Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives

Speaker
Doron Ravid
Date
08/03/2018 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2018-03-08 11:30:00 2018-03-08 13:00:00 Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives Paper: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941601  We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: the sender's preferences are state-independent. We observe that this setting is amenable to the belief-based approach familiar from models of persuasion with commitment. Using this approach, we examine the possibility of valuable communication, assess the value of commitment, and explicitly solve for sender-optimal equilibria in a large class of examples. A key result is a geometric characterization of the value of cheap talk, described by the quasiconcave envelope of the sender's value function. Joint with Elliot Lipnowski Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Chicago University
Abstract

Paper: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941601 

We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: the sender's preferences are state-independent. We observe that this setting is amenable to the belief-based approach familiar from models of persuasion with commitment. Using this approach, we examine the possibility of valuable communication, assess the value of commitment, and explicitly solve for sender-optimal equilibria in a large class of examples. A key result is a geometric characterization of the value of cheap talk, described by the quasiconcave envelope of the sender's value function.

Joint with Elliot Lipnowski

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 22/02/2018