Sequential Vote Buying
Speaker
Jan Zápal
Date
03/11/2020 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2020-11-03 11:30:00
2020-11-03 13:00:00
Sequential Vote Buying
To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes.The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy is put to a vote or paid upfront. With transfer promises, the leader buys the votes of those least opposed at a cost near zero. With up-front payments, she does not necessarily buy the votes of those least opposed, and a vote can cost significantly more than zero. The leader is better off with up-front payments. We discuss several extensions including private histories and simultaneous offers.
Recording: To view the seminar recording, click here.
Zoom https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Zoom https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839
Affiliation
Economics Institute, Prague
Abstract
To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes.The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy is put to a vote or paid upfront. With transfer promises, the leader buys the votes of those least opposed at a cost near zero. With up-front payments, she does not necessarily buy the votes of those least opposed, and a vote can cost significantly more than zero. The leader is better off with up-front payments. We discuss several extensions including private histories and simultaneous offers.
Recording: To view the seminar recording, click here.
Last Updated Date : 03/11/2020
