The Simplicity of Large Bayesian Persuasion Strategies
Speaker
Itai Arieli
Date
05/11/2019 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2019-11-05 11:30:00
2019-11-05 13:00:00
The Simplicity of Large Bayesian Persuasion Strategies
(joint with Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky)
Abstract: We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem with a one-dimensional interval as the state space. We find a simple class of semi-interval policies such that every persuasion problem has an optimal solution in the class. Conversely, for any policy in the class, we show that there exists a persuasion problem that the policy is its unique maximiser. We discuss our results in the context of a partially informed sender.
Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Faculty Lounge, Building 504, First Floor
Affiliation
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Abstract
(joint with Yakov Babichenko and Rann Smorodinsky)
Abstract: We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem with a one-dimensional interval as the state space. We find a simple class of semi-interval policies such that every persuasion problem has an optimal solution in the class. Conversely, for any policy in the class, we show that there exists a persuasion problem that the policy is its unique maximiser. We discuss our results in the context of a partially informed sender.
Last Updated Date : 31/10/2019
