Efficient Allocation with Informational Externalities
Speaker
Boaz Zik
Date
05/06/2018 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2018-06-05 11:30:00
2018-06-05 13:00:00
Efficient Allocation with Informational Externalities
We consider a seller of an item who faces potential buyers whose valuations depend on multiple private signals. It is known from the literature that when there are informational externalities and buyers' private signals arrive all at once efficiency is unattainable. We show that if the buyers' private signals arrive over time then the seller can attain efficiency even in the presence of informational externalities.
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Hebrew University
Abstract
We consider a seller of an item who faces potential buyers whose valuations depend on multiple private signals. It is known from the literature that when there are informational externalities and buyers' private signals arrive all at once efficiency is unattainable. We show that if the buyers' private signals arrive over time then the seller can attain efficiency even in the presence of informational externalities.
תאריך עדכון אחרון : 04/12/2022
