Preferences Under Ignorance
Speaker
Christoph Kuzmics
Date
23/05/2017 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar
2017-05-23 11:00:00
2017-05-23 12:30:00
Preferences Under Ignorance
Abstract. A decision maker (DM) makes choices from different sets of alternatives. The DM is initially fully ignorant of the payoff associated to each alternative, and learns these payoffs only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option once payoffs are learned, the optimal choice rule from sets of alternatives is one that is as if the DM had strict preferences over all alternatives. Under this model, the DM has preferences for preferences while being ignorant of what preferences are “right”.
Download
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor.
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor.
Affiliation
University of Graz
Abstract
Abstract. A decision maker (DM) makes choices from different sets of alternatives. The DM is initially fully ignorant of the payoff associated to each alternative, and learns these payoffs only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option once payoffs are learned, the optimal choice rule from sets of alternatives is one that is as if the DM had strict preferences over all alternatives. Under this model, the DM has preferences for preferences while being ignorant of what preferences are “right”.
תאריך עדכון אחרון : 24/04/2017
