From Multiwinner Elections to Participatory Budgeting

Speaker
Nimrod Talmon
Date
05/03/2019 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2019-03-05 11:30:00 2019-03-05 13:00:00 From Multiwinner Elections to Participatory Budgeting Participatory budgeting, in which city residents decide directly on the distribution of their mutual funds, is gaining increased visibility and attention; e.g., this year the city of Paris uses such a system to decide on the allocation of ~100M Euros. The theoretical understanding of the elicitation methods and aggregation mechanisms to be used in participatory budgeting is, however, lacking. To explain the state of the art, I will first discuss recent progress within computational social choice regarding multiwinner elections, which can be viewed as a special case of budgeting. I will then discuss several aggregation methods for participatory budgeting and scientific tools to evaluate them. Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Ben-Gurion University
Abstract

Participatory budgeting, in which city residents decide directly on the distribution of their mutual funds, is gaining increased visibility and attention; e.g., this year the city of Paris uses such a system to decide on the allocation of ~100M Euros. The theoretical understanding of the elicitation methods and aggregation mechanisms to be used in participatory budgeting is, however, lacking. To explain the state of the art, I will first discuss recent progress within computational social choice regarding multiwinner elections, which can be viewed as a special case of budgeting. I will then discuss several aggregation methods for participatory budgeting and scientific tools to evaluate them.

Last Updated Date : 04/12/2022