Netflix Games: Local Public Goods with Capacity Constraints

Speaker
Philip R. Neary
Date
27/04/2021 - 12:45 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2021-04-27 11:30:00 2021-04-27 12:45:00 Netflix Games: Local Public Goods with Capacity Constraints Joint with: Stefanie Gerke, Gregory Gutin, Sung-Ha Hwang. Abstract: This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially excludable along social links. Individuals face a capacity constraint in that, conditional upon providing, they may nominate only a subset of neighbours as co-beneficiaries. Our model has two typically incompatible ingredients: (i) a graphical game (in- dividuals decide how much of the good to provide), and (ii) graph formation (individuals decide which subset of neighbours to nominate as co-beneficiaries). For any capacity constraints and any graph, we show the existence of specialised pure strategy Nash equilibria - those in which some individuals (the ‘Drivers’, D) contribute while the remaining individuals (the ‘Passengers’, P) free ride. The proof is constructive and corresponds to showing, for a given capacity, the exis- tence of a new kind of spanning bipartite subgraph, a DP-subgraph, with partite sets D and P. We consider how the number of Drivers in equilibrium changes as the capacity constraints are relaxed and show a weak monotonicity result. Fi- nally, we introduce dynamics and show that only specialised equilibria are stable against individuals unilaterally changing their provision level. https://sites.google.com/site/prneary/ Schedule (Israel time): 11:30-11:45 free talk 11:45-12:45 - research presentation To view the seminar recording, click here. https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839 אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839
Affiliation
Royal Holloway
Abstract

Joint with: Stefanie Gerke, Gregory Gutin, Sung-Ha Hwang.

Abstract: This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially excludable
along social links. Individuals face a capacity constraint in that, conditional upon
providing, they may nominate only a subset of neighbours as co-beneficiaries.
Our model has two typically incompatible ingredients: (i) a graphical game (in-
dividuals decide how much of the good to provide), and (ii) graph formation
(individuals decide which subset of neighbours to nominate as co-beneficiaries).
For any capacity constraints and any graph, we show the existence of specialised
pure strategy Nash equilibria - those in which some individuals (the ‘Drivers’, D)
contribute while the remaining individuals (the ‘Passengers’, P) free ride. The
proof is constructive and corresponds to showing, for a given capacity, the exis-
tence of a new kind of spanning bipartite subgraph, a DP-subgraph, with partite
sets D and P. We consider how the number of Drivers in equilibrium changes
as the capacity constraints are relaxed and show a weak monotonicity result. Fi-
nally, we introduce dynamics and show that only specialised equilibria are stable
against individuals unilaterally changing their provision level.

https://sites.google.com/site/prneary/

Schedule (Israel time):

11:30-11:45 free talk

11:45-12:45 - research presentation

To view the seminar recording, click here.

Last Updated Date : 27/04/2021