Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems
Speaker
Eilon Solan
Date
27/11/2018 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2018-11-27 11:30:00
2018-11-27 13:00:00
Quitting Games and Linear Complementarity Problems
We prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot $\ep$-equilibrium for every $\ep > 0$,
that is, an $\ep$-equilibrium in an extended game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We also prove that if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoffs in the game is not a $Q$-matrix in the sense of linear complementarity problems, then the game admits a uniform $\ep$-equilibrium for every $\ep > 0$.
Joint work with Omri N. Solan.
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
We prove that every multiplayer quitting game admits a sunspot $\ep$-equilibrium for every $\ep > 0$,
that is, an $\ep$-equilibrium in an extended game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We also prove that if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoffs in the game is not a $Q$-matrix in the sense of linear complementarity problems, then the game admits a uniform $\ep$-equilibrium for every $\ep > 0$.
that is, an $\ep$-equilibrium in an extended game in which the players observe a public signal at every stage. We also prove that if a certain matrix that is derived from the payoffs in the game is not a $Q$-matrix in the sense of linear complementarity problems, then the game admits a uniform $\ep$-equilibrium for every $\ep > 0$.
Joint work with Omri N. Solan.
Attached file
Last Updated Date : 04/12/2022
