What You Get is What You See: Cooperation in Repeated Games with Observable Payoffs

Speaker
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan
Date
22/11/2016 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar 2016-11-22 11:00:00 2016-11-22 12:30:00 What You Get is What You See: Cooperation in Repeated Games with Observable Payoffs Abstract: We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, players observe neither the other player’s actions nor her payoff. We prove that any strictly efficient payoff can be obtained as sequential equilibrium payoff, when costly communication is available and the players are sufficiently patient. Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor. אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה לכלכלה Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor.
Affiliation
Tel Aviv University
Abstract

Abstract: We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, players observe neither the other player’s actions nor her payoff. We prove that any strictly efficient payoff can be obtained as sequential equilibrium payoff, when costly communication is available and the players are sufficiently patient.

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 13/09/2016