Statistical Inference in Games

Speaker
Yuval Salant
Date
25/12/2017 - 12:30 - 11:10Add To Calendar 2017-12-25 11:10:00 2017-12-25 12:30:00 Statistical Inference in Games We consider statistical inference in games. Each player obtains a random sample of other players’ actions, uses statistical inference to form beliefs about their actions, and best-responds to those beliefs when choosing his action. In a Generalized Sampling Equilibrium (GSE), the random sample is drawn from the distribution of players' actions based on this process. We characterize the set of GSEs in large two-action games, and compare their predictions for different sample sizes and statistical inference procedures. An application to search and matching markets demonstrates that statistical inference from small samples leads to significantly larger unemployment than in Nash equilibrium. Building 504 (Economics), seminar room 011 אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Building 504 (Economics), seminar room 011
Affiliation
Northwestern University
Abstract

We consider statistical inference in games. Each player obtains a random sample of other players’ actions, uses statistical inference to form beliefs about their actions, and best-responds to those beliefs when choosing his action. In a Generalized Sampling Equilibrium (GSE), the random sample is drawn from the distribution of players' actions based on this process. We characterize the set of GSEs in large two-action games, and compare their predictions for different sample sizes and statistical inference procedures. An application to search and matching markets demonstrates that statistical inference from small samples leads to significantly larger unemployment than in Nash equilibrium.

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 07/09/2017