Trade Associations and Collusion among Many Agents: Evidence from Physicians

Speaker
Jorge Ale Chilet
Date
04/03/2019 - 12:30 - 11:10Add To Calendar 2019-03-04 11:10:00 2019-03-04 12:30:00 Trade Associations and Collusion among Many Agents: Evidence from Physicians Joint with: Juan Pablo Atal We study a recent collusion case among physicians in Chile. Most gynecologists in one city formed a trade association to bargain for better rates with insurance companies. After unsuccessful negotiations, the physicians jointly terminated their insurer contracts and set a minimum price. We find that subsequent realized prices coincided with Nash-Bertrand prices, and that the minimum price was barely binding. We show that these actions ensured the association’s stability and increased profits. Our findings show how a trade association may help sustain collusion among a large number of heterogeneous agents. building 504, seminar room 011. אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
building 504, seminar room 011.
Affiliation
BIU
Abstract

Joint with: Juan Pablo Atal

We study a recent collusion case among physicians in Chile. Most gynecologists in one city formed a trade association to bargain for better rates with insurance companies. After unsuccessful negotiations, the physicians jointly terminated their insurer contracts and set a minimum price. We find that subsequent realized prices coincided with Nash-Bertrand prices, and that the minimum price was barely binding. We show that these actions ensured the association’s stability and increased profits. Our findings show how a trade association may help sustain collusion among a large number of heterogeneous agents.

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Last Updated Date : 19/02/2019