Resource Buying Games with Load-Dependent Costs

 In the basic setting of cost-sharing games, every resource has a fixed cost that is shared equally by its users. The talk will consider a more general setting: resource buying games with load-dependent costs and arbitrary cost-sharing. Under arbitrary cost-sharing, players do not only declare the resources they select to use, but they also declare a payment for each such resource. If the total payments declared for a resource cover its cost, then the resource is activated; otherwise it remains unavailable to the players. We will analyze the equilibrium existence and computation in various classes of these games. In addition, we will see how a simple natural constraint on the declared payments can be used to significantly reduce the equilibrium inefficiency.

(based on joint work with Eirini Georgoulaki and Kostas Kollias)

Tami Tamir's homepage: https://cs.idc.ac.il/~tami