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The Simplicity of Large Bayesian Persuasion Strategies

Speaker
Itai Arieli
Date
05/11/2019 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2019-11-05 11:30:00 2019-11-05 13:00:00 The Simplicity of Large Bayesian Persuasion Strategies (joint with Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky) Abstract: We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem with a one-dimensional interval as the state space. We find a simple class of semi-interval policies such that every persuasion problem has an optimal solution in the class. Conversely, for any policy in the class, we show that there exists a persuasion problem that the policy is its unique maximiser. We discuss our results in the context of a partially informed sender. Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor
Affiliation
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Abstract

(joint with Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky)

Abstract: We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem with a one-dimensional interval as the state space. We find a simple class of semi-interval policies such that every persuasion problem has an optimal solution in the class. Conversely, for any policy in the class, we show that there exists a persuasion problem that the policy is its unique maximiser. We discuss our results in the context of a partially informed sender.

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 31/10/2019