Majority Judgment vs. Majority Rule
Speaker
Rida Laraki
Date
27/12/2018 - 13:00 - 11:00Add To Calendar
2018-12-27 11:00:00
2018-12-27 13:00:00
Majority Judgment vs. Majority Rule
Paper: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8519/d266ceb22adeef7caad26c5926bc3ab6c351.pdf
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates — and so also of Condorcet consistency — is challenged. Axioms based on evaluating candidates — paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparing candidates — lead to another method, majority judgment, that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of “polarized” candidates. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation. It may also be viewed as a “solution” to Dahl’s (reformulated) intensity problem in that an intense minority sometimes defeats an apathetic majority.
Joint work with Michel Balinski
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Paris Dauphine and Liverpool University
Abstract
Paper: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8519/d266ceb22adeef7caad26c5926bc3ab6c351.pdf
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates — and so also of Condorcet consistency — is challenged. Axioms based on evaluating candidates — paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparing candidates — lead to another method, majority judgment, that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of “polarized” candidates. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation. It may also be viewed as a “solution” to Dahl’s (reformulated) intensity problem in that an intense minority sometimes defeats an apathetic majority.
Joint work with Michel Balinski
Last Updated Date : 04/12/2022