עברית
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Sir Isaac Wolfson Chair in Economics 2006-2017

Professor Emeritus Shmuel Nitzan

Email
Shmuel.Nitzan@biu.ac.il
Office
304; Building : 504
Reception Hours
In coordination in advance by mail
PO Box
24
Personal Website
http://econ.biu.ac.il/en/nitzan
Research Categories
Teaching
Personal

My son Yonatan sings:

 

CV

Education

1976 Ph.D., Economics The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Subject of Thesis: The Rationality of Social Choice Mechanisms
1972 M.A., Economics (with Distinction)The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
1971 B.A., Economics and Political Science (with Distinction), The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Professional Experience

Employment

2006-2017 Sir Issac Wolfson Chair in Economics
1990 - Present Professor, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel
1990 - 1991 Chair, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel
1985 - 1990 Associate Professor, Department of Economics Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel
1984 - 1985 Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel
1978 - 1983 Lecturer, Department of Economics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

Visiting positions

1987 - 1988 Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida
1981 - 1982 Department of Economics, The University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
1977 Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
1977 Department of Economics, Boston University
1975 - 1976 Department of Economics Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, VA

Visiting positions (less than 4 months)

2018

 Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study (HIAS), Kunitachi, Tokyo, Japan
2017 Hitotsubashi Institute of Advanced Study (HIAS), Tokyo, Japan
2016 Hitotsubashi Institute of Advanced Study (HIAS), Tokyo, Japan
2011 Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria
2007 Institute for Economic Analysis (IAE), Barcelona, Spain
2005 Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria
2004 CODE and the Department of Economics, University of Barcelona, Spain
2004 Tinbergen Institute and CREED, The University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2004 CES, University of Munich, Germany
2004 Singapore Management University, Singapore
2003 WZB, Berlin, Germany
2003 Singapore Management University, Singapore
2000 CES, University of Munich, Germany
1999 The Tinbergen Institute, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
1999 CentER of Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
1999 Institute of Economic Theory, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany
1999 Department of Economics, New York University, NY
1993 Public Finance Institute, University of Bonn, Germany
1992 CentER of Economic Research, Tilburg University,The Netherlands
1992 IGIER, Bocconi University, Milano, Italy
1992 The Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1992 Department of General Economics, Free University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1987 - 1988 and 1989 Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN

Professional Consulting

1980 - 2012 The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel
1982 Center for Study of Business and Government The City University of New York

Teaching Experience

  • Microeconomics (Elementary, Intermediate and Advanced)
  • Public Economics
  • Social Choice
  • Economics of Collective Decision making
  • Advanced Economic Theory
  • Principles of Economics
  • Managerial Economics

Reviewer for:

  • American Economic Review
  • American Political Science Review
  • Annals of Operations Research
  • Econometrica
  • Economic Inquiry
  • Economic Journal
  • Economic Theory
  • Economica
  • Economics and Politics
  • Economics Quarterly
  • Economics of Governance
  • European Economic Review
  • European Journal of Political Economy
  • Games and Economic Behavior
  • International Economic Review
  • Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
  • Journal of Economic Theory
  • Journal of Economics
  • Journal of Public Economics
  • Journal of Theoretical Politics
  • Mathematical Modeling
  • Mathematical Social Sciences
  • Mathematics of Operations Research
  • National Science Foundation
  • Public Choice
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics
  • Review of Economic Studies   
  • Social Choice and Welfare
  • State and Government
  • The Israel Science Foundation
  • United States - Israel Binational Science Foundation

Editor

1994 - 1998 The European Journal of Political Economy

Academic Awards

2003 Listed in Blaug and Vane: Who is Who in Economics, 4th ed., Elgar
1987 Winner of the Association for Comparative Economic Studies paper competition (with N. Kahana)
1976 Shenbrunn Award for a distinguished Doctoral Dissertation

Miscellaneous

2014 - 2016 President of the Israeli Economic Association.
2014 - Present Member of the Promotions Committee of the Council for Higher Education (MALAG)
1990 - 1993 Member of the Council of the Israeli Economic Association
1992 - 1997 and
2002 - 2007		 Member of the Academic Council of the Open University
2000 - Present Fellow, CESifo (Munich, Germany)

Grants

2002 - 2004 Israel Science Foundation, Public-Policy Determination: A Political-Economic Contest Approach (with G. Epstein).

Presentations

SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS:

 

 

  • Hitotsubashi Institute of Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, November 2018, "Conditioning Sovereign Debt Relief on Democratization".
  • Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, November 2018, "Conditioning Sovereign Debt Relief on Democratization".
  • Department of Economics, Nanzan University, Nagoya, November 2018, "Conditioning Sovereign Debt Relief on Democratization".
  • Department of Economics, Kobe University, Kobe, November 2018, "Conditioning Sovereign Debt Relief on Democratization".
  • Department of Economics, Niigata University, Niigata, November 2018, "Conditioning Sovereign Debt Relief on Democratization".
  • University of Tokyo, Department of Economics, Tokyo, December 2018, " Two Applications of the Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Model: Conditional Debt Relief & Skills and Power".
  • Hitotsubashi Institute of Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, December 2017, "The Significance of Choice Functions: Two Political-Economy  Illustrations " .
  • Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University,  December 2017, "The Significance of Choice Functions: Two Political-Economy  Illustrations " .
  • Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, December 2017, "The Significance of Choice Functions: Two Political-Economy  Illustrations " .
  • Department of Economics, Nanzan University, Nagoya, November 2017, "The Significance of Choice Functions: Two Political-Economy  Illustrations " .
  • Hitotsubashi Institute of Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, April 2016, "Resolving the Social Choice Problem: Compromize, Maximize, Axiomatize"
  • Special Lecture Series, Niigata University, March 2016, "The Social Choice Problem and its Possible Resolution"
  • Department of Economics, Nanzan University, Nagoya, March 2016, "Resolving the Social Choice Problem: compromize, maximize, axiomatize"
  • Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, March 2016, "Resolving the Social Choice Problem: Compromize, Maximize, Axiomatize"
  • Department of Economics, University of Rome La Sapienza, October 2013, "Discrimination in Contests".
  • Department of Economics, University of Vienna, October 2013, "Discrimination in Contests".
  • Department of Applied Economics, University of Valladolid, Valladolid, July 2013, "Discrimination in contests".
  • Choice Lab, Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, June 2013, "Discrimination in Contests".
  • Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, Department of Economics, February 2013, "Discrimination in Contests".
  • Department of Economics, Javerianna University, Bogota, October 2012, "The ABC(D) of Social Choice".
  • Department of Economics, University of Exterbado, Bogota, October 2012, "The ABC(D) of Social Choice".
  • Department of Economics, Central University, Bogota, October 2012, "The ABC(D) of Social Choice".
  • Department of Economics, University of Stockholm, May 2012, “Discrimination in Contests”.
  • Department of Economics, The University of Vienna, Austria, March 2011, "Optimal Contests and Discrimination".
  • Department of Economics, University of Malaga, Spain, November 2010, "Success and Efforts of Interest Groups after the Elections".
  • Institute of Mathematics, University of Seville, Spain, November 2010, " Success and Efforts of Interest Groups after the Elections".
  • Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna, October 2010, " Success and Efforts of Interest Groups after the Elections".
  • Department of Economics, University of Catania, Sicily, October 2010, (a) "Bureaucratic Norms and Market Structure". (b) Success and Efforts of Interest Groups after the Elections".
  • Department of Economics, University of Rome La Sapienza, February 2008, "The ABC(D) of Social Choice".
  • Department of Economics, The University of Hawaii, October 2007, "Size, Transparency and Quality of Competitive Clubs under Selection by Fixed Random Sampling".
  • Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna, September 2007, “Contest Efforts in light of Behavioral Considerations”.
  • Department of Economics, Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan, July 2006, “Contest Efforts in light of Behavioral Considerations”.
  • Creed, University of Amsterdam, February 2006, “Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioral Considerations”.
  • Department of Economics, University of Rome La Sapienza, January 2006, “Contest Efforts in light of Behavioral Considerations”.
  • Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna, June 2005, “Rent Seeking in Light of Behavioral Considerations”.
  • Singapore Management University, January 2005, “The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule “.
  • European Economic Institute, Florence, October 2004, “The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule”.
  • Institute of Advanced Studies, Vienna, Workshop on Voting Theory and Collective Decision Making, September 2004, “The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule”.
  • CODE, University Autonoma of Barcelona, May 2004, “Context-Based Choice“.
  • Creed, University of Amsterdam, April 2004, “Lobbying and Transparency”.
  • The Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, April 2004, “Topics in Public Economics:
    (a) The Public Policy Contest, (b) The Survival of the Un-fittest (c) The Golden Voting Rule“.
  • The Center of Economic Studies (CES), University of Munich, March 2004,
  • “Individual and Collective Decision Making: (a) Context-Based Choice, (b) The Public Policy Contest, (c) The Golden Voting Rule“.
  • Singapore Management University, February 2004, “Context-Based Choice. “
  • Department of Economics, Singapore National University, February 2004,  “Lobbying and Transparency“.
  • WZB, Berlin, September 2003, “The Struggle over Migration Policy”.
  • Singapore Management University, Singapore, January 2003, “The Struggle over Migration Policy”.
  • The Center of Economic Studies (CES), University of Munich, February 2000, "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination".
  • The Tinbergen Institute, Rotterdam, November 1999, "The Political Economy of Endogenous Public Policy".
  • The Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, November 1999, "Political Culture and MonoPrice Deter".
  • Department of Economics, Erasmus University, October 1999, "Extended Individual Choice".
  • Center of Economic Research, Tilburg University, October 1999, "A Reexamination of Monopoly Price Determina - A New Political Economy Perspective".
  • Institute of Economic Theory, Humboldt Univers, June 1999, "A Reexamination of Monopoly Price Determination - A New Political Economy Perspective".
  • Department of Economics, New York University, April 1999, "A Reexamination of Monopoly Price Determination - A New Political Economy Perspective".
  • Department of Economics, University of Chile, March 1999, "A Reexamination of Monopoly Price Determination - A New Political Economy Perspective".
  • Department of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, January 1999, "A Reexamination of Monopoly Price Determination - A New Political Economy Perspective".
  • Department of Economics, Hebrew University, November 1998, "A Reexamination of Monopoly Price Determination - A New Political Economy Perspective".
  • Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, October 1998, "A Reexamination of Monopoly Price Determination - A New Political Economy Perspective".
  • Department of Political Science, Turku University, September 1998, "Extended Individual Choice".
  • Institute of Public Finance, University of Catania, April 1997, "Social Compromise - The Metric Approach".
  • Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, January 1995, "Warranted Structural Unemployment in Decision Making".
  • Institute of Economic Theory and Operations Research, University of Karlsruhe, February 1995, "Warranted Structural Unemployment in Decision Making".
  • Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, February 1994, "Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?".
  • Institute of Economic Theory and Operations Research, University of Karlsruhe, February 1994, "Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?".
  • Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, July 1993, "Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?".
  • Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,March 1993, "A Folk Theorem in Dynamic Games".
  • Institute of Economic Theory and Operations Research, University of Karlsruhe, February 1993, "Some Peculiarities of Group Decision Making in Teams".
  • Public Economics Workshop, University of Bonn, January 1993, "Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?".
  • Economic Theory Workshop, University of Bonn, January 1993, "Some Peculiarities of Group Decision Making in Teams".
  • Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, January 1993, "Some Peculiarities of Group Decision Making in Teams".
  • Economic Theory Workshop, Tel-Aviv University, December 1992, "A Folk Theorem in a Dynamic Game of Private Provision of Public Goods".
  • Department of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, December 1992, "Some Peculiarities of Group Decision Making in Teams".
  • Center of Economic Research, Tilburg University, November 1992, "Private Provision of Public Goods in Differential Games".
  • IGIER, Bocconi University, Milano, September 1992, "Private Provision of Public Goods in Differential Games".
  • The Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, June 1992
    (a) "The Voluntary Provision of Pure Public Goods"
    (b) "The Nature and Severity of Collective Action Problems"
    (c) "Optimal Group Decision Making"
    (d) "The Extent of Rent Dissipation"
  • Department of General Economics, Free University of Amsterdam, May 1992, "Public Choice and Collective Decision Making."
  • Institute of Economic Theory and Operations Research, University of Karlsruhe, February 1992, "The Extent of Rent Dissipation in Alternative Rent-Seeking Models."
  • Economic Theory Seminar, The University of Basel, February, 1992, "The Extent of Rent Dissipation in Alternative Rent-Seeking Models."
  • Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, February 1990, "Collective Rent Dissipation."
  • Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, January 1989, "Voluntary Provision of Mixed Collective Goods".
  • Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, October 1988,"Voluntary Provision of Public Goods Under Uncertainty".
  • Political Economy Seminar, Carnegie Mellon University, April 1988, "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods".
  • Economic Theory Workshop, Department of Economics, Boston University, April 1988, "Restricted Competition as a Reward for Public Service: The Case of Auditors".
  • Industrial Organization and Public Policy Workshop, Department of Economics, University of Florida, September 1987, "Restricted Competition as a Reward for Public Service: The Case of Auditors," December, 1987, "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods," January 1988, "More on Alternative Objectives of Labor-Managed Firms".
  • Department of Economics, Indiana University at Indianapolis, October 1987, "Restricted Competition as a Reward for Public Service: The Case of Auditors".
  • Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University at Bloomington, November 1987, "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods".
  • Economic Theory Workshop, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, October 1987, "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods".
  • Public Finance Workshop, Bonn University, February 1986, "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods", "Restricted Competition as a Reward for Public Service: The Case of Auditors".
  • Institute of Economic Theory and Operations Research, University of Karlsruhe, February 1987, "Restricted Competition as a Reward for Public Service: The Case of Auditors".
  • Institute of Economic Theory and Operations Research, University of Karlsruhe, February 1987, "Restricted Competition as a Reward for Public Service: The Case of Auditors".
  • Institute of Public Finance, Kiel University, February 1986, "The Libertarian Resolution of the Paretian Liberal Paradox".

IN MEETINGS:

  • Conference on Contests: Theory and Evidence, Norwich, England, June 2016, The advantage of dual discrimination in lottery contest games.
  • The Annual Conference of the Israeli Economic Association, Patinkin Lecture, Tel Aviv, Israel,  June 2015, "The Economics of Voting: The ABCD of Social Choice".
  • Likelihood and Simplicity Conference, Ramat Gan, Israel, January 2014, "Do consistent majority judgments guarantee the truth?"
  • The Fourteenth Conference of the Public Economic Theory Association, Catolica-Lisbon, June 2013, "Discrimination in Contests".
  • Conference on Contests: Theory and Applications, Stockholm School of Economics, June 2008, "Prize Sharing in Collective Contests".
  • The Eighth International Meeting of the Society of Social Choice and Welfare, "Rent-Seeking in light of Behavioral Considerations." Istanbul, July 2006 WZB, Conference on “Advances in the Theory of Contests and Tournaments”, Berlin, October 2005, “Rent Seeking in light of Behavioral Considerations”.
  • Area Conference on Applied Micro-Economics, The Center of Economic Studies (CES), University of Munich, March 2005, “Entry and the Survival of the Un-fittest”.
  • Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Diego, California, March 2002, "Eliminating Majority Tyranny Through Expression of Preference Intensities."
  • Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Diego, California, March 2002, "Can Voting Rules Satisfy 'Preference-Based' Liberalism?."
  • European Public Choice Society, Paris, April 2001, "Strategic Restraint in Contests.
  • "European Public Choice Society, Siena, Italy, April 2000, "Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare".
  • Conference on Contest Theory, Tinbergen Institute, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, August 1997, "Uncertain Preassigned Transfers and Contestable Rents".
  • European Public Choice Society, Prague, Czech Republic, April 1997, "Social Compromise - The Metric Approach".
  • European Economic Association, Istanbul, Turkey, August 1996, "Centralized and Decentralized Determination of Investment Criteria in Economic Organizations".
  • European Public Choice Society, Tiberias, Israel, March 1996, "Uncertain Preassigned Transfers and Contestable Rents."
  • International Meeting of the Econometric Society, Tokyo, Japan, August 1995, "Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?"
  • European Public Choice Society, Valencia, Spain, April 1994, "Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarily Stable?".
  • European Public Choice Society, Portrush, Northern Ireland, April 1993, "A Folk Theorem in a Dynamic Game of Private Provision of Public Goods".
  • The Israeli Economic Association, Tel-Aviv, Israel, December 1991, "Economic Models of Rent Seeking."
  • European Economic Association, Cambridge, England, August 1991, "The Nature and Severity of Collective Action Problems - The Voluntary Provision of Mixed Public Goods Approach".
  • European Public Choice Society, Konstanz, Germany, April 1990, "Voluntary Provision of Mixed Public Goods."
  • Conference on Markets and Politicians, Bar-Ilan University, June 1989, "Rules, Technologies and Games of Voluntary Provision of Public Goods."
  • Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, San Francisco, April 1988, "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods".
  • American Economic Association, Chicago, December 1987, "More on Alternative Objectives of Labor-Managed Firms".
  • European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Budapest, September 1986, "The Libertarian Resolution of the Paretian Liberal Paradox"
  • International Conference on Economics and Psychology, Shefaim, July 1986, "The Essential Ordering of Decision rules in Small Panels of Experts".
  • First Conference on Judgement and Decision Making, Jerusalem, May 1986, "The Essential Ordering of Decision rules in Small Panels of Experts".
Books

Books :

 

 

Shmuel Nitzan.

Collective Preference and Choice

Cambridge University Press, London and New York, 2010

כריכת הספר

Gil S. Epstein, Shmuel Nitzan.

Endogenous Public Policy and Contests

Book Review

Springer, 2007

כריכת הספר

Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush.

Collective decision making: An economic outlook

Cambridge University Press, London and New York, 1985

כריכת הספר

 

 

 

 

 

המושג העדפה חברתית מתאר טעמים או העדפות של חברה. המושג בחירה חברתית מתייחס להתנהגות החברה. דהיינו לבחירה של אחת מאפשרויות הפעולה העומדות בפניה. דיון בנושא ההעדפה והבחירה החברתית הוא רלוונטי ובעל חשיבות רבה לתחומים שונים במדעי החברה, ובפרט לכלכלה. לימוד הנושא מחייב היכרות עם כמה בעיות קשות ומעניינות. המטרה העיקרית של הספר הזה היא להבהיר את הבעיות המרכזיות הללו ואת חשיבותן.

שמואל ניצן

העדפה ובחירה חברתית

האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, 2008

כריכת הספר

הספר עוסק בתורת הצרכן הפועל בסביבה תחרותית.

מנחם יערי, שמואל ניצן, ז'ראר עמיאש

תורת המחירים א': תורת הצרכן א;

יח' 2-1

האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, 1996

כריכת הספר

הספר מציג בהרחבה את תורת הביקוש.

שמואל ניצן, ז'ראר עמיאש

תורת המחירים א': תורת הצרכן ב;

יח' 4-3

האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, 1996

כריכת הספר

הספר מוקדש ליישומים של תורת הצרכן: היצע עבודה, צריכה על-פני זמן, אי-ודאות, מדדי רמת מחיה ומדדי יוקר מחיה, מדדים של שינויי רווחה ומושג הגמישות.

שמואל ניצן,  ז'ראר עמיאש

תורת המחירים א': יישומים של תורת הצרכן;

יח' 5

האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, 1997

כריכת הספר

הספר עוסק בתורת היצרן הפועל בסביבה תחרותית.

שמואל ניצן

תורת המחירים ב' : תורת היצרן;

יח' 9-6

האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, 1997

כריכת הספר

הספר עוסק בסביבות לא תחרותיות: מונופול, דואופול  וסוגים שונים של קרטל.

שמואל ניצן, שי בז'ה, דוד דילינברגר

תורת המחירים ג': המונופול; תחרות אסטרטגית בין מעטים;

יח' 11-10

האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, 2004

כריכת הספר

הספר עוסק בשיווי משקל תחרותי בהקשר של כלכלת חליפין ובתורת הרווחה.

שמואל ניצן, ז'ראר עמיאש, ענת אלכסנדרון

תורת המחירים ג': כלכלת חליפין;

יח' 12

האוניברסיטה הפתוחה, 2004

כריכת הספר
Publications

Selected Publications

Publications

Papers By Topic

 

Selected Publications

Books

  • Collective Preference and Choice, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
  • Endogenous Public Policy and Contests, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2007, (with G. Epstein).
  • Social Preference and Choice, The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel, 2008 (Hebrew).
  • Price Theory, The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel, 13 Units, 1996-2004 (with M. Yaari, G. Amiash, A. Alexandron, D Dilinberger and S. Beja), (Hebrew).
  • Collective Decision Making: An Economic Outlook, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1985 (with J. Paroush).

Articles

 

 

Publications

Books

 

  • Collective Preference and Choice, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
  • Endogenous Public Policy and Contests, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2007, (with G. Epstein).
  • Social Preference and Choice, The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel, 2008.
  • Collective Decision Making: An Economic Outlook, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1985 (with J. Paroush).
  • Price Theory, Unit 10: “Monopoly”, The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel, 2004 (with D. Dillenberger).
  • Price Theory, Unit 11: “Strategic Competition Among the Few - Duopoly”, The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel, 2004 (with S. Beja).
  • Price Theory, Unit 12: "Exchange Economics", The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel, 2004 (with G. Amiash and A. Alexandron).
  • Price Theory, Units 6-9: "Theory of the Producer", The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel, 1997.
  • Price Theory, Units 1-2: "Theory of the Consumer", Part A, The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel, 1996 (with G. Amiash and M. Yaari).
  • Price Theory, Units 3-4: "Theory of the Consumer", Part B, Unit 5: "Theory of the Consumer: Applications" and Unit 13: . Interaction Among Consumers and Producers. , The Open University, Tel Aviv, Israel, 1996 (with G. Amiash).

Articles

  • “Balancing democracy: majoritarianism vs. preference intensity”, 2024, Public Choice, forthcoming (with A Nitzan)
  • “Multiple Designer's Objectives in Business Contests”, 2023, Economics and Politics, forthcoming (with C. Cohen and R. Darioshi).
  • “Equivalent Modes of Reimbursement in Augmented Contests”, Games, 2023, 14, x. https://doi.org/10.3390 (with C. Cohen and R. Darioshi).
  • “Sovereign debt assistance and democratic decision making", Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2023, 25 (5), 930-943  (with R. Ben Yashar and M. Krausz-Cohen).
  • “One Person One Weight: When is Weighted Voting Democratic?” Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, 59, 467–493 (with R. Baharad and Segal-Halevi, E.).
  • “Litigation with Adversarial Efforts”, International Review of Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 69(C) (with R. Baharad and C. Cohen).
  • “Optimal Favoritism and Maximal Revenue: A Generalized Result”, European Journal of Political Economy, 2022, Vol. 73 (with C. Cohen and R. Darioshi).
  • “Inequality of Decision Makers’ Power and Marginal Contribution”, Theory and Decision, 2022, 92 (2), 275-292 (with T. Tajika). 
  • “Advantageous Defensive Efforts in Contests”, 2021, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 0 No. 0 p.A185. (with C. Cohen).
  • “Skill, Power and Marginal Contributions in Committees”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2021, 7, 225-235 (with R. Ben Yashar and T. Tajika).
  • “Envy Free Division of Land”, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020, 45(3), 896_922 (with E. Segal-Halevi, Y. Aumann and A. Hassidim).
  • “Variable Competence and Collective Performance: Unanimity vs. Simple Majority Rule”, Group Decision and Negotiation, 2020, 29(1), 157-167 (with E. Baharad and R. Ben Yashar).
  • “Envy Free Division of Land”, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2019, forthcoming (with E. Segal-Halevi, Y. Aumann and A. Hassidim).
  • “Variable Competence and Collective Performance: Unanimity vs. Simple Majority Rule”, Group Decision and Negotiation, 2019, forthcoming (with E. Baharad and R. Ben Yashar)
  • "Fair Cake-Cutting among Families", Social Choice and Welfare, 2019,  53(4), 709-740 (with E. Segal-Halevi).
  • "Skill, Value and Remuneration in Committees”, Economics Letters, 2019, 174, 93-95.  (with R. Ben Yashar).
  • "The Effect of Democratic Decision Making on Investment in Reputation", Public Choice, 2018, 177(1), 155-164 (with R. Ben Yashar and M. Krausz-Cohen).
  • "Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: Analysis and algorithms", Social Choice and Welfare, 2018,50 (3), 457–479 (with M. Nitzan and E. Segal-Halevi).
  • "Selective Incentives and Intragroup Heterogeneity in Collective Contests",Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018, 20 (4), 477-498  (with K. Ueda).
  • "Loan Guarantees and the Design of the Credit Decision-Making Structure", Canadian Journal of Economics, 2018, 51(2), 607-625 (with R. Ben Yashar and M. Krausz-Cohen).
  • "Fair and Square - Cake Cutting in Two Dimensions", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, 70, 1-28 (with E. Segal-Halevi, Y. Aumann and A. Hassidim)
  • "Are Two Better than One?", Public Choice, 2017, 171 (3), 323-329 (with R. Ben-Yashar) 
  • "Is Diversity in Capabilities Desirable When Adding Decision Makers?", Theory and Decision, 2017, 82 (3), 395–402 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "Discrimination in Contests", Review of Economic Design, 2016, 20(2), 145-172 (with Y. Mealem).
  • "Is majority consistency possible? "  Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 46(2), 287-299 (with E. Baharad).
  • "Level r  Consensus and Stable Social Choice", Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, 45(4), 805-817 (with M. Mahajne and O. Volij).
  • "Rising and Changing Professional Knowledge as a Barrier to Entry", Journal of Theoretical Accounting Research, 2014, forthcoming (with U. Procaccia and Y. Tzur).
  • “Intra-group Heterogeneity and Collective Action in Group Contests”, Social Choice and Welfare” 2014, 43, 219-238 (with K. Ueda).
  • “Equity and Effectiveness of Optimal Taxation in Contests under an All-Pay Auction”, Social Choice and Welfare” 2014, 42(2), 347-365 (with Y. Mealem).
  • "On the Significance of the Prior of a Correct Decision in Committees”, Theory and Decision, 2014, 76(3), 317-327 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • “Lotteries vs. All-Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests”, Economics and Politics, 2013, 25, 48-60 (with G. Epstein and Y. Mealem).
  • "The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation", Economics of Governance, 2013, 14 (1), 77-105 (with G. Epstein and Y. Mealem).
  • "Is Specialization Desirable in Committee Decision Making?", Theory and Decision, 2012, 341-357 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Using Voting Records", Theory and Decision, 2012, 72(1), 113-130 (with E. Baharad, M. Koppel and J. Goldberger)
  • "Prize Sharing in Collective Contests", European Economic Review, 2011, 55,678-687 (with K. Ueda)
  • "Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests", Journal of Public Economics, 2011, 95(1-2), 88-93 (with G. Epstein and Y. Mealem).
  • "Monopoly vs. Competition in Light of Extraction Norm", Public Choice, 2011, 148 (3), 561-567 (with A. Koziashvili and Y. Tobol)
  • "Distilling the Wisdom of Crowds: Weighted Aggregation of Decisions on Multiple Issues", JAAMS, 2011, 22 (1), 31-42 (with E. Baharad, M. Koppel and J. Goldberger).
  • "Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach", Theory and Decision, 2011, 71, 151-162 (with E. Baharad).
  • "The Effect of Limited Search Ability on the Quality of Competitive Rent-Seeking Clubs", Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 35(1), 81-106 (with K. Kriesler).
  • "Demystifying the 'Metric Approach to Social Compromise with the Unanimity Criterion' ", Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 35(1), 25-28.
  • "Collective Contests for Commons and Club Goods", Journal of Public Economics, 2009, 93, 48-55 (with K. Ueda).
  • "The Efficient and Fair Approval of “Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit” Projects under Unilateral Information", Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, 11, 6, 947–960. (with N. Kahana and Y. Mealem).
  • "Framing-Based Choice: A Model of Decision-Making Under Risk", Korean Economic Review, 2009, 25(1), 65-89 (with K. Kriesler).
  • "Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioral Considerations", Economic Journal, 2008, 118, 2047-2059 (with E. Baharad).
  • "A Complete Implementation of the Efficient Allocation of Pollution", Economics Letters, 2008, 101(2), 142-144 (with N. Kahana and Y. Mealem).
  • "Efforts in Two-Sided Contests", Public Choice, 2008, 136, 3-4, 283-291 (with G. Epstein and M. Schwarz).
  • "Is Context-Based Choice Due to Context-Dependent Preferences?", Theory and Decision, 2008, 64, 65-80 (with K. Kriesler).
  • "Performance and Prize Decomposition in Contests", Public Choice, 2008, 134, 3-4, 429-443 (with G. Epstein and M. Schwarz).
  • "The Cost of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule", Economic Theory, 2007, 31(1), 69-84 (with E. Baharad).
  • "Scoring Rules: An Alternative Parameterization", Economic Theory, 2007, 30(1), 187-190 (with E. Baharad).
  • "Contest Performance and Ambiguous Political Power", Public Choice, 2007, 132, 113-123 (with G. Epstein, I. Miltchaich and M. Schwarz).
  • “On the Selection of the same Winner by all Scoring Rules”, Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 26(3), 597-601 (with E. Baharad).
  • “Effort and Performance in Public Policy Contests”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006, 8(2), 265-282 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Lobbying and Compromise", Public Choice, 2006, 126(3-4), 317-330 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Reduced Prizes and Increased Effort in Contests", Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 26(3), 447-453, (with G. Epstein).
  • "The Struggle over Migration Policy", Journal of Population Economics, 2006, 19(4), 703-723, (with G. Epstein).
  • "The Politics of Randomness", Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 27 (2), 423-433, (with G. Epstein).
  • "Increasing Sales by Introducing Non-Salable Items", Managerial and Decision Economics, 2006, 27, 631-641 (with K. Kriesler).
  • "Comparison of Optimal Cutoff Points for Single and Multiple Tests in Personnel Selection" Psycothema, 2006, 18, 651-659 (with Ben-Yashar, R. and Vos, H.J.)
  • “Approval Voting Reconsidered”, Economic Theory, 2005, 26(3), 619-628 (with E. Baharad).
  • "The Inverse Plurality Rule- Axiomatization", Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25(1), 173-178 (with E. Baharad).
  • "Size and Distribution of Prizes and Efforts in Contests", Economics Bulletin, 2005, Volume 8 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Strategic Restraint in Contests", European Economic Review, 2004, 48(1), 201-210 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Contestable Privatization”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2004, 54(3), 377-387 (with B. Gal and G. Epstein).
  • "The Borda Rule, Condorcet Consistency and Condorcet Stability," Economic Theory, 2003, 22(3), 685-688 (with E. Baharad).
  • "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination", Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, 21,(1), 1-19 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Essential Alternatives and Set-Dependent Preferences: An Axiomatic Approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, 2003, 45 (2), 121-129 (with E. Baharad).
  • "Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness Through Expression of Preference Intensity," American Political Science Review, 2002,96(4),745-754(with E. Baharad).
  • "Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare, " Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002, 4(4), 61-77 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Asymmetry and Corrective Public Policy in Contests," Public Choice, 2002, 113(1-2), 231-240 (with G. Epstein).
  • "The Social Cost of Rent Seeking When Consumer Opposition Influences Monopoly Behavior”, European Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 19(1), 61-60 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Pre-assigned Rents and Bureaucratic Friction," Economics of Governance, 2002, 3(3), 241-248 (with N. Kahana).
  • "Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, 112(1), 2002, 137-142 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Privatization as Rent Seeking with Asymmetric Compensation," Economics Quarterly, 2, 2002, 355-372 (with B. Drook-Gal and G. Epstein).
  • "Are Referees Sufficiently Informed About the Editor's Practice?," Theory and Decision, 51(1), 2001, 1-11 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "Investment Criteria in Single- and Multi-Member Economic Organizations," Public Choice, 2001, 109, 2001, 1-13 ( with R. Ben-Yashar ).
  • "The Invalidity of Condorcet Jury Theorem Under Endogenous Decisional Skills," Economics of Governance, 2, 2001, 243-249 ( with R. Ben-Yashar ).
  • "The Robustness of Optimal Organizational Architectures: A Note on Hierarchies and Polyarchies", Social Choice and Welfare, 18(1), 2001, 155-163 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "Extended Preferences and Freedom of Choice," Social Choice and Welfare, 17(4), 2000, 629-637 (with E. Baharad).
  • "Uncertain Preassigned Non-Contestable and Contestable Rents," European Economic Review, 43, 1999, 1705-1721 (with N. Kahana).
  • "Quality and Structure of Organizational Decision Making," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 36, 1998, 521-534 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "The Evolutionary Stability of Moral Objections to Free Riding," Economics and Politics, 9, 1997, 133-149 (with W. G" ?th).
  • "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed Size Committees In Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, 38(1), 1997, 175-187 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "Admittance Criteria in Centralized and Decentralized Classification Systems," Economics Quarterly, 44, 1997, 337-350 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "On Two Properties of the Marginal Contribution of Individual Decisional Skills," Mathematical Social Sciences, 34, 1997, 29-36 (with D. Karotkin).
  • "A Note on Restricted Majority Rules: Invariance to Rule Selection and Outcome Distinctiveness," Social Choice and Welfare, 13, 1996, 269-274 (with D. Karotkin).
  • "The Effect of Expansions and Substitutions on Group Decision Making," Mathematical Social Sciences, 30, 1995, 263-271, (with D. Karotkin).
  • "Two Remarks on the Effect of Increased Equalitarianism in Decisional Skills on the Number of Individuals that Maximizes Group Judgemental Competence," Public Choice, 85, 1995, 307-311 (with D. Karotkin).
  • "Uncertainty, Information and the Private Provision of Public Goods," European Journal of Political Economy, 10, 1994, 449-464 (with M. Gradstein and S. Slutsky).
  • "Neutrality and the Private Provision of Public Goods with Incomplete Information," Economics Letters, 46, 1994, 69-75 (with M. Gradstein and S. Slutsky).
  • "More on More Efficient Rent Seeking and Strategic Behavior in Contests," Public Choice, 79, 1994, 355-356.
  • "Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests," European Journal of Political Economy, 10(1), 1994, 41-60.
  • "A Folk Theorem for Dynamic Games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 23, 1994, 167-178 (with V. Gaitsgory).
  • "Transfers or Public Good Provision? A Political Allocation Perspective," Economics Letters, 45, 1994, 451-457.
  • "The Likelihood of Inefficiency, a Prisoners' Dilemma and Suboptimality in Games of Binary Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Social Choice and Welfare, 11, 1994, 157-164.
  • "The Private Provision of Public Goods Under Price Uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, 10(4), 1993, 371-382 (with M. Gradstein and S. Slutsky).
  • "The Theory of the Labour-Managed Firm Revisited: The Voluntary Interactive Approach," Economic Journal, 103, 1993, 937-945 (with N. Kahana).
  • "The Effect of Uncertainty on Interactive Behavior," Economic Journal, 102, 1992, 554-561 (with M. Gradstein and S. Slutsky).
  • "Rent Seeking and Social Investment in Taste Change," Economics and Politics, 4, 1992, 31-42 (with J. Guttman and U. Spiegel).
  • "CollectiRent Dissipation," Economic Journal, 101, 1991, 1522-1534.
  • "Rent Seeking with Non-Identical Sharing Rules," Public Choice, 71(1-2), 1991, 43-50.
  • "The Game of Political Entry with Truly Effective Identical Playe," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3(2), 1991, 163-174.
  • "Costly Diagnosis and Price Dispersion," Economics Letters, 36, 1991, 245-251 (with J. Tzur).
  • "Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," European Economic Review, 35(5), 1991, 1057-1067 (with C. Fershtman).
  • "Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good With Uncertain Cost," Journal of Public Economics, 42 (3), 1990, 357-370 (with R. Romano).
  • "Collective Decision Making and the Limits on the Organization's Size," Public Choice, 66, 1990, 279-291 (with M. Gradstein and J. Paroush).
  • "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods," Social Choice and Welfare, 7, 1990, 171-192 (with M. Gradstein).
  • "Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, 65, 1990, 49-60 (with E. Katz and J. Rosenberg).
  • "Restricted Competition as a Reward for Public Service: The Case of Auditors," European Journal of Political Economy, 5, 1989, 519-532 (with J. Tzur).
  • "More on Alternative Objectives of Labor-Managed Firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, 13(4), 1989, 527-538 (with N. Kahana).
  • "Advantageous Multiple Rent Seeking," Mathematical Modeling, 12(4,5), 1989, 511-18 (with M. Gradstein).
  • "Price and Quality of Professional Services and Codes of Ethics," European Journal of Political Economy, 5(1), 1989, 31-48 (with J. Tzur).
  • "More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(1), 1989, 187-90.
  • "Why are Auditors and Land Appraisers Protected?" Economics Quarterly, 140, 1988, 59-63 (with J. Tzur), (Hebrew).
  • "Participation, Decision Aggregation and Internal Information Gathering in Organizational Decision Making," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10(4), 1988, 415-431 (with M. Gradstein).
  • "Production Theory with Profit-Constrained Revenue-Maximization: The Duality Approach, "Managerial and Decision Economics, 9, 1988, 269-273 (with N. Kahana).
  • "The Essential Ordering of Decision Rules in Small Panels of Experts," Theory and Decision, 24, 1988, 253-268, (with D. Karotkin and J. Paroush).
  • "The Libertarian Resolution of the Paretian Liberal Paradox," Journal of Economics, 47, 1987, 337-352 (with A. Harel).
  • "Egalitarianism and Equilibrium Output in Producer Cooperatives," Economics Letters, 24(2), 1987, 133-137 (with A. Schnytzer).
  • "Organizational Decision Making Quality and the Severity of the Free Riding Problem", Economics Letters, 23, 1987, 335-339 (with M. Gradstein).
  • "Diligence and Laziness in the Chinese Countryside Revisited," Journal of Development Economics, 26(2), 1987, 407-418 (with A. Schnytzer).
  • "Optimal Voting Procedures for Profit Maximizing Firms," Public Choice, 51, 1986, 191-208 (with U. Procaccia).
  • "Performance Evaluation of Some Special Classes of Weighted Majority Rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, 12, 1986, 31-46 (with M. Gradstein).
  • "Social Compromise and Social Metrics," Social Choice and Welfare, 3, 1986, 1-16 (with Don Campbell).
  • "Some General Results on the Metric Rationalization for Social Decision Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, 37(1), 1985, 191-201 (with E. Lehrer).
  • "Concepts of Extended Preference," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 6, 1985, 161-176 (with H. Hochman).
  • "The Vulnerability of Point Voting Schemes to Preference Variation and Strategic Manipulation, "Public Choice, 47(2), 1985, 349-70.
  • "The Sensitivity of Political Outcomes to Electoral Decision Rules," Political Methodology, 10(3), 1984, 337-356 (with S. Lampert and J. Paroush).
  • "Partial Information on Decisional Skills and the Desirability of the Expert Rule in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," Theory and Decision, 17(3), 1984, 275-86 (with J. Paroush).
  • "A General Theorem and Eight Corollaries in Search of a Correct Decision," Theory and Decision, 17(3), 1984, 211-220, (with J. Paroush).
  • "Potential Variability of Decisional Skills in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations, "Mathematical Social Sciences, 8(1), 1984, 217-27 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Median Based Extensions of an Ordering over a Set to the Power Set: An Axiomatic Characterization", Journal of Economic Theory, 34(2), December 1984, 252-61 (with P. Pattanaik).
  • "The Significance of Independent Decisions in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations, "Theory and Decision, 17(1), 1984, 47-60 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Are Qualified Majority Rules Special?," Public Choice, 42, 1984, 257-72 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Tiebout and Sympathy," Mathematical Social Sciences, 6(2), 1983, 195-214 (with H. Hochman).
  • "Small Panels of Experts in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," Decision Sciences, 14(3), July 1983, 314-25 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Optimal Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment and the Establishment of Rival Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, 1(4), October 1983, 345-65 (with A. Pakes).
  • "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, 23(2), June 1982, 289-97 (with J. Paroush).
  • "The Characterization of Decisive Weighted Majority Rules," Economics Letters, 7, 1981, 119-24 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Directional and Local Electoral Equilibria with Probabilistic Voting," Journal of Economic Theory, 24(2), April 1981, 226-39 (with P. Coughlin), also appears in Social Choice and Welfare, Chapter 16, edited by P. Pattanaik and M. Salles, North Holland, 1983.
  • "Some Measures of Closeness to Unanimity and Their Implications," Theory and Decision, 13, 1981, 129-38.
  • "Electoral Outcomes with Probabilistic Voting and Nash Social Welfare Maxima," Journal of Public Economics, 15, 1981, 113-21 (with P. Coughlin).
  • "A Further Characterization of Borda Ranking Method," Public Choice, 36, 1981, 153-8 (with Ariel Rubinstein).
  • "Investment in Human Capital and Social Self Protection Under Uncertainty," International Economic Review, 21(3), October 1980, 547-57 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Preference Expression and Misrepresentation in Point Voting Schemes," Public Choice, 35, 1980, 57-72 (with J. Paroush and S. Lampert).
  • "Social Choice, Social Ordering and the Allocation of Power - The Possibility of Manipulating from Above," State and Government, 15, 1980, 74-89 (with J. Paroush and S. Lampert). (Hebrew).
  • "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, 47, September 1979, 1305-06 (with D. Farkas).
  • "A Note on Reinsurance and the Technology of Risk," The Journal of Risk and Insurance, XLIV (3), September 1977, 403-409 (with U. Rosen).
  • "More on Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes," British Journal of Political Science, 7(3), July 1977, 419-22 (with A. Kats).
  • "Revenue Sharing in Multiperson Public Choice Models," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (91), May 1977, 315-26.
  • "Global and Local Majority Voting Equilibrium," Public Choice, XXVI, Summer 1976, 105-06 (with A. Kats).
  • "Linear and Lexicographic Orders, Majority Rule and Equilibrium," International Economic Review, 17(1), February 1976, 213-219.
  • "Social Preference Ordering in a Probabilistic Voting Model," Public Choice, XXIV, Winter 1975, 93-100.

Chapters in Books

  • "Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules", in Oxford Handbook of Public Choice. 2017, forthcoming, Oxford University Press, (with J. Paroush).
  • "Collective Decision Making and Jury Theorems", Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. 2017, Edited by Francesko Parisi, Oxford University Press (with J. Paroush)
  • “Extraction Norms and Market Size”, in Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, 2014, (Edited by Francesko Forte, Ram Mudambi and Pietro Maria Navarra), London: Edward Elgar (with Y. Tobol and A. Koziashvili).
  • “Contest Effort”, in Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking. Roger D. Congleton and  Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 2015, (with Yossi Mealem).
  • “Contestable Policies”, in A Companion to Rent Seeking Literature, (Edited by Roger Congleton and Arye L. Hillman), London: Edward Elgar 2015, (with Gil Epstein).
  • Editor of Contest Theory, Special Issue of the European Journal of Political Economy, 14(4), 1998.
  • "Optimal Decision making Under Dichotomous Choice: The Basic Result and Some Generalizations", Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, edited by B. Grofman and G. Owen. JAI Press Inc., Greenwich, CT, (with J. Paroush), 1986.

Reviews

  • Review of: Strategy and Dynamics in Contest. by Kai A. Konrad, Oxford University Press, Economica, 2011, 78 (312), 789-790.
  • Review of: Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes by Donald G. Saari, Cambridge University Press, Economica, 2011, 78(309) 191-2.
  • Review of: Voting under Uncertainty by H. Nurmi, Elgar, 2003, in Journal of Economics, 2003, 280-282.
  • Review of: Probabilistic Voting Theory by P. Coughlin, Cambridge University Press, 1992 in Social Choice and Welfare, 11, 1994, 95.
  • Review of: Libertarian Conflicts in Social Choice by L. Wriglesworth, Cambridge University Press, in Journal of Economics, 48, 1988, 22-23.

Papers By Topic

Social Choice

Axiomatization
  • "A Further Characterization of Borda Ranking Method," Public Choice, 36, 1981, 153-8 (with Ariel Rubinstein).
  • "Median Based Extensions of an Ordering over a Set to the Power Set: An Axiomatic Characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, 34(2), December 1984, 252-61 (with P. Pattanaik).
  • "The Characterization of Decisive Weighted Majority Rules," Economics Letters, 7, 1981, 119-24 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Scoring Rules: An Alternative Parameterization", Economic Theory, 2007, 30(1), 187-190 (with E. Baharad).
  • “Balancing democracy: majoritarianism vs. preference intensity”, 2024, Public Choice, forthcoming (with A Nitzan).
The Social Compromise Metric Approach
  • "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, 47, September 1979, 1305-06 (with D. Farkas).
  • "Some Measures of Closeness to Unanimity and Their Implications," Theory and Decision, 13, 1981, 129-38.
  • "Some General Results on the Metric Rationalization for Social Decision Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, 37(1), 1985, 191-201 (with E. Lehrer).
  • "Social Compromise and Social Metrics," Social Choice and Welfare, 3, 1986, 1-16 (with Don Campbell).
  • "More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(1), 1989, 187-90.
  • "Demystifying the 'Metric Approach to Social Compromise with the Unanimity Criterion' ", Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 35(1), 25-28.
The Paretian Liberal Paradox
  • "The Libertarian Resolution of the Paretian Liberal Paradox," Journal of Economics, 47, 1987, 337-352 (with A. Harel).
  • Review of: Libertarian Conflicts in Social Choice by L. Wriglesworth, Cambridge University Press, in Journal of Economics, 48, 1988, 22-23.
Equilibrium
Extended Preferen\ces
  • "Median Based Extensions of an Ordering over a Set to the Power Set: An Axiomatic Characterization", Journal of Economic Theory, 34(2), December 1984, 252-61 (with P. Pattanaik).
  • "Extended Preferences and Freedom of Choice," Social Choice and Welfare, 17(4), 2000, 629-637 (with E. Baharad).
  • "Essential Alternatives and Set-Dependent Preferences – An Axiomatic Approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, 2003, 45(2), 121-129 (with E. Baharad).
Manipulability
  • "Social Choice, Social Ordering and the Allocation of Power - The Possibility of Manipulating from Above," State and Government, 15, 1980, 74-89 (with J. Paroush and S. Lampert). (Hebrew).
  • "Preference Expression and Misrepresentation in Point Voting Schemes," Public Choice, 35, 1980, 57-72 (with J. Paroush and S. Lampert).
  • "The Sensitivity of Political Outcomes to Electoral Decision Rules," Political Methodology, 10(3), 1984, 337-356 (with S. Lampert and J. Paroush).
  • "The Vulnerability of Point Voting Schemes to Preference Variation and Strategic Manipulation," Public Choice, 47(2), 1985, 349-70.

Uncertain Dichotomous Collective Choice

Theory
  • "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, 23(2), June 1982, 289-97* (with J. Paroush).
  • "Small Panels of Experts in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," Decision Sciences, 14(3), July 1983, 314-25 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Are Qualified Majority Rules Special?," Public Choice, 42, 1984, 257-72 (with J. Paroush).
  • "The Significance of Independent Decisions in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations", Theory and Decision, 17(1), 1984, 47-60 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Potential Variability of Decisional Skills in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations", Mathematical Social Sciences, 8(1), 1984, 217-27 (with J. Paroush).
  • "A General Theorem and Eight Corollaries in Search of a Correct Decision", Theory and Decision, 17(3), 1984, 211-220, (with J. Paroush).
  • "Partial Information on Decisional Skills and the Desirability of the Expert Rule in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," Theory and Decision, 17(3), 1984, 275-86 (with J. Paroush).
  • "Performance Evaluation of Some Special Classes of Weighted Majority Rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, 12, 1986, 31-46 (with M. Gradstein).
  • "Optimal Decision making Under Dichotomous Choice: The Basic Result and Some Generalizations," Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, edited by B. Grofman and G. Owen. JAI Press Inc., Greenwich, CT, (with J. Paroush), 1986.
  • "The Essential Ordering of Decision Rules in Small Panels of Experts," Theory and Decision, 24, 1988, 253-268, (with D. Karotkin and J. Paroush).
  • "Participation, Decision Aggregation and Internal Information Gathering in Organizational Decision Making," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10(4), 1988, 415-431 (with M. Gradstein).
  • "Collective Decision Making and the Limits on the Organization's Size," Public Choice, 66, 1990, 279-291 (with M. Gradstein and J. Paroush).
  • "Two Remarks on the Effect of Increased Equalitarianism in Decisional Skills on the Number of Individuals that Maximizes Group Judgmental Competence," Public Choice, 85, 1995, 307-311 (with D. Karotkin).
  • "The Effect of Expansions and Substitutions on Group Decision Making," Mathematical Social Sciences, 30, 1995, 263-271, (with D. Karotkin).
  • "A Note on Restricted Majority Rules: Invariance to Rule Selection and Outcome Distinctiveness," Social Choice and Welfare, 13, 1996, 269-274 (with D. Karotkin).
  • "On Two Properties of the Marginal Contribution of Individual Decisional Skills," Mathematical Social Sciences, 34, 1997, 29-36 (with D. Karotkin).
  • "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed Size Committees In Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, 38(1), 1997, 175-187 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • “Quality and Structure of Organizational Decision Making,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 36, 1998, 521-534 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • “The Invalidity of Condorcet Jury Theorem Under Endogenous Decisional Skills,” Economics of Governance, 2, 2001, 243-249 ( with R. Ben-Yashar ).
  • "The Robustness of Optimal Organizational Architectures: A Note on Hierarchies and Polyarchies," Social Choice and Welfare, 18(1), 2001, 155-163 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "Distilling the Wisdom of Crowds: Weighted Aggregation of Decisions on Multiple Issues", JAAMS, 2011, 22 (1), 31-42 (with E. Baharad, M. Koppel and J. Goldberger).
  • "Is Specialization Desirable in Committee Decision Making?", Theory and Decision, 2012, 341-357 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Using Voting Records", Theory and Decision, 2012, 72(1), 113-130 (with E. Baharad, M. Koppel and J. Goldberger).
  • "On the Significance of the Prior of a Correct Decision in Committees”, Theory and Decision, 2014,76(3), 317-327 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "Collective Decision Making and Jury Theorems", Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. 2017, Oxford University Press (with J. Paroush)
  • "Is Diversity in Capabilities Desirable When Adding Decision Makers?", Theory and Decision, 2017, 82 (3), 395–402 (with R. Ben-Yashar).
  • "Are Two Better than One?", Public Choice, 2017, 171 (3), 323-329 (with R. Ben-Yashar)
  • "Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules", in Oxford Handbook of Public Choice. 2017, forthcoming, Oxford University Press, (with J. Paroush).
  • "Skill, Value and Remuneration in Committees”, Economics Letters, 2019, 174, 93-95.  (with R. Ben Yashar).
  • "Variable Competence and Collective Performance: Unanimity vs. Simple Majority Rule”, Group Decision and Negotiation, 2020, 29(1), 157-167 (with E. Baharad and R. Ben Yashar).  
  • “Skill, Power and Marginal Contributions in Committees”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2021, 7, 225-235 (with R. Ben Yashar and T. Tajika).
  • “Inequality of Decision Makers’ Power and Marginal Contribution”, Theory and Decision, 2022, 92 (2), 275-292 (with T. Tajika).   
  • “Equivalent Modes of Reimbursement in Augmented Contests”, Games, 2023, 14, x. https://doi.org/10.3390 (with C. Cohen and R. Darioshi).
  •  Sovereign debt assistance and democratic decision making;, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2023, 25 (5), 930-943 2023, forthcoming (with R. Ben Yashar and M. Krausz-Cohen
Applications

Political Economy

Probabilistic Voting　
  • "Social Preference Ordering in a Probabilistic Voting Model," Public Choice, XXIV, Winter 1975, 93-100.
  • "Electoral Outcomes with Probabilistic Voting and Nash Social Welfare Maxima," Journal of Public Economics, 15, 1981, 113-21 (with P. Coughlin), also appears in The Economics of Politics, edited by Dennis Mueller, The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics-Series Editor: Mark Blaug, Edward Elgar, 2001.
  • "Directional and Local Electoral Equilibria with Probabilistic Voting," Journal of Economic Theory, 24(2), April 1981, 226-39 (with P. Coughlin), also appears in Social Choice and Welfare, Chapter 16, edited by P. Pattanaik and M. Salles, North Holland, 1983.
  • Review of: Probabilistic Voting Theory by P. Coughlin, Cambridge University Press, 1992 in Social Choice and Welfare, 11, 1994, 95.
Endogenous Public Policy
  • “Privatization as Rent Seeking with Asymmetric Compensation,” Economics Quarterly, 2002, 49, 355-372 (with Druk-Gal, B. and G. Epstein).
  • “Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests,” Public Choice, 2002, 112(1), 137-142 (with G. Epstein).
  • “Asymmetry and Corrective Public Policy in Contests,” Public Choice, 2002, 113(1-2), 231-240 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002, 4(4), 661-677 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination," Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, 21(1), 1-19 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Contestable Privatization", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2004, 54(3), 377-387 (with Druk-Gal, B. and G. Epstein).
  • "Strategic Restraint in Contests", European Economic Review, 2004, 48(1), 201-210 (with G. Epstein). Reprinted in: The Theory of Rent Seeking: Forty Years of Research. Congleton, Hillman and Konrad, editors, Springer, Heidelberg and Berlin, 2007.
  • "Size and Distribution of Prizes and Efforts in Contests", Economics Bulletin, 2005, Volume 8 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Lobbying and Compromise", Public Choice, 2006, 126(3-4), 317-330 (with G. Epstein).
  • "The Politics of Randomness", Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 27 (2), 423-433, (with G. Epstein).
  • "The Struggle over Migration Policy", Journal of Population Economics, 2006, 19(4), 703-723 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Reduced Prizes and Increased Effort in Contests", Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 26(3), 447-453, (with G. Epstein).
  • “Effort and Performance in Public Policy Contests”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006, 8(2), 265-282 (with G. Epstein).
  • "Performance and Prize Decomposition in Contests", Public Choice, 2008, 134, 3-4, 429-443 (with G. Epstein and M. Schwarz).
  • "Monopoly vs. Competition in Light of Extraction Norm", Public Choice, 2011, 148 (3), 561-567 (with A. Koziashvili and Y. Tobol).
  • "The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation", Economics of Governance, 2013, 14 (1), 77-105 (with G. Epstein and Y. Mealem).
  • “Extraction Norms and Market Size”, in Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, 2014, (Edited by Francesko Forte, Ram Mudambi and Pietro Maria Navarra), London: Edward Elgar (with Y. Tobol and A. Koziashvili).
  • “Contestable Policies”, in A Companion to Rent Seeking Literature, (Edited by Roger Congleton and Arye L. Hillman), London: Edward Elgar 2015 (with Gil Epstein).
Other topics
  • "Revenue Sharing in Multiperson Public Choice Models," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (91), May 1977, 315-26.
  • "More on Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes," British Journal of Political Science, 7(3), July 1977, 419-22 (with A. Kats).
  • "The Game of Political Entry with Truly Effective Identical Players," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3(2), 1991, 163-174.
  • "Rising and Changing Professional Knowledge as a Barrier to Entry", Journal of Theoretical Accounting Research, 2014, forthcoming (with U. Procaccia and Y. Tzur).

Contest Theory　

Individual Contests　
Group Contests　
Applications　
  • "Rent Seeking and Social Investment in Taste Change," Economics and Politics, 4, 1992, 31-42 (with J. Guttman and U. Spiegel).
  • "Transfers or Public Good Provision? A Political Allocation Perspective," Economics Letters, 45, 1994, 451-457.
  • “The Social Cost of Rent Seeking When Consumer Opposition Influences Monopoly Behavior, ”European Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 19(1), 61-69, (with G. Epstein).
  • “Pre-Assigned Rents and Bureaucratic Friction,” Economics of Governance, 2002, 3(3), 241-248 (with N. Kahana).　
  • “Litigation with Adversarial Efforts”, International Review of Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 69(C) (with R. Baharad and C. Cohen) Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2023, 25 (5), 930-943 

Voting Theory

Public Economics　

Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
  • "Organizational Decision Making Quality and the Severity of the Free Riding Problem, "Economics Letters, 23, 1987, 335-339 (with M. Gradstein).
  • "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods," Social Choice and Welfare, 7, 1990, 171-192 (with M. Gradstein).
  • "Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good With Uncertain Cost," Journal of Public Economics, 42 (3), 1990, 357-370 (with R. Romano).
  • "Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," European Economic Review, 35(5), 1991, 1057-1067 (with C. Fershtman).
  • "The Effect of Uncertainty on Interactive Behavior," Economic Journal, 102, 1992, 554-561 (with M. Gradstein and S. Slutsky).
  • "The Private Provision of Public Goods Under Price Uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, 10(4), 1993, 371-382 (with M. Gradstein and S. Slutsky).
  • "The Likelihood of Inefficiency, a Prisoners' Dilemma and Suboptimality in Games of Binary Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Social Choice and Welfare, 11, 1994, 157-164.
  • "A Folk Theorem for Dynamic Games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 23, 1994, 167-178 (with V. Gaitsgory).
  • "Neutrality and the Private Provision of Public Goods with Incomplete Information," Economics Letters, 46, 1994, 69-75 (with M. Gradstein and S. Slutsky).
  • "Uncertainty, Information and the Private Provision of Public Goods," European Journal of Political Economy, 10, 1994, 449-464 (with M. Gradstein and S. Slutsky).
  • "The Evolutionary Stability of Moral Objections to Free Riding,” Economics and Politics, 9, 1997, 133-149 (with W. Güth).
Concepts
  • "Tiebout and Sympathy," Mathematical Social Sciences, 6(2), 1983, 195-214 (with H. Hochman).
  • "Concepts of Extended Preference," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 6, 1985, 161-176 (with H. Hochman).
Implementation

Bounded Rationality

Fairness

Miscellaneous – Applied Microeconomics　

  • "A Note on Reinsurance and the Technology of Risk," The Journal of Risk and Insurance, XLIV (3), September 1977, 403-409 (with U. Rosen).
  • "Optimal Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment and the Establishment of Rival Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, 1(4), October 1983, 345-65 (with A. Pakes).
  • "Diligence and Laziness in the Chinese Countryside Revisited," Journal of Development Economics, 26(2), 1987, 407-418 (with A. Schnytzer).
  • "Egalitarianism and Equilibrium Output in Producer Cooperatives," Economics Letters, 24(2), 1987, 133-137 (with A. Schnytzer).
  • "Production Theory with Profit-Constrained Revenue-Maximization: The Duality Approach," Managerial and Decision Economics, 9, 1988, 269-273 (with N. Kahana).
  • "Why are Auditors and Land Appraisers Protected?" Economics Quarterly, 140, 1988, 59-63 (with J. Tzur), (Hebrew).
  • "Price and Quality of Professional Services and Codes of Ethics," European Journal of Political Economy, 5(1), 1989, 31-48 (with J. Tzur).
  • "More on Alternative Objectives of Labor-Managed Firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, 13(4), 1989, 527-538 (with N. Kahana).
  • "Restricted Competition as a Reward for Public Service: The Case of Auditors," European Journal of Political Economy, 5, 1989, 519-532 (with J. Tzur).
  • "Costly Diagnosis and Price Dispersion," Economics Letters, 36, 1991, 245-251 (with J. Tzur).
  • "The Theory of the Labour-Managed Firm Revisited: The Voluntary Interactive Approach," Economic Journal, 103, 1993, 937-945 (with N. Kahana).
Research

Public Economics, Group Decision Making, Economics and Politics, Social and Individual Choice

Research Interests

  • Political Economiy (Endogenous public policy, Contest theory)
  • Voting Theory
  • Collective Decision Making
  • Social Choice
  • Foundations of Individual Choice (Bounded rationality)
  • Public Economics

Research in Progress

Political Economy  

  • The advantage of dual discrimination in lottery contest games
  • Think twice before attacking: Effort, restraint and sanctions in war conflicts The optimal mode of funding in contestsInevitable contests in lawsuits
  • Inevitable contests in lawsuits
  • Strategic contest design with multiple objectives
  • The optimal mode of funding in contests

Social Choice

  • The advantage of approval voting in balancing democracy
  • Robust voting under uncertainty
  • Progressive scoring rules

 

 

Courses

Last Updated Date : 26/03/2024