choice

Speaker
Srinivas Arigapudi
Date
03/12/2019 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2019-12-03 11:30:00 2019-12-03 13:00:00 Exit from Equilibrium in Coordination Games under Probit Choice Abstract: We consider a model of stochastic evolution under the probit choice rule. In the small noise double limit, where first the noise level in agents’ decisions is taken to zero, and then the population size to infinity, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. We use results from optimal control theory to solve the exit cost problem. This is used to determine the most likely exit paths from the initial basin of attraction and also to assess the expected time until the evolutionary process leaves the basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium in a class of three-strategy coordination games. Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor
Affiliation
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Abstract
Abstract: We consider a model of stochastic evolution under the probit choice rule. In the small noise double limit, where first the noise level in agents’ decisions is taken to zero, and then the population size to infinity, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. We use results from optimal control theory to solve the exit cost problem. This is used to determine the most likely exit paths from the initial basin of attraction and also to assess the expected time until the evolutionary process leaves the basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium in a class of three-strategy coordination games.

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 08/11/2019