Revealed Preference Tests for Bayesian Persuasion

Speaker
Jeffrey Mensch
Date
10/12/2024 - 12:30 - 11:15Add To Calendar 2024-12-10 11:15:00 2024-12-10 12:30:00 Revealed Preference Tests for Bayesian Persuasion When is random choice generated by a decision maker (DM) who is Bayesian-persuaded by a sender? In this paper, I consider a DM whose state-dependent preferences are known to an analyst, yet chooses stochastically as a function of the state. I proved necessary and sufficient conditions for the dataset to be consistent with the DM being Bayesian persuaded by an unobserved sender who generates a distribution of signals to optimize ex-ante the sender's expected payoff.   Jeffrey Mensch's homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/jeffreyimensch BIU Economics common room אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
BIU Economics common room
Affiliation
Hebrew University
Abstract
When is random choice generated by a decision maker (DM) who is Bayesian-persuaded by a sender? In this paper, I consider a DM whose state-dependent preferences are known to an analyst, yet chooses stochastically as a function of the state. I proved necessary and sufficient conditions for the dataset to be consistent with the DM being Bayesian persuaded by an unobserved sender who generates a distribution of signals to optimize ex-ante the sender's expected payoff.
 

Last Updated Date : 03/12/2024