Existence of an epsilon-equilibrium in Bayesian games with nested information.

Speaker
Royi Jacobovic
Date
16/01/2024 - 12:30 - 11:15Add To Calendar 2024-01-16 11:15:00 2024-01-16 12:30:00 Existence of an epsilon-equilibrium in Bayesian games with nested information. In this talk I will review a recent working paper with Eilon Solan in which we proved that Bayesian games with a general state space and nested information admit an -equilibrium for every  > 0. In particular, I will discuss the positioning of this result with respect to the existing literature and introduce the main benchmarks of the proof. Lastly, I will share some open questions for future research including the existence of 0-correlated equilibrium and extending the current result to Bayesian games with multiple stages.    BIU Economics common room אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
BIU Economics common room
Affiliation
Tel Aviv University
Abstract

In this talk I will review a recent working paper with Eilon Solan in which we proved that Bayesian games with a general state space and nested information admit an \epsilon-equilibrium for every \epsilon > 0. In particular, I will discuss the positioning of this result with respect to the existing literature and introduce the main benchmarks of the proof. Lastly, I will share some open questions for future research including the existence of 0-correlated equilibrium and extending the current result to Bayesian games with multiple stages. 

 

Last Updated Date : 09/01/2024