Optimal Voting Rules
Speaker
Alex Gershkov
Date
24/03/2015 - 12:30 - 11:00Add To Calendar
2015-03-24 11:00:00
2015-03-24 12:30:00
Optimal Voting Rules
Abstract: We modify the successive voting procedure, predominantly used by European legislatures,
by including flexible majority requirements for each of several alternatives. This
modification allows us to replicate the outcome of any anonymous, unanimous and dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanism. We use this equivalence to compute the
optimal (utilitarian) procedure and its associated majority requirements.
Economics and Business Administration building (No. 504), room 011
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
Economics and Business Administration building (No. 504), room 011
Affiliation
Hebrew University
Abstract
Abstract: We modify the successive voting procedure, predominantly used by European legislatures, by including flexible majority requirements for each of several alternatives. This modification allows us to replicate the outcome of any anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism. We use this equivalence to compute the optimal (utilitarian) procedure and its associated majority requirements.
Attached file
Last Updated Date : 21/03/2015
