Cardinal Representations of Information
Speaker
Jeffrey Mensch
Date
26/12/2017 - 13:00 - 11:30Add To Calendar
2017-12-26 11:30:00
2017-12-26 13:00:00
Cardinal Representations of Information
In the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), this paper provides an axiomatic representation of information. Under the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, along with an additional continuity, indifference to randomization, and a Blackwell informativeness axiom, I show that any ordering over information can be essentially uniquely represented as, equivalently: (a) a strictly increasing cost of information acquisition; (b) for a given prior, the expected utility from a decision problem; (c) for a given prior, an additive posterior-separable measure of uncertainty; and (d) a separable cost of signals. I discuss the implications of the results for the rational inattention literature.
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
Affiliation
Hebrew University
Abstract
In the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), this paper provides an axiomatic representation of information. Under the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, along with an additional continuity, indifference to randomization, and a Blackwell informativeness axiom, I show that any ordering over information can be essentially uniquely represented as, equivalently: (a) a strictly increasing cost of information acquisition; (b) for a given prior, the expected utility from a decision problem; (c) for a given prior, an additive posterior-separable measure of uncertainty; and (d) a separable cost of signals. I discuss the implications of the results for the rational inattention literature.
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Last Updated Date : 04/12/2022