Optimal Voting Rules

Speaker
Alex Gershkov
Date
24/03/2015 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar 2015-03-24 11:00:00 2015-03-24 12:30:00 Optimal Voting Rules Abstract: We modify the successive voting procedure, predominantly used by European legislatures, by including flexible majority requirements for each of several alternatives. This modification allows us to replicate the outcome of any anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism. We use this equivalence to compute the optimal (utilitarian) procedure and its associated majority requirements. Economics and Business Administration building (No. 504), room 011 אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Economics and Business Administration building (No. 504), room 011
Affiliation
Hebrew University
Abstract

Abstract: We modify the successive voting procedure, predominantly used by European legislatures, by including flexible majority requirements for each of several alternatives. This modification allows us to replicate the outcome of any anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism. We use this equivalence to compute the optimal (utilitarian) procedure and its associated majority requirements.

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Last Updated Date : 21/03/2015