General Distribution of Consumers in Pure Hotelling Games
Speaker
Gaëtan Fournier
Date
01/03/2016 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar
2016-03-01 11:00:00
2016-03-01 12:30:00
General Distribution of Consumers in Pure Hotelling Games
Abstract:A pure Hotelling game is a competition between a finite number of players who select simultaneously a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this paper, we study the case of a general distribution of consumers on a network generated by a metric graph. Because players do not compete on price, the continuum of consumers shop at the closest player’s location. Under regularity hypothesis on the distribution we prove the existence of an ϵ-equilibrium in pure strategies and we construct it, provided that the number of players is larger than a lower bound.
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Economics building (No. 504), room 011
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics building (No. 504), room 011
Affiliation
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
Abstract:A pure Hotelling game is a competition between a finite number of players who select simultaneously a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this paper, we study the case of a general distribution of consumers on a network generated by a metric graph. Because players do not compete on price, the continuum of consumers shop at the closest player’s location. Under regularity hypothesis on the distribution we prove the existence of an ϵ-equilibrium in pure strategies and we construct it, provided that the number of players is larger than a lower bound.
Last Updated Date : 17/02/2016