Stopping games with Termination Rates
Speaker
Eilon Solan
Date
13/12/2022 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar
2022-12-13 11:00:00
2022-12-13 12:30:00
Stopping games with Termination Rates
Two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time have a value in randomized stopping times, and two-player nonzero-sum stopping games in continuous time have an epsilon-equilibrium for every epsilon>0. Three-player stopping games in continuous time do not necessarily have an epsilon-equilibrium. I will discuss these results and how the existence of epsilon-equilibrium can be restored.
Joint work with Catherine Rainer
BIU Economics common room
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
BIU Economics common room
Affiliation
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
Two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time have a value in randomized stopping times, and two-player nonzero-sum stopping games in continuous time have an epsilon-equilibrium for every epsilon>0. Three-player stopping games in continuous time do not necessarily have an epsilon-equilibrium. I will discuss these results and how the existence of epsilon-equilibrium can be restored.
Joint work with Catherine Rainer
Last Updated Date : 07/12/2022
