Long Information Design (Seminar-At-A-Distance)
Speaker
Tristan Tomala
Date
20/05/2020 - 12:30 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2020-05-20 11:30:00
2020-05-20 12:30:00
Long Information Design (Seminar-At-A-Distance)
Abstract:
We analyse zero-sum games between two designers who provide information to a decision maker (DM). Before the DM takes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose information about fixed state parameters. Designers face admissibility constraints on the distributions of posterior beliefs they can induce. Our main results characterise equilibrium payoffs and strategies for various timings of the game: simultaneous or alternating disclosures, with or without deadline.
(joint with Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, and Jérôme Renault)
https://technion.zoom.us/j/99246876569
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
https://technion.zoom.us/j/99246876569
Affiliation
HEC Paris
Abstract
Abstract:
We analyse zero-sum games between two designers who provide information to a decision maker (DM). Before the DM takes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose information about fixed state parameters. Designers face admissibility constraints on the distributions of posterior beliefs they can induce. Our main results characterise equilibrium payoffs and strategies for various timings of the game: simultaneous or alternating disclosures, with or without deadline.
(joint with Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, and Jérôme Renault)
Last Updated Date : 14/05/2020
