Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives
Speaker
Doron Ravid
Date
08/03/2018 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2018-03-08 11:30:00
2018-03-08 13:00:00
Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives
Paper: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941601
We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: the sender's preferences are state-independent. We observe that this setting is amenable to the belief-based approach familiar from models of persuasion with commitment. Using this approach, we examine the possibility of valuable communication, assess the value of commitment, and explicitly solve for sender-optimal equilibria in a large class of examples. A key result is a geometric characterization of the value of cheap talk, described by the quasiconcave envelope of the sender's value function.
Joint with Elliot Lipnowski
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Chicago University
Abstract
Paper: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941601
We study a model of cheap talk with one substantive assumption: the sender's preferences are state-independent. We observe that this setting is amenable to the belief-based approach familiar from models of persuasion with commitment. Using this approach, we examine the possibility of valuable communication, assess the value of commitment, and explicitly solve for sender-optimal equilibria in a large class of examples. A key result is a geometric characterization of the value of cheap talk, described by the quasiconcave envelope of the sender's value function.
Joint with Elliot Lipnowski
Last Updated Date : 04/12/2022
