Comparison of Oracles
Speaker
David Lagziel
Date
22/04/2025 - 12:30 - 11:15Add to Calendar
2025-04-22 11:15:00
2025-04-22 12:30:00
Comparison of Oracles
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations are provided for deterministic and stochastic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, partition refinements, and common knowledge components. This study extends the work of Blackwell (1951) to games, and expands the study of Aumann (1976) on common knowledge by developing a theory of information loops.(joint with Ehud Lehrer and Tao Wang)David Lagziel's homepage: https://www.davidlagziel.com
BIU Economics common room
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
BIU Economics common room
Affiliation
Ben-Gurion University
Abstract
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations are provided for deterministic and stochastic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, partition refinements, and common knowledge components. This study extends the work of Blackwell (1951) to games, and expands the study of Aumann (1976) on common knowledge by developing a theory of information loops.
(joint with Ehud Lehrer and Tao Wang)
David Lagziel's homepage: https://www.davidlagziel.com
Last Updated Date : 17/04/2025
