A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift-Homogeneous Equilibrium Selection
Speaker
Yehuda (John) Levy
Date
13/11/2013 - 12:00 - 10:00Add To Calendar
2013-11-13 10:00:00
2013-11-13 12:00:00
A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift-Homogeneous Equilibrium Selection
Abstract: We construct a continuum of games on a countable set of players that does not possess a measurable equilibrium selection that satisfies a natural homogeneity property. The explicit nature of the construction yields counterexamples to the existence of equilibria in models with overlapping generations and in games with a continuum of players.
אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Economics
Economics.Dept@mail.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Affiliation
University of Oxford
Abstract
Abstract: We construct a continuum of games on a countable set of players that does not possess a measurable equilibrium selection that satisfies a natural homogeneity property. The explicit nature of the construction yields counterexamples to the existence of equilibria in models with overlapping generations and in games with a continuum of players.
Last Updated Date : 14/10/2013
