Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions

Seminar
BIU Game and Economic Theory Seminar 2018-2019
Speaker
Olga Gorelkina
Date
27/12/2018 - 13:00 - 11:00Add To Calendar 2018-12-27 11:00:00 2018-12-27 13:00:00 Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions Paper: https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/schoolofmanagement/research/economics/collusion-via-information-sharing.pdf This paper studies collusion via information sharing in the context of auctions. The model of collusion via information sharing builds on Aumann’s (1976) description of knowledge. Robustness of auction mechanisms to collusion via information sharing is defined as the impossibility of an agreement to collude. A cartel can agree to collude on a contract if it is common knowledge within that cartel that the contract is incentive compatible and individually rational. Robust mechanisms are characterized in a number of settings where some, all, or no bidders are bound by limited liability. Finally, the characterization is used in a simple IPV setting to design a mechanism that is both optimal and robust to collusion. Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Liverpool University (Management School)
Abstract

Paper: https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/schoolofmanagement/research/economics/collusion-via-information-sharing.pdf

This paper studies collusion via information sharing in the context of auctions. The model of collusion via information sharing builds on Aumann’s (1976) description of knowledge. Robustness of auction mechanisms to collusion via information sharing is defined as the impossibility of an agreement to collude. A cartel can agree to collude on a contract if it is common knowledge within that cartel that the contract is incentive compatible and individually rational. Robust mechanisms are characterized in a number of settings where some, all, or no bidders are bound by limited liability. Finally, the characterization is used in a simple IPV setting to design a mechanism that is both optimal and robust to collusion.

Last Updated Date : 04/12/2022