Prof. Eyal Baharad

Articles in Refereed Journals

• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2000): “Extended Preferences and Freedom of Choice”, Social Choice and Welfare 17(4), pp. 629-637.
• Baharad, E. and Neeman, Z. (2002): “The Asymptotic Strategyproofness of Scoring and Condorcet Consistent Rules”, Review of Economic Design 7(3), pp. 331-340.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2002): “Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Preference Intensity”, American Political Science Review 96(4), pp. 745-754.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2003): “The Borda Rule, Condorcet Consistency and Condorcet Stability”, Economic Theory 22(3), pp. 685-688.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2003): “Essential Alternatives and Set-Dependent Preferences - An Axiomatic Approach”, Mathematical Social Sciences 45(2), pp. 121-129.
• Baharad, E. and Eden, B. (2004): “Price Rigidity and Price Dispersion: Evidence from Micro Data”, Review of Economic Dynamics 7, pp. 613-641.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2005): “Approval Voting Reconsidered”, Economic Theory 26, pp. 619-628.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2005): “The Inverse Plurality Rule - An Axiomatization”, Social Choice and Welfare 25, pp. 173-178.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2006): “On the Selection of the Same Winner by all Scoring Rules”, Social Choice and Welfare 26, pp. 597-601.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2007): “Scoring Rules: An Alternative Parameterization”, Economic Theory 30, pp. 187-190.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2007): “The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule”, Economic Theory 31, pp. 69-84.
• Baharad, E. and Neeman, Z. (2007):  “Robustness against Inefficient Manipulation”, Social Choice and Welfare 29, pp. 55-67.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2008): “Contest Efforts in Light of Behavioural Considerations”, Economic Journal 118, pp. 2047-2059.
• Baharad, E. and Ben-Yashar, R. (2009): “The Robustness of the Optimal Weighted Majority Rule to Probability Distortion”, Public Choice 139, pp. 53-59.
• Baharad, E. and Nitzan, S. (2011): “Condorcet vs. Borda in Light of a Dual Majoritarian Approach”, Theory and Decision 71, pp. 151-162.
• Baharad E., Goldberger J., Koppel M. and Nitzan S. (2011): “Distilling the Wisdom of Crowds: Weighted Aggregation of Decisions on Multiple Issues”, Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 22, pp. 31-42.
• Baharad E., Goldberger J., Koppel M. and Nitzan S. (2012): “Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Judgment Aggregation Using Voting Records”, Theory and Decision 72, pp. 113-130.
• Baharad, E. and Kliger, D. (2013): “Market Failure in Light of Non-Expected Utility”, Theory and Decision 75, pp. 599-612.
• Baharad E. and Nitzan, S. (2016): “Is Majority Consistency Possible?”, Social Choice and Welfare 46, pp. 287-299.

Submitted and work in progress

• Baharad, E. and Ben-Yashar, R.: “Optimal Preference Aggregation under Naive Probabilities”.
• Baharad, E. and Ben-Yashar, R.: “On the Merit of Randomization in the Context of the Unanimity Rule”.
• Baharad, E.: “Minimal Deviation from Maximal Efficiency: An Optimal Voting Mechanism”.
• Baharad, E., Neeman, Z. and Rubinchik, A.: “Linearity and the Doctrinal Paradox”.
• Baharad, E. and Danziger, L.: “Voting in Hiring Committees: The Optimality of the 'Almost' ”.
• Baharad E. and Nitzan, S.: “On the Merit of Choice with Limited Attention”.
• Baharad, E. and Ben-Yashar, R.: “On the (Positive?) Impact of a Committee Size in the Context of the Unanimity Rule”.
• Baharad, E., Ben-Yashar, R. and Nitzan, S.: “Do Consistent Majority Judgments Guarantee the Truth”.
• Baharad, E. and Ben-Yashar, R.: “The Impact of Competency on Voting Outcome: Unanimity vs. Majority Rule”.