A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

Speaker
Alex Gershkov
Date
11/12/2018 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar 2018-12-11 11:30:00 2018-12-11 13:00:00 A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations We study the revenue maximizing allocation of m units among n symmetric agents that have unit demand and convex preferences over the probability of receiving an object. Such preferences are naturally induced by a game where the agents take costly actions that affect their values before participating in the mechanism. Both the uniform m + 1 price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices constitute symmetric revenue maximizing mechanisms. Contrasting the case with linear preferences, the optimal reserve price reacts to both demand and supply, i.e., it depends both on the number of objects m and on number of agents n. Joint work with B Moldovanu and P Strack Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Hebrew University
Abstract

We study the revenue maximizing allocation of m units among n symmetric agents that have unit demand and convex preferences over the probability of receiving an object. Such preferences are naturally induced by a game where the agents take costly actions that affect their values before participating in the mechanism. Both the uniform m + 1 price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices constitute symmetric revenue maximizing mechanisms. Contrasting the case with linear preferences, the optimal reserve price reacts to both demand and supply, i.e., it depends both on the number of objects m and on number of agents n.

Joint work with B Moldovanu and P Strack

Last Updated Date : 04/12/2022