Persuasion, Transparency, and Commitment

Seminar

BIU Game and Economic Theory Seminar 2014-2015

Speaker

Ronen Gradwohl

Date

16/06/2015 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar 2015-06-16 11:00:00 2015-06-16 12:30:00 Persuasion, Transparency, and Commitment Abstract: We investigate the impact of the transparency requirement on the performance of advisory committees. If a committee has the ability to commit to its process, and in particular to the behavior of its members, than requiring transparency may benefit the ultimate decision maker. However, without such strong commitment capabilities transparency may be so harmful as to completely destroy the committee’s ability to persuade. Economics and Business Administration building (No. 504), room 011 אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public

Place

Economics and Business Administration building (No. 504), room 011

Affiliation

Northwestern University

Abstract

Abstract: We investigate the impact of the transparency requirement on the performance of advisory committees. If a committee has the ability to commit to its process, and in particular to the behavior of its members, than requiring transparency may benefit the ultimate decision maker. However, without such strong commitment capabilities transparency may be so harmful as to completely destroy the committee’s ability to persuade.