Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk

Speaker
Ronen Gradwohl
Date
21/03/2023 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar 2023-03-21 11:00:00 2023-03-21 12:30:00 Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if and only if this equilibrium either reveals no information to the receiver or fully reveals one of the states with positive probability. We then characterize the actions that can be played with positive probability in any robust equilibrium. Finally, we fully characterize the optimal sender-utility under binary receiver's private information, and provide bounds for the optimal sender-utility under general private information. Joint work with Itai Arieli and Rann Smorodinsky. BIU Economics common room אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
BIU Economics common room
Affiliation
Ariel University
Abstract

We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if and only if this equilibrium either reveals no information to the receiver or fully reveals one of the states with positive probability. We then characterize the actions that can be played with positive probability in any robust equilibrium. Finally, we fully characterize the optimal sender-utility under binary receiver's private information, and provide bounds for the optimal sender-utility under general private information.

Joint work with Itai Arieli and Rann Smorodinsky.

Last Updated Date : 15/03/2023