Voting in Corporations
Seminar
Speaker
Alan Miller
Date
12/11/2018 - 12:30 - 11:10Add To Calendar
2018-11-12 11:10:00
2018-11-12 12:30:00
Voting in Corporations
Paper: http://alandmiller.com/VotingInCorporations.pdf
I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting outcomes following
stock-for-stock mergers, and reallocation invariance, which requires the shareholder voting rule to be immune to certain manipulative techniques used by shareholders to hide their ownership. The paper also extends the classic result of May (1952) on majority rule.
Economics Building (504). Room 011
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics Building (504). Room 011
Affiliation
Haifa University
Abstract
Paper: http://alandmiller.com/VotingInCorporations.pdf
I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting outcomes following
stock-for-stock mergers, and reallocation invariance, which requires the shareholder voting rule to be immune to certain manipulative techniques used by shareholders to hide their ownership. The paper also extends the classic result of May (1952) on majority rule.
Last Updated Date : 04/12/2022
