Differentiation Games | Department of Economics

Seminar

BIU Game and Economic Theory Seminar 2015-2016

Speaker

Gilad Bavly

Date

03/05/2016 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar 2016-05-03 11:00:00 2016-05-03 12:30:00 Differentiation Games Abstract: We consider a class of games in which players with private information are motivated to differ in their actions. Two related questions are studied: (1) the existence of a “collision-free” equilibrium, in which no two players choose the same action; (2) the maximal social welfare. We give exact answers for some specific information structures, and a lower bound for the general case. Economics building (No. 504), room 011. אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public

Place

Economics building (No. 504), room 011.

Affiliation

Bar-Ilan University

Abstract

Abstract: We consider a class of games in which players with private information are motivated to differ in their actions. Two related questions are studied: (1) the existence of a “collision-free” equilibrium, in which no two players choose the same action; (2) the maximal social welfare. We give exact answers for some specific information structures, and a lower bound for the general case.

Attached file

Download