Searching Forever After
Speaker
Benjamin Bachi
Date
28/01/2020 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2020-01-28 11:30:00
2020-01-28 13:00:00
Searching Forever After
(joint with Yair Antler)
Abstract: Modern matching markets are becoming less frictional yet more complex. We study the implications of these phenomena through the lens of a two-sided search model in which agents' reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while, for other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to their prospects in the market. Consequently, they search longer than optimal. Moreover, agents with intermediate match values may search indefinitely while all others eventually marry. We show that the share of eternal singles converges monotonically to 1 as search frictions vanish.
Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor
Affiliation
University of Haifa
Abstract
(joint with Yair Antler)
Abstract: Modern matching markets are becoming less frictional yet more complex. We study the implications of these phenomena through the lens of a two-sided search model in which agents' reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while, for other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to their prospects in the market. Consequently, they search longer than optimal. Moreover, agents with intermediate match values may search indefinitely while all others eventually marry. We show that the share of eternal singles converges monotonically to 1 as search frictions vanish.
Last Updated Date : 13/01/2020
