שלחו לחבר

Subgame Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Tolerance Levels

Speaker
János Flesch
Date
21/01/2020 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2020-01-21 11:30:00 2020-01-21 13:00:00 Subgame Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Tolerance Levels (joint with Jean-Jacques Herings, Jasmine Maes, and Arkadi Predtetchinski) Abstract: We study subgame f-optimal strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite action spaces and a countable state space. Here f denotes the tolerance function, a function which assigns a non-negative tolerated error level to every subgame. Subgame f-optimal strategies are strategies that guarantee the value in every subgame within the subgame-dependent tolerance level as given by f. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of a subgame f-optimal strategy. We also show that the existence of subgame f-optimal strategies for every positive tolerance function f is equivalent to the existence of a subgame optimal strategy.  Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor
Affiliation
Maastricht University
Abstract

(joint with Jean-Jacques Herings, Jasmine Maes, and Arkadi Predtetchinski)

Abstract: We study subgame f-optimal strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite action spaces and a countable state space. Here f denotes the tolerance function, a function which assigns a non-negative tolerated error level to every subgame. Subgame f-optimal strategies are strategies that guarantee the value in every subgame within the subgame-dependent tolerance level as given by f. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of a subgame f-optimal strategy. We also show that the existence of subgame f-optimal strategies for every positive tolerance function f is equivalent to the existence of a subgame optimal strategy. 

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 07/01/2020