Optimal Dynamic Inspection
Speaker
Chang Zhao
Date
30/11/2017 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2017-11-30 11:30:00
2017-11-30 13:00:00
Optimal Dynamic Inspection
Paper: http://zhaochangtau.weebly.com/uploads/1/0/8/4/108458087/repeated_inspection.pdf
We study a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one principal. Both agents may profit by violating certain rules, while the principal can inspect at most one agent in each period, inflicting a punishment on an agent who is caught violating the rules. The goal of the principal is to minimize the discounted number of violations, and he has a Stackelberg leader advantage. We characterize the principal's optimal inspection strategy.
Joint work with Eilon Solan.
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
Paper: http://zhaochangtau.weebly.com/uploads/1/0/8/4/108458087/repeated_inspection.pdf
We study a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one principal. Both agents may profit by violating certain rules, while the principal can inspect at most one agent in each period, inflicting a punishment on an agent who is caught violating the rules. The goal of the principal is to minimize the discounted number of violations, and he has a Stackelberg leader advantage. We characterize the principal's optimal inspection strategy.
Joint work with Eilon Solan.
Last Updated Date : 04/12/2022
