Approachability with Constraints
Speaker
Eilon Solan
Date
21/03/2017 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar
2017-03-21 11:00:00
2017-03-21 12:30:00
Approachability with Constraints
Abstract. We study approachability in repeated games with vector payoffs, with the additional aspect that there are constraints. Namely, the goal of Player 1 is to approach a given set while ensuring that the realized average payoff in every given stage is not in a given set of payoff vectors that should be evaded. We characterize the pairs of sets (A,E) such that Player 1 can ensure that the long-run average payoff converges to A while evading E.
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor.
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor.
Affiliation
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
Abstract. We study approachability in repeated games with vector payoffs, with the additional aspect that there are constraints. Namely, the goal of Player 1 is to approach a given set while ensuring that the realized average payoff in every given stage is not in a given set of payoff vectors that should be evaded. We characterize the pairs of sets (A,E) such that Player 1 can ensure that the long-run average payoff converges to A while evading E.
Last Updated Date : 21/01/2017
