What You Get is What You See: Cooperation in Repeated Games with Observable Payoffs

Seminar

BIU Game and Economic Theory Seminar 2016-2017

Speaker

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan

Date

22/11/2016 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar 2016-11-22 11:00:00 2016-11-22 12:30:00 What You Get is What You See: Cooperation in Repeated Games with Observable Payoffs Abstract: We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, players observe neither the other player’s actions nor her payoff. We prove that any strictly efficient payoff can be obtained as sequential equilibrium payoff, when costly communication is available and the players are sufficiently patient. Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor. אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public

Place

Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor.

Affiliation

Tel Aviv University

Abstract

Abstract: We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, players observe neither the other player’s actions nor her payoff. We prove that any strictly efficient payoff can be obtained as sequential equilibrium payoff, when costly communication is available and the players are sufficiently patient.