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Prof. Arye L. Hillman

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+ 972-9-774-6424
Email
Arye.Hillman@biu.ac.il
Office
205; Building 504
Fields of Interest

RESEARCH THEME: POLITICAL ECONOMY OR POLITICIZED ECONOMICS

The theme of my research is political economy or politicized economics. Policy decisions are made by politicians and government committees. It is therefore natural to study public policy and public finance from a perspective that combines political and economic outcomes and decisions. I introduced political motives for international trade policy in a paper in the American Economic Review in 1982. This was followed by further papers on political-economy trade-policy themes with coauthors James Cassing and Heinrich Ursprung in the same journal in 1986 and 1988. My book ‘The Political Economy of Protection’ (Harwood 1989; reissued by Francis and Taylor in 2013) provided the first comprehensive account of the politics of international trade policy. Subsequently the political economy view of international trade policy became mainstream with the publication by Grossman and Helpman of their paper 'Protection for sale' in the American Economic Review in 1994. My political economy theme continued to trade liberalization and migration, failures of economic development, the extended duration of the transition from socialism, and prejudice and discrimination. A parallel theme has been the social cost of political discretion when privileged policy benefits are contested (through rent seeking). The study of rent seeking brought me into the domain of the public-choice school. My textbook ‘Public Finance and Public Policy: A Political Economy Perspective on Responsibilities and Limitations of Government’ (Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition 2019) integrates classical public finance with political economy and public choice concepts.

There was initial resistance to political economy in academia. The same resistance was encountered by the public choice school, with whose themes my research in time coalesced. The assumptions of lump-sum taxes and benevolent government have been proposed as having been made in the mainstream economics model for convenience. The assumptions also protect (and project) a socialist or in the U.S. ‘liberal’ ideology. Lump-sum taxes describe people as contributing according to ability rather than reward, and such taxes facilitate redistribution of income without efficiency losses being incurred through the excess burden of taxation. Add the assumption of government benevolence and there are also no social losses from rent seeking because budgetary benefits and taxation are benevolently predetermined. It is informative that, when politics began to enter the mainstream economic models, the focus was on the ‘median voter’ who is decisive under majority voting. My interpretation is that the median-voter model was a means of avoiding referring to the political agency problem of representative democracy that forms the basis for political economy or politicized economics.

 

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Reception Hours
in coordination by email
PO Box
30
Research Categories
Presentations

Plenary talks and public and invited lectures (excludes departmental seminars)

  • Jadavpur University, Kolkata, Department of Economics, 10th February 2020, “Interface of Economics and Politics”
  • Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Kolkata, February 6, 2020, “Ambiguous protection”
  • Armenian Economic Association, Yerevan, June 14-16 June 2018. Keynote speaker on: Politics and public policy.
  • The University of the West Indies at Mona, Kingston, Jamaica. 1st Conference of Caribbean Economists, March 9-10 2017. Plenary lecture on ‘The political economy of public policy: The case of income support and work incentives’.
  • Guangxi Normal University, School of Political Science and Public Administration, Guilin, China, November 1 and November 3, 2016, “Public finance and public policy”
  • Huazhong University of Science and Technology, School of Public Administration, Wuhan, China, November 7, “Public finance and public policy”
  • University of Genoa, lecture on “Political economy”, at ceremony conferring an honorary doctorate, March 4 2016.
  • Tullock Memorial Conference, George Mason University, Arlington, VI, USA. “The political economy of an idea: The case of rent seeking”, 2-3 October 2015.
  • Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Kolkata, Conference on Public Finance, Public Economics, and Public Policy, keynote speaker, “Expressive behavior and public policy”, 5-6 December 2013.
  • Trade and the Organization of Production in the Global Economy: A Conference in Honor of Wilfred Ethier, Vanderbilt University, “Rent extraction and income redistribution: A behavioral perspective on international trade policy”, October 25-26, 2013.
  • Australasian Public Choice Conference, University of Tasmania. Plenary lecture: “Beyond criticism: Logrolling and decoy voting in the United Nations”, December 10-11 2012
  • National University of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Public lecture: “Expressive behavior and public policy”, August 13, 2012
  • World Bank, ECA PREM Seminar, Washington DC, on “Lost in transition”, June 19, 2012
  • XII International Conference on Economic and Social Development, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, “The professional literature in economics”, 3-4 April 2012
  • Public Choice Society, World Conference, Miami. Plenary talk on the contributions of Gordon Tullock, “A good idea: So what”. March 2012
  • Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies May 2011. Public lecture on: "Identity and expressive behavior in voting in Israel"
  • Public Choice Society, San Antonio, March 2011. Plenary presentation: “Behavioral political economy”
  • Silvaplana Workshop on Political Economy. Pontresina, July 2010. “Expressive policy traps”
  • CESifo 3rd Workshop on Political Economy, Dresden, December 2009. Keynote speaker on “Expressive behavior”
  • European Public Choice Society, Athens, April 2009. Plenary lecture on: “Expressive behavior in economics and politics: An overview and a perspective”
  • Alexander von Humboldt Foundation: The Israeli Humboldt Club, the Humboldt Kolleg Symposium on “When Science and Humanities Meet”, January 8, 2009. Invited lecture: “The welfare state”
  • Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies, 21 May 2008. Public lecture: "The work ethic and the welfare state"
  • Hubei College of Economics, China, October 10, 2007. Public lecture: “Is social justice achievable?”
  • Singapore Economic Review annual public lecture, Nanyang University, September 20, 2007, “Globalization and social justice”
  • Humboldt University, Berlin, July 9-13 2007, MEMS guest lecturer, public lectures on “Current aspects of public finance and public policy” 
  • BESA Institute for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, May 7, 2007, public lecture on “Why does the Arab world remain poor?”
  • University of Havana, 44th Anniversary of the Initiation of the Study of Economics, Havana, Cuba, October 6, 2006. Plenary lecture on: “The elusive quest for social justice”
  • Mont Pelerin Society General Meetings, Salt Lake City, August 15-20, 2004.  Plenary address on: “Institutions of international decision making: the United Nations”
  • The World Bank, PREM Conference, Washington DC, April 27-28, 2004.  Debate with Jeffrey Sachs on: “Economic policies for failed states”
    http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/magazine/07SACHS.html?pagewanted=all&…
  • European Public Choice Society, Berlin, April, 2004. Plenary lecture on: “Development failure”
  • Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Public lecture, “Why are some countries rich and others poor?” August 2000.
  • Israel Economic Association, Symposium on 50 years of Economic Research in Israel, April 28, 1999. Invited lecture on: “Political Economy”
  • European Public Choice Society Annual Conference, Prague, April 1997. Presidential Address: "Political economy and political correctness"
  • Mont Pelerin Society General Meeting, Cannes, September 1994. Plenary address: "Nostalgia, self-interest, and the transition from socialism"
  • European Public Choice Society Annual Conference, Portrush, April 1993. Plenary address: "The transition from socialism: Some comforting thoughts for adherents to a public choice perspective"
  • Geneva Environmental Meetings, Environment and Development: Conflict and Convergence, May 1992. Presentation on: "Environmental protection and international trade"
  • Annual Meetings of the Economic Association of Israel, Tel-Aviv, December 1991. Plenary lecture: "The political economy of international trade policy"
  • European Public Choice Society Annual Conference, Meersburg, April 1990. Plenary lecture on "International trade policy: Benevolent dictators and optimizing politicians"
  • Taft Lecture, University of Cincinnati, April 1989. Public lecture on: “Liberalizing socialist industry"
Teaching
  • Markets and public policy
  • Political economy and public policy
  • International trade
Personal

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES – ARYE L. HILLMAN

Choosing a pond

Ideology in academic economics requires choosing a pond. I was rather naïve regarding ideology until after I had completed graduate school. I did realize that there were competing ideologies within economics. I knew of course of Adam Smith and Karl Marx, and that the communist countries differed in social and economic organization from private–property market economies. But why should be there ideological differences within academia in western economies?

When I understood that a choice was required, I preferred the economic right to the economic left. In this choice, I differed from nearly all academic economists in Israel. The economic left in general espoused universal values and did not look favorably on tradition, which is viewed as divisive in emphasizing differences.

Fortunately I discovered the Public Choice school. There was certainly anti-Semitism and by extension anti-Israeli sentiment at meetings of the European Public Choice Society. But the prejudice was openly expressed, which was preferable to innuendos of the left, with whom open discussion can be difficult. On the right there is more forthrightness. I recall a professor from Portugal asking me how we were doing to solve our problems with the Palestinians and my answering ‘not through the Iberian solution’. A well-known Swiss professor as a matter of principle did not want to travel to Israel and rejected my offer to ensure that on arriving in Israel he would immediately be taken to Gaza. A Swiss professor from Berlin would invariably sneak up to me at conferences, make some comment or other that was barely audible, and sneak off, until he had the courage of his convictions to declare to declare to my wife Jeannette and myself that as Jews in Israel we did not necessarily have the right of self-defense. 

Actually I have found the least anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli sentiment among contemporary Germans. There was a terrorist attack at a mall in Tel-Aviv in the week preceding the beginning of the European Public Choice Society that I organized In Israel in 1996. Shimon Peres, the Labor Party leader, called the two young girls who perished in the terror attack ‘victims of peace’. There was much ‘1984’ parlance on the left. In response to the terror attack, the intending attendees from Sweden, the United States, and France cancelled their participation in the conference. Of the Germans, only one cancelled, and he sent an apology credibly pointing to the opposition of his wife to his coming.

Public choice provided overall a comfortable academic environment, aside from the few for whom the existence of the state of Israel was an emotional challenge. I know that there was nothing personal in the diatribes, which were also rare. I have no answer to the question why there has never been an Israeli on the editorial board of the journal Public Choice. In particular in my department in Bar-Ilan there was great support for the public-choice research agenda. We contributed journal articles and we must have done more than our fair share of reviewing for Public Choice. Yet no one was invited to join the editorial board. The same theme appears in the editorial board of the sister journal Constitutional Political Economy. I was for many years busy with editorial responsibilities at the European Journal of Political Economy (which was sympathetic to public-choice ideas). There was not the same impediment to asking my Bar-Ilan colleagues to join the editorial board of Public Choice. We do not understand the criteria that were used for editorial board membership. We do not understand because we rule out systematic exclusion.

 

Early influences

The experiences of my father and mother may have imbued me with mistrust of governments. My parents Yehoshua Hillman (ז"ל) (Helman and Pinczewski families) and my mother Rosa (ז"ל) (née Borenstein) were survivors of the holocaust, which is unmatched in evil perpetrated by a government. There are different types of survivors, those who survived by being hidden or crossing into Russia or finding other havens, and those who did not escape. My parents did not escape. My father had an Auschwitz number on his arm. My mother survived through usefulness in forced labor and told how she saved 300 young women who were seamstresses from murder in the last days of the war by standing up to her handlers and declaring that the girls would not leave their sewing machines to go outside the building. With the Red Army approaching, the handlers fled without taking time to force the girls outside to kill them in a group.

After liberation, in the case of my father and mother by the Red army, survivors went home to see who was left alive (a case of a Schelling focal point). My father found my mother wandering around in Lodz, alone and confused, and took care of her. Poland could at the time be dangerous for survivors, in particular those seeking to reclaim property. There was a pogrom against Jewish survivors in Kielce Poland in 1946. My parents left Poland in 1946, crossing borders, and reaching a displaced people's camp in southern Germany, from which they moved to the nearby small town of Bad Wörishofen, where I was born. I was to be their only surviving child. My mother explained that ‘one I can protect’. My parents feared that the conditions of the holocaust could return. Both my mother and father had previously been married. Their respective spouses and children had perished. Their experiences left them forever fearful.

My first language was Yiddish, which remained the language spoken at home. My second language was German, spoken in kindergarten and on the street. Bad Wörishofen where I was born is situated in Bavaria off the highway between Munich and Lindau. The town has spa waters that have purported curative properties. The town is beautiful and worth a visit. We lived in Bad Wörishofen until late 1951. My parents’ intention had been to move to Israel but there had been reports of insufficient food and hard times. I was to close the circle by later moving to Israel in 1974 with my wife and children. My parents eventually joined us in 1995. They lived out the last years of their lives in Israel, in the presence of grandchildren and great grandchildren.

 

Australia

We moved to Australia in 1951, the sea journey being long, going from Marseilles through the Panama Canal and across the Pacific. My parents chose to settle in the town of Newcastle, north of Sydney. We lived in a working-class area of a working-class town. My best friend often went to school barefoot, which I did also, not wanting to be different. Amazingly, in retrospect, shoes were not required at school, but this was the early 1950s in a large but provincial Australian town. In our working class neighborhood, my parents built up a successful retail clothing business based on trust and personal credit, at a time when credit and trust were not part of the usual business model. Women came to my mother to buy clothes because, if a dress did not suit, she immediately would say ‘not for you, take it off’. She imposed her taste but she apparently had good taste because the customers kept coming back. My father managed the business and continued with the tailoring of men’s suites that was his profession. He in time became the equivalent of the local rabbi, which he could do because of his pre-war yeshiva studies. My mother was an effective businesswoman although she had left school in pre-war Poland at the age of 1. My father was learned in the traditional Jewish manner and was unfamiliar with Latin characters.

Admittance to a selective regional high school introduced me to a new milieu. Other children at the school had more extensive English vocabularies. I was in the A class that studied Latin, which was a special privilege. The Latin teacher was said to be the secretary of the local branch of the Communist Party and we were made familiar not only with Ovid but also Spartacus. I played rugby and also ‘Australian’ football, and was a member of the school chess team. In retrospect, it seems that I was trying to please my mother with various dimensions of success. My mother was depressed and was always recalling that her son Yitzhak Berle had been taken to Auschwitz where children of the age four alone had no hope of survival.

In 1967 I married Jeannette (née Mann) and in the same year completed an honors degree at the local University of Newcastle. With 1st class honors and the University Medal, I was encouraged by Professor Warren Hogan to pursue an academic career. When Warren Hogan called to inform me that I had won the University Medal, I did not know that the Medal existed. I had to ask him what it was all about.

I was awarded a Commonwealth (of Australia) PhD scholarship and thought to study with Professor Murray Kemp at the University of NSW in Sydney. Professor Harry Edwards, who was at the time setting up the economics department at newly opened Macquarie University in western Sydney, convinced me that I could complete a PhD while teaching. I accepted a teaching position and began a PhD at Macquarie. Peter Lloyd from Australian National University was external advisor. I was happy to be able to contribute, years later, to Peter Lloyd’s retirement Festschrift. Harry Edwards left academia after being elected to the Australian federal parliament for the Liberal (actually conservative) Party and remained a backbencher for 22 years. With his Oxford PhD, he was surely a more competent economist than the politicians who had positions of economic decision making when the Liberal Party was in office. There is political economy in the case study of his career. A good economist is apparently not necessarily a successful politician.

My wife Jeannette’s father Joseph Mann (ז"ל) was a Sydney lawyer who had arrived in Australia as a baby from Harbin in China. Her mother Netta (ז"ל) was born in Australia. Her parents had emigrated from Odessa and ran a pub in Ballarat in the gold-mining area of the state of Victoria, and subsequently had a pub in an inner western suburb of Sydney. Netta traveled from far to help out whenever she was needed. Our first great granddaughter is named Netta.

My mother’s outrage at what had happened to her in the holocaust never subsided. Growing up meant exposure to continual rage. Kitchen cupboard doors were slammed late into the night. My mother would over and over ask the question was ‘Why did someone not come to save us?’

In 1985 I witnessed a meeting in Israel between my mother and her brother Yaacov. They had not met for some 40 years. There were no introductory remarks when my mother entered her brother’s living room. She said (in Yiddish) ‘why did you let them take the child?’ He replied: ‘Had I not given them the child, they would have returned later and taken you with the child.’ My mother believed that she would have saved her four-year old son. She had previously been put on a death train with Yitzhak Berle but escaped when the train stopped. She boarded another train, where she entered a compartment of German soldiers, whom she told that she was Volksdeutch, meaning that she was part of the Germanic population of Poland. She believed that she could have saved Yitzhak Berle again, had her brother (my uncle) not given the child to the collectors-for-death of Jewish children.

My father was silent about what had happened to him and his family. My father told me that he had entered into a personal contract in Auschwitz that, if he were to survive, he would, for the course of his life, honor Jewish traditions. The contract applied to his descendants. After many years, I insisted that he tell me about himself. I asked ‘who are you?’ And ‘what happened?’ His reply was ‘I have never told you because I did not want you to become insane by hearing what was done to us.’ And there he stopped, never to return to these topics again. I did learn that my father lost his wife and two children. To this day, I cannot see a film about the Holocaust or confront any other reminder of what happened. I do not need reminding.     

 

Graduate studies: the U.S.

In 1970, I resigned from the tenured position at Macquarie University and left with Jeannette and our two young daughters Tamara and Ilana to begin graduate school at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. Various graduate-school scholarship offers that I received were all for one year contingent on academic performance. I was risk-averse. Gerry Adams, head of the Economics Research Unit at Penn, offered a guaranteed three-year appointment as Research Fellow. The position paid tuition and provided a small stipend and health insurance. Jeannette’s U.S. visa did not allow her to work. Graduate school teachers included Irving Kravis, Wilfred Ethier, Albert Ando, Thomas Sargent, Oliver Williamson, Lawrence Klein, Herbert Levine, Phoebus Dhrymes and Karl Shell. Sargent, Williamson, and Klein went on to receive a Nobel Prize.

The three-year fellowship limitation provided an incentive to complete the PhD within that time period. Zvi Adar, a graduate student ahead of me, who subsequently became a professor in the Tel-Aviv University business school, gave me the invaluable advice to choose an advisor who had completed his own PhD thesis in a short period of time. I had nine months left of the Fellowship when I approached Albert Ando, who taught the public economics graduate course, and asked whether the remaining time was sufficient to write a thesis. Albert replied ‘I wrote my thesis in three months and I am three times cleverer than you, so you should be able to finish in nine months’ – which I did. The thesis combined international and public economics. Bill Ethier was co-advisor.

As the end of the three years of graduate school approached, Irving Kravis, the senior international-trade professor at Penn at the time, offered to propose me for a position in a leading department (Stanford). I asked instead for a recommendation for a position in Israel. I accepted an offer from Tel-Aviv University. There was a detour. Our financial resources, not substantial in the first place, were depleted, and, although my thesis had been accepted, I had to make some ‘revisions’. We stayed in the U.S. an additional fourth year at the University of Illinois in Urbana, which had made an income-maximizing offer for a one-year visiting appointment.

 

Israel

We arrived in Israel in June 1974, with four children, ranging in age from 6 years to 3 months. Our sons Nachman Eliyahu (Eli) and Benjamin had been additions to our two daughters Tamara and Ilana with whom we had arrived in the U.S. We had never previously been in Israel, which had been for us a concept rather than an actual physical location.

Don Patinkin, who had arrived in Israel in the early years of the modern state from the University of Chicago, was the father of academic economics in Israel. He ensured that academic standards in economics in Israel would be high.

The ‘left’ had been instrumental in establishing the modern state of Israel through collective institutions, including the kibbutz, and also, when we arrived, controlled much of the economy through ‘the holding company of the workers’. The Jews who returned to Israel, from the later part of the 19th century on, did what Jews during the long years of exile. They defended themselves and they worked the land. Many of the returnees also abandoned Jewish tradition.

The premise of the left was (and is): ‘If we do not insist on our traditions that separate us from others, we will be more liked.’ My father also had sympathies for the left. He related how he would approach Polish Catholics and declare that ‘the enemy is the capitalist’. He told me how, when he was with communist partisans toward the end of the war, a Polish nationalist group had arrived and demanded from the communists that they give them the “Jew”. The communists refused. My father felt that he had an eternal debt.  

After our arrival in Israel, I settled in at the economics department of Tel-Aviv University. I had excellent colleagues. Elhanan Helpman and Efraim Sadka arrived when I did, from studies respectively at Harvard and MIT. Elhanan seemed focused on broader recognition than he believed possible as an academic in Israel and in the end was at Harvard. Efraim went in the direction of local involvement in business activity. At Tel-Aviv University, I was advised about the personal benefit from pragmatism of identifying with the ‘left’. I was told to position myself on the left of the spectrum of ideology, so as to be met with acceptance by academics in Israel and abroad. I was also advised to accept all blame that was directed at me as representing the state of Israel, whatever the accusations. In a meeting with an attaché from the British Embassy in Tel-Aviv, I asked what would happen if we actually did what we were accused of doing. His reply was ‘that would be awful’.

I found, through my conversations, that our critics were worried that we had the means to defend ourselves, which contradicted the historical presumption that Jews should be victims. It became clear that facts do not matter when critics of Israel make their case. In the beginning, I would attempt to point out that six Arab armies had invaded the nascent state of Israel in 1948 and that a population exchange had taken place as had occurred elsewhere around the same time, and that uniquely only the population exchange involving Jews and the Arabs was not recognized - and that only the Palestinian Arabs were permitted to pass their refugee status on their children, perpetuated through a special United Nations agency. For this, I received angry glares from the critics of Israel. If my colleagues of the left in Israel were present, I could see in their eyes ‘I told you so. Just agree with them.’ In time, I became aware of post-modernism whereby ‘there is no truth’ or ‘there are many truths’ and ‘my view is as good as yours’. There was no point in argument or discussion.

Having grown up in a working class neighborhood, my sympathy was with workers. The Labor Party in Israel did not represent the workers but rather represented the privileged elites, including the managers of factories and businesses of the ‘socialist’ sector that in the 1970s and 1980s controlled the economy. Monopolies and cartels, and trade restrictions, were justified as protecting workers’ job security but were sources of privileged rents for ‘socialist’ managers. A paper that I wrote in 1988 paper listed the monopolies of the ‘holding company of the workers’ and the private monopolies and cartels. Foreign leftists strangely have identified with the Israeli Labor Party, when workers in Israel have tended to vote not for Labor but for the Likud or other parties.

The unthinkable happened in 1977 when the ‘left’, which had won every election since the establishment of the modern state in 1948, lost the general election. The deep left-controlled state however remained.

Life was uncomfortable at Tel-Aviv university, ideologically and intellectually. The best that could happen occurred when I was denied tenure and moved in 1980 across town to Bar-Ilan University. I had tried to move to Bar-Ilan from Tel-Aviv some years previously, but, ironically, because of the deep ideological divide of the time, I was suspect in approaching Bar-Ilan from Tel-Aviv University. Jacob Paroush paved the way to Bar-Ilan. When I had asked Irving Kravis to approach a university in Israel on my behalf, I had not known about the existence of Bar-Ilan. My academic record was superior to that of others to whom tenure was given at Tel-Aviv but my traditional Jewish outlook and unwillingness to accommodate to the principles of the left made me, as one forthright faculty member old me, ‘not our sort of person’. Her honesty was much appreciated.

Bar-Ilan was subject to two sources of enmity, the left that sought to downplay Jewish traditions, and orthodox Jews who rejected that anything beyond yeshiva learning was necessary and who objected to male and female students in the same class. Orthodox Jews are in a difficult situation. They continue to wait for the coming of the messiah to gather Jews from the corners of the earth to recreate that the state of Israel as the restored kingdom of David, but Israel has already been recreated and Jews ingathered. The conditions of the messianic age seem to be present. Jews can defend themselves and there is food and economic sustenance for everybody. The orthodox cannot however abandon their belief that the true reborn state of Israel is yet to come. Abandonment of the belief would contradict foundations of their belief system.      

 

Academia

At Bar-Ilan, I self-discovered the Public Choice School by reading the 1980 volume ‘Toward a Rent-Seeking Society’. The papers of Gordon Tullock and others in the volume were wise and immediately comprehensible. Here was economics that expressed ideas directly and did not hide behind a façade of exaggerated technicality and abstraction that was intended to pass for intellect and sophistication.

In the age before the internet, visiting academic positions were a means of broadening perspectives. In spring of 1979 a visit to the Australian National University led to joint research with Ngo Van Long, Peter Swan, and Jim Cassing (who was visiting from the University of Pittsburgh). Max Corden, Fred Gruen, and Robert Gregory were there for interesting discussions. During a stay as visiting professor at UCLA in 1985-87, I benefitted from the intellectual depth of Robert Clower, Harold Demsetz, Arnold Harberger, and Jack Hirshleifer. Sebastian Edwards, Ed Leamer, David Levine, and John Riley were also stimulating colleagues. At UCLA, I met Heinrich Ursprung, with whom a long research collaboration began. I benefitted from two semesters, separated by some years, at Princeton, where I had the good company of Gene Grossman and Avinash Dixit. A stay in 1990 in the newly created Transition Unit of the World Bank under the directorship of Alan Gelb and subsequent return visits sponsored by Manuel Hinds provided opportunities to travel to and study transition countries at first hand. Being ‘on the ground’ for discussions with government officials reaffirmed the validity of my political-economy perspective on the transition from socialism. A research program with Željko Bogetić of the World Bank continued over the years.

Beginning in the year 2000, Vito Tanzi and Sanjeev Gupta, who had introduced recognition of corruption as an impediment to development into IMF research and policy discussion, invited me to participate in studies of low-income countries with staff members of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department. During my initial visit to the IMF, I formulated a Nietzschean view of development failure. It seemed to me that the primary impediment to development in low-income countries was not corruption but rather absence of ethics and the rule of law. The strong appropriated the output of the weak, which undermined incentives of the weak to be productive. The weak have an incentive to pretend to be lazy or unproductive, and to rely on non-appropriable means of happiness, such as music and dance. The domination of the weak by the strong includes the subjugation of women by men. I approached Stanley Fischer, then deputy chief of the IMF, and asked him whether it was acceptable to put out an IMF research paper on the themes of Nietzsche. He replied ‘fine as long as you do not blame the poor for their predicament’, which my Nietzschean model certainly did not do.    

If I have been an iconoclast, it is not as a matter of principle, and not at all from the viewpoint of the public-choice school. I did not accept the at-the-time mainstream explanations for public policy based on the ‘public-economics’ model of benevolent government. Because of the Marxian connotations (contributing according to ability), I was uncomfortable with lump-sum taxes and with the assumption of government seeking to maximize social welfare.

The experience of 20 years as editor and editor-in-chief of the European Journal of Political Economy (from 1994 to 2015) has brought me to understand the discretion that editors have over what will be published. My co-editor Henry Ursprung and I aimed for objectivity and fairness with authors. We did not wish to treat others as we had been treated by some editors, who had at times been supercilious and condescending, and for whom, in the absence of objective criteria for evaluating merit, the scope was present to favor friends and acquaintances, and perhaps authors from leading U.S. departments.

Although I have published papers in the ‘leading’ professional journals, I should point out that the peer-review system for academic publications is far from being fair and objective. Personal connections and luck matter in the review process and a researcher’s academic affiliation can influence editorial decisions. I was an editor of the European Journal of Political Economy (Elsevier) for two decades. The journal was founded as a protest by Manfred Holler as a response to perceived injustice in the editorial handling of a paper that he had submitted to the American Economic Review. It is to Manfred Holler’s credit that he did more than complain. As an editor, I saw how much discretion there is in accepting or rejecting papers. It can only be taken for granted that editors at other journals have similar discretion. My co-editors and I sought to give submitted papers fair evaluation – because of the merits of fairness and objectivity, and out of respect for the motivation for the founding of the journal by Manfred Holler. If we wish to judge the merits of a paper, we should read the paper, rather than basing judgment on the journal in which the paper happened to be published. This is in particular the case for authors outside of the elites of the ‘leading departments’ who pre-specify their ‘hot topics’ for a bandwagon effect so that they can cite one another and review each other’s papers for the journals that they control.

Since 1989, Henry Ursprung and I have organized the Silvaplana workshop in political economy in the mountains of eastern Switzerland. The workshop was initiated to promote political economy when political economy was not mainstream. The workshop combines presentation of papers with mountain treks and on-the-way discussions. An open call for papers is issued every year. In 1994 Henry Ursprung and I were awarded the Max-Planck Prize for our research in political economy.

Bill Ethier, my graduate school advisor, once told me that I was ‘ahead of my time’. Which implies that I should have waited. But for what I do not know. Perhaps for ideas to emanate from the ‘leading’ departments. Dennis Snower has told me how a paper of his was rejected at a leading journal but then the idea was found in a subsequent paper published by an author from a ‘leading’ U.S. university. When he asked the author to explain, he was told that no idea is publishable until it has been worked through and elucidated in a ‘leading’ economics department.

In October 2015, because of a legally specified age limit, I was obliged to change my status to professor emeritus. The change is inconsequential. I keep my office, students, research funds, and my professional life. A reduced teaching load provides more flexibility to travel, interrupted however in 2020 by the covid virus.

I was proud in March 2016 to receive an honorary doctorate from the University of Genoa. The University has a long tradition, dating back to at least 1471. Genoa is the suggested birthplace of Christopher Columbus, the discoverer of the ‘new world’. There are indications that Columbus may have been a Converso or hidden Jew, who set out in 1492, the year of the Spanish expulsion of Jews, to find a new world.

Jews were not safe from the Inquisition in the Spanish New World. The discovery of the ‘New World’ had unfortunate consequences for native populations. The New World however has given us the United States, in which equality of opportunity displaced European privilege and hierarchy. The independence of the Unites States provided a bastion of freedom. Australia followed. European settlement began, because the American colonies were no longer available to take the convicts.

It is a remarkable historical continuity that in the 21st century the Jews and their state have special treatment. The capital of the Jewish state is recognized by few countries beyond the United States, borders are not recognized, books are written about the case of existence of Israel, proclamations are made about the right of the Jewish state to self-defense as if this were not an elemental human right, and boycotts are organized against people and goods from Israel. The famous Catalonian professor once told me gleefully that ‘you are Israelis, you can take it’. The source of the historical continuity and the accompanying emotion are interesting topics of research.

 

Arye L. Hillman

29 October 2020

CV

PERSONAL AND CAREER INFORMATION

Summary:  Since 1980 I have been on the faculty of Bar-Ilan University in Israel, where I continue to teach. My undergraduate studies were at the University of Newcastle in Australia. I have an M.Ecs (Hons) degree from Macquarie University in Sydney and a PhD in economics from the University of Pennsylvania, where I was an Economics Research Fellow for the duration of my  studies. Much of my research over the years was conducted with Heinrich Ursprung. We were awarded jointly the Max-Planck Prize for Humanities Sciences. I have an honorary doctorate from the University of Genoa and have been an invited professor and have taught at UCLA, Princeton, the University of Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne), the University of Catania, and the Australian National University, and has been a fellow of the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science at Kobe University. My most recent parallel appointment has been as research fellow at Ariel University. I had the opportunity to conduct research on the transition from socialism under the auspices of the World Bank and on impediments to economic development at the International Monetary Fund. I was born in 1947 in Germany, the only surviving child of parents who were survived the holocaust under German occupation. Surviving physically does not imply necessarily surviving emotionally. The trauma of my parents’ loss of their young children and their not knowing every day whether they would live or die was transmitted to me. Research shows that the trauma is transmitted to further generations. My wife Jeannette and I have 4 children, 18 grandchildren, and to date four great grandchildren.

 

Date of birth: 13 January 1947

Place of birth: Bad Wörishofen, U.S. zone, Germany

Immigration to Australia 1952

Married Jeannette Hillman (née Mann) 1967

Graduate school U.S. 1970-1973

Immigration to Israel 1974

 

Higher education

B.A., First Class Honors in Economics and the University Medal, University of Newcastle, Australia 1963-67 (honors thesis advisor Paul Sherwood)

M. Ecs. (Honors), Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia 1968-70, degree awarded in 1972 (external thesis advisor Peter Lloyd, Australian National University)

PhD Economics, University of Pennsylvania, USA 1970-73 (thesis advisors Albert Ando, Wilfred Ethier)

 

Academic position

Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, from 1980. Professor of Economics and William Gittes Chair, 1984 -2015. Professor emeritus with retained office and teaching from 2016. Previously Senior Lecturer 1980-1982. Associate Professor 1982-1984.

 

Previous positions

Macquarie University, Sydney. Senior teaching fellow 1968, lecturer with tenure 1969-1970 (resigned June 1970 to begin graduate studies)

University of Pennsylvania, Research Fellow, Economics Research Unit (concurrent with graduate studies) 1970-1973

Tel-Aviv University, Department of Economics, lecturer 1974-78

Ariel University, Research Fellow 2017-2019

 

Visiting positions

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne, Paris. Visiting professor, Master in Economics Program, Spring semesters 2010, 2011, 2012

Princeton University, School of Public Policy and International Affairs (Woodrow Wilson School) and Department of Economics, visiting professor of economics, fall semester 2004

The World Bank, Washington DC, Research Fellow, Socialist Economies Reform Unit, February–September 1990

Princeton University, School of Public Policy and International Affairs (Woodrow Wilson School) and Department of Economics, visiting professor of economics, spring semester 1989

University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), visiting professor, Department of Economics, 1985-1987

Australian National University, visiting lecturer, The Faculties (Public Finance), 1979

University of Illinois at Urbana, visiting assistant professor of economics, 1973-74

 

Offices and honors

Max-Planck Prize for Humanities Sciences, joint with Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1994

President, European Public Choice Society, 1996-1997

Fellow, Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science, 2000

Honorary doctorate, University of Genoa, March 2016

 

Conference organization

Silvaplana workshop in political economy: Organized with Professor Heinrich Ursprung, University of Konstanz, annually since 1989

Ariel University biennial conference on themes of the political economy of public policy: Organized with Daniel Schiffman, Idit Sohlberg, and Ariel faculty, since 2017  

 

Editorial positions

European Journal of Political Economy (Elsevier): Editor and editor-in-chief, 1994-2014

Open-Assessment E-journal, Associate editor for Political Economy and Institutions 2006-2020

Australian Economic Papers, editorial board since 2004

Editorial Board, The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, since 1995

International Advisory Board, Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archive), 1995-2015

Associate Editor, Economics and Politics, 1990-1999

 

PhD thesis supervision, Bar-Ilan University

Yoav Zeif, 1999. Three essays in international trade policy and income distribution

Shirit Katav-Herz, 2002, Social norms, labor standards, and international consequences

Ronen Bar-El, 2006. Essays in intergenerational economics

Odelia Rosin, 2008. The economic consequences of obesity

Yariv Weltzman, 2010. The persistence of ineffective aid

Rezina Sultana, 2011. Essays on the political economy of economic development

Doron Klunover, 2016. Three essays in the theory of contests

 

Courses taught (graduate and undergraduate)

Public economics; Political economy; Public policy; International economics; Microeconomic theory

 

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Short-term visitor

2011-2020: Jadavpur University, Department of Economics, Kolkata, February 2020; Queensland University of Technology, Department of Economics December 2019; Huazhong University of Science and Technology, School of Public Administration, Wuhan, November 2016; Guangxi Normal University, School of Political Science and Public Administration, Guilin, November 2016; University of NSW Business School, November 2015; University of Queensland, Department of Economics, November-December 2015; University of Melbourne, Faculty of Business and Economics, Melbourne Institute, July 2013; Monash University, Department of Economics, August 2012

2000-2010: University of Freiburg, Institute for Economic Research, M. Ec. Program, 2009; Humboldt University, Berlin, July 2007; University of Havana, October 2006; Cambridge University, Faculty of Economics, January-February 2005; Huazhong University of Science and Technology, School of Public Administration, Wuhan, August 2005; International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., Fiscal Affairs Department, summers 2000-2003; Kobe University, January-February 2000; Nanyang Technological University Singapore Albert Winsemius Professor, August 2000; University of Catania, March 2000

Pre-2000: Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences, Budapest (now Corvinus University of Budapest); Monash University, Center for Excellence, July 1981, July 1982; Australian National University, Research School of Social Sciences summer 1980

 

 

 

Books

The Political Economy of Protection

Arye L. Hillman, 1989. Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur. Reprinted 2001 by Routledge, London, and 2014 by Taylor and Francis (Routledge), London

A basic principle of the theory of international trade is that free trade is efficient. Possible externalities aside, people can only gain from voluntary exchange. This book considered the reasons why political decision makers have chosen not to allow free trade. Standard trade theory at the time of writing of the book had used the Musgrave separation between efficiency and distributional decisions through lump-sum taxes and transfers.  Yet, because such taxes and transfers are generally not available, the efficiency of free trade is compromised by governments seeking distributional objectives through trade policies. Standard trade theory also assumed benevolent governments choosing policies to maximize social welfare and explained protectionism as a second-best policy of the social-welfare maximizing governments. This volume describes decision makers who have political objectives that are not necessarily consistent with the public interest. Since the initial publication of the book, the political-economy themes of the book have become common place in the literature on international trade policy.

Public Finance and Public Policy: A Political Economy Perspective on Responsibilities and Limitations of Government

Arye L. Hillman, 2019 (3rd edition). Cambridge University Press, New York NY (1st Edition, 2003, 2nd Edition, 2009).

Other language editions: Japanese 2006, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo; Chinese 2006, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing; Russian, 2009, Publishing House of the State University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow; Greek, 2013, Papazisis publishers, Athens; Hebrew (electronic)

Public Finance and Public Policy studies the responsibilities and limitations of government in a market economy. Featuring the same wealth of real-life examples and rigorous but accessible exposition of previous editions, the third edition has been reorganized and fully updated. The traditional public-finance topics are covered of public goods, externalities, unwanted markets, and asymmetric information. The quest for social justice is considered in terms of social insurance, moral hazard, and social mobility. Public choice concepts are applied to evaluating how politics affects societal efficiency and income distribution. Political economy is supplemented by behavioral concepts such as trust, fairness, envy, and hyperbolic discounting. The book is suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students taking courses on public policy and government and the market, this book offers an accessible introduction to the subject without excessive technicality.

 

Edited Volumes

Arye L. Hillman (Ed.), 1991. Markets and Politicians: Politicized Economic Choice. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston and Dordrecht. http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9780792391357

Arye L. Hillman and Branko Milanovic (Eds.), 1992. The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1992/09/440179/transition-soc…

Arye L. Hillman and Željko Bogetić (Eds.), 1995. Financing Government in Transition, Bulgaria: The Political Economy of Tax Policies, Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1995. Reprinted by Avebury Publishing, Brookfield, Vermont, 1996. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1995/09/697061/bulgaria-finan…

Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), 2008. The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK. http://www.e-elgar.com/shop/the-wto-and-the-political-economy-of-trade-…

Roger D. Congleton, Arye L, Hillman, and Kai Konrad (Eds.), 2008. 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking. Springer, Heidelberg. Volume 1: Theory of Rent Seeking. Volume 2: Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783540791881

Roger D. Congleton and Arye L, Hillman (Eds.), 2015. Companion to Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK. https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/companion-to-the-political-economy-of-rent…

Publications

Selected publications by field

  1. International trade and migration (politics and protectionist trade policies; politics and international trade liberalization; asset markets and political choice of trade policy; trade embargoes; environmentalists and trade policy; international migration)
  2. Politics and public policy (privileged policies rent seeking; expressive behavior and public policy; the Nobel Peace Prize and public policy; voluntary sharing and self-financing; tax-base competition)
  3. Applications of political economy (the transition from socialism; development failure; supreme values; prejudice and discrimination; choosing to have a king)
  4. Research at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund


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1.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MIGRATION

POLITICS AND PROTECTIONIST TRADE POLICIES

My research in political economy began with international trade policy. How were trade policies that departed from  efficient free trade to be explained? The prevailing explanation was that market inefficiencies led benevolent governments to restrict international trade (the explanation was promoted by Jagdish Bhagwati of the MIT economics department, who referred to markets as ‘distorted’ and as requiring correction by means that included restrictions on international trade). I showed how objectives of political support explained use of tariffs to protect industries facing increasing import competition because of falling world prices (American Economic Review 1982). The politically determined tariff did not fully compensating an industry for the lower world price, leaving benefit for consumers through a lower domestic price. The proposal that political calculations underlie protectionist trade policies was taken up by Gene Grossman (Princeton) and Elhanan Helpman (Harvard) who formulated an elegant model (American Economic Review 1994) in which a politician extracted money (rents in economic terminology) from producers seeking tariff protection against imports (they called their model ‘protection for sale’). Before the publication of ‘protection for sale’, I had extended the idea of political policy determination to explain industry collapse in the face of import competition (with James Cassing, American Economic Review 1986), and to explain how political competition between contenders for political office could result in an import quota for which quota rents were assigned to foreign producers (with Heinrich Ursprung American Economic Review 1988). The foreign producers were permitted (or instructed) to form an export cartel. Motivation was actual policy of the U.S. government. The book ‘The Political Economy of Protection’ (1989, reissued and reprinted 2014) reviewed the political influences on the conduct of international trade policy.

Arye L. Hillman, 1982. Declining industries and political-support protectionist motives. American Economic Review 72, 1180-1187.

Reprinted in:

  • The WTO, Safeguards, and Temporary Protection from Imports, Chad Brown (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2006.
  • The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 43 – 50.
  • Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 – Applications Rent Seeking in Practice. Roger D. Congleton et al. (Eds.), Springer, Berlin, 2008, pp. 105 – 112.

James H. Cassing and Arye L. Hillman, 1986. Shifting comparative advantage and senescent industry collapse. American Economic Review 76, 516-523.

Reprinted in:

  • The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 516 – 523.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1988. Domestic politics, foreign interests and international trade policy. American Economic Review 78, 729-745.

Reprinted in:

  • International Trade, J. Peter Neary (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1996.
  • The Globalization of the World Economy: Trade and Investment Policy, Thomas Brewer (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1999, pp. 470 – 86.
  • The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 99 -115.

Also: Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1994. Domestic politics, foreign interests, and international trade policy: Reply, American Economic Review, 1994, 84, 1476-78.

Arye L. Hillman, 1989. The Political Economy of Protection. Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur. Reprinted 2001 by Routledge, London. Reprinted 2013 by Taylor and Francis Abingdon UK.

http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415753654/

 

POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION

The view of trade liberalization propagated by trade theorists had been that governments were retreating from ‘optimum tariffs’ that they had imposed to improve their terms of trade. Papers with Peter Moser and Ngo Van Long  proposed that reciprocal trade liberalization should be viewed as ‘political exchange of market access.’ Through trade negotiations, governments made the ‘concessions’ of allowing each other’s exporters to sell in their domestic markets. The idea of ‘concessions’ is consistent with the actual conduct of trade negotiations.

Arye L. Hillman, Peter Moser and Ngo Van Long, 1995. Modeling reciprocal trade liberalization: The political-economy and national-welfare perspectives. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik (Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics) 131, 503-515.

Arye L. Hillman and Peter Moser, 1996. Trade liberalization as politically optimal exchange of market access. In: Matthew Canzoneri, Wilfred Ethier, and Vittorio Grilli (Eds.), The New Transatlantic Economy, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, pp. 295-312.  

Reprinted in:

  • The Global Trading System, volume 2, Core Rules and Procedures, Kym Anderson and Bernard Hoekman (Eds.), I. B. Tauris and Co Ltd, London and New York, 2002.
  • The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 290 – 307.

 

ASSET MARKETS AND POLITICAL CHOICE OF TRADE POLICY

Asset markets had not been included in studies of trade policy. A research program with JoAnne Feeney studied how asset markets affected policies. We showed how income diversification through asset markets moderated support for protectionist policies. Asset markets also compromised the case for ‘strategic trade policy’, which had become the favored case for intervention by governments in international markets.

JoAnne Feeney and Arye L. Hillman, 2004. Trade liberalization through asset markets. Journal of International Economics 64, 151-167.

Reprinted in:

  • The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 173 - 189.

JoAnne Feeney and Arye L. Hillman, 2001. Privatization and the political economy of strategic trade policy. International Economic Review 42, 535-556.

 

TRADE EMBARGOS

Studies below appear to be the first analyses of trade subject to the threat of boycotts or embargoes. A country was studied subject to embargo threat when importing products such a defense equipment. Public-policy conclusions were derived when a country that is threatened with an embargo on imports of a depletable resource such as oil has substitutable domestic resources. The consequences of an oil cartel having joint monopoly power in the international oil and capital markets were studied. The cartel could influence both sides of the Hotelling rule for extraction of depletable resources (the price of oil and the interest rate).

Ruth W. Arad and Arye L. Hillman, 1979. Embargo threat, learning and departure from comparative advantage. Journal of International Economics 9, 265 – 75.

Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long, 1983. Pricing and depletion of an exhaustible resource when there is anticipation of trade disruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 215 – 33.

Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long, 1985. Monopolistic recycling of oil revenue and intertemporal bias in oil depletion and trade. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 597 – 624.

 

ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND TRADE POLICY

A project with Henry Ursprung investigated the influence of environmentalists on political determination of international trade policy. Outcomes were shown to depend on whether the environmentalists are nimbies (not in my backyard) or cared about the global environment.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1992. The influence of environmental concerns on the political determination of international trade policy. In: Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (Eds.), The Greening of World Trade Issues, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI, 1992, pp. 195 – 220.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1994. Greens, super greens, and international trade policy: Environmental concerns and protectionism. In: Carlo Carraro (Ed.), Trade, Innovation, Environment, Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 75 – 108.

 

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Acknowledging that it is people who migrate rather international factor movements taking place affects social and economic policies, including financing of intergenerational transfers. We showed why governments might allow illegal immigration as long as the employment of immigrants was confined to particular sectors and studied emigration as a response to predatory government. Immigrants can be part of the efficiency-wage theory of labor-market equilibrium

Arye L. Hillman, 1994. The political economy of migration policy. In: Horst Siebert (Ed.), Migration: A Challenge for Europe, J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck, Tübingen, pp. 263 – 282.

Arye L. Hillman and Avi Weiss, 1999. A theory of permissible illegal immigration. European Journal of Political Economy 15, 585-604.

Epstein, Gil S., Arye L. Hillman, and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1999. The king never emigrates. Review of Development Economics, 3, 107 – 21.

Reprinted in:

  • Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 – Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 265 – 79.

Epstein, Gil S. and Arye L. Arye L. Hillman 2003. Unemployed immigrants and voter sentiment in the welfare state, Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1641-1655.

Reprinted in:

  • Seiichi Katayama and Heinrich W. Ursprung (Eds.), International Economic Policies in a Globalized World, Springer, Berlin, 2004, pp. 119 – 32.

 

MEASUREMENT OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

In an early paper, I studied ‘revealed comparative advantage’, which had been proposed by Bela Balassa as a measure of comparative advantage in international trade The measure has been a popular means of quantifying comparative advantage. I showed that the measure of ‘revealed comparative advantage’ does not necessarily reveal comparative advantage and derived a sufficient condition for the measure to be valid. The paper was submitted to the journal in which the original paper on ‘revealed comparative advantage’ had been published (the Manchester School). The editor somewhat obtusely rejected the paper on the grounds that ‘revealed comparative advantage was not actually intended to measure (reveal) comparative advantage’. Yet the measure was being used as such and the name accorded to the measure suggested measuring comparative advantage. My study of the measure emanated from research on the consequences for Israel of the initiation in 1988 of the free-trade agreement with Europe. The research was in conjunction with the Kiel Institute. The editor of the journal of the Kiel Institute offered to publish the paper.

Arye L. Hillman, 1980. Observations on the relation between "revealed comparative advantage" and comparative advantage as indicated by pre-trade relative prices. Review of World Economics Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 116, 315 – 21.

  • See also: Jeroen Hinloopen and Charles Van Marrewijk, 2008. Empirical relevance of the Hillman condition and comparative advantage. Applied Economics 40, 2313 – 2328.

 

ENERGY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Introducing energy as a factor of production into the U.S. input-output table allowed asking whether the U.S., which was importing energy (oil) directly at the time, was also importing energy indirectly through the factor content of international trade. We found a version of the Leontief Paradox based on factor complementarity between energy and capital. The U.S., which was a direct importer of energy, was exporting energy indirectly.

Arye L. Hillman and Clark W. Bullard III, 1978. Energy, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and U.S. international trade. American Economic Review 68, 96-106.

Reprinted in:

  • John Cunningham Wood (Ed.), 1997. Bertil Ohlin: Critical Assessments, Routledge, London.

 

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2.. POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

PRIVILEGED POLICIES AND RENT SEEKING

I maintained an interest in international trade and migration. My interests however expanded to the political economy of public policy more generally. Gordon Tullock (Western Economic Journal 1967) had observed that if political decisions created ‘rents’ (or politically assigned privileged benefits), there would be social losses incurred through time and resources used in contesting the rents. Building on his observations, in joint research with Bar-Ilan colleagues at the time Eliakim Katz and Dov Samet, and then at UCLA with John Riley, I developed the theory of social loss through rent seeking to include risk aversion and a contest-success function for which the highest outlay made in a contest for a rent secured the rent (Tullock 1980 had assumed that securing a rent was like winning a lottery). This research project included the link between bribes and rent seeking in hierarchical administrative structures.

Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz, 1984. Risk-averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power. Economic Journal 94, 104-110.

Reprinted in:

  • The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Charles Rowley, Robert Tollison and Gordon Tullock (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1988, pp. 81-90.
  • The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking, Roger Congleton and Robert Tollison (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Oxford, 1995, pp. 243 – 249.
  • The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Charles K, Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston and Dordrecht, pp. 81-90.
  • Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 – The Theory of Rent seeking. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 97 – 103.

Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz, 1987. Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers. Journal of Public Economics, 34, 129-142.

Reprinted in:

  • The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets, Gianluca Fiorentini and Stephano Zamagni (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK 1999. In the series The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics.
  • Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 – The Theory of Rent seeking. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 523 – 536.

Arye L. Hillman and Dov Samet, 1987. Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice, 54, 63-82.

Reprinted in:

  • Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 – The Theory of Rent seeking. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 165 – 184.

See also: Hillman, Arye L. and Dov Samet, 1987. Characterizing equilibrium rent-seeking behavior: A reply to Tullock, Public Choice, 54, 85-87.

Arye L. Hillman and John Riley, 1989. Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1, 17-39.

Reprinted in:

  • Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 – The Theory of Rent seeking. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 185 – 207.

 

EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY

I have defined expressive behavior as encompassing individuals acts that confirm an identity that people have chosen for themselves. The identity need not be consistent with actual behavior. The identity might be one of generosity and benevolence expressed in non-decisive behavior such as voting, rhetoric, and giving to others, when in real-life, in situations in which decisions matter for outcomes, behavior might be self-interested. An expressive-policy trap emerges when a majority of non-decisive voters expressively supported a policy that each voter because of actual adverse consequences would veto if decisive. Gordon Tullock (1971) had used the example of voting for high taxes and income-redistribution but not actually being charitable in true life. I was influenced by the terror that had been unleashed on the people in Israel, but considerable numbers of voters voting for ‘peace’, not because they believed necessarily that peace was achievable, but because they identified themselves as seekers of peace. A natural experiment provides evidence on how identity can override self-interest. When majorities and minorities persist because group identity predetermines how people vote, democracy is usually compromised  because there can be no loyal opposition waiting a turn in government. We studied a case (local-government elections in Israel) in which sustained democracy has been consistent with group identity.

Arye L. Hillman, 2010. Expressive behavior in economics and politics. European Journal of Political Economy 26, 404 – 419.

Arye L. Hillman, 2011. Expressive voting and identity: evidence from a case study of a group of U.S. voters. Public Choice 148, 249-257.

Arye L. Hillman, Kfir Metsuyanim, and Niklas Potrafke, 2015. Democracy with group identity. European Journal of Political Economy, 40(Part B), 274-287.

 

THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AND PUBLIC POLICY

A foundation for political economy or public choice is the principal-agent problem between voters and their political representatives. Voters have imperfect control over the policies that their political representatives choose. It is however uncommon for political representatives to choose policies that are unpopular with large segments of the electorate and that raise the possibility of electoral defeat. Yet that is precisely what happened when the chancellor of Germany and the governing political coalition chose to admit more than a million asylum seekers, who it has been shown have in general intentions regarding permanence that do not differ from the intentions of immigrants, legal or illegal. In a paper on ‘policies and prizes’, Ngo Van Long and I do not judge the ethical merits of a policy of openness to asylum seekers. We were interested in the manifestation of the political principal-agent problem through the quest for the Nobel Peace Prize. The Prize awards money but we focus on the Prize as a ‘rent’ or ‘ego-rent’ (the latter in the terminology of a literature on candidates’ benefits from political office). We also study the anti-immigration policy change that occurred when, despite the display of benevolence, the Nobel Peace Prize was not achieved. We point to other cases in which the Nobel Peace Prize was given (to the negotiators of the end of the Vietnam war and to an American president) and the Prize being sought and not given (the U.S. secretary of state seeking to impose a peace agreement in the middle east).

Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long, 2018. Policies and prizes. European Journal of Political Economy 54, 99-109. Special issue on The Political Economy of Public Policy.

 

VOLUNTARY SHARING AND SELF-FINANCING

An alternative to public finance is voluntary sharing and self-financing. These papers considered efficient club size when there is exclusion. A mechanism for determining inclusion is sale of lottery tickets, which can provide greater revenue than simply selling admission.

Elhanan Helpman, and Arye L. Hillman, 1977. Two remarks on optimal club size. Economica 44, 293 – 96.

Arye L. Hillman and Peter Swan, 1979. Club participation under uncertainty, Economics Letters 4, 307–12.

Arye L. Hillman and Peter Swan, 1983. Participation rules for Pareto-optimal clubs. Journal of Public Economics 20, 55 – 76.

 

TAX-BASE COMPETITION

A literature describes governments competing for tax bases, or competing to tax the same activity or the same source of income. Ostensibly the first paper describing tax competition in a federal system of government is:

James H. Cassing and Arye L. Hillman, 1982. State-federal resource tax rivalry. Economic Record 58, 235 – 241.

 

RELIGION AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM

Does religion influence economic freedom? Using a cross-sectional dataset for 137 countries averaged over the period 2001-2010, we studied how the relation between the three religions derived from Judaism – Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam – and economic freedom. The Protestant ethic requires economic freedom, suggesting a prediction of greater economic freedom in Protestant societies. Islam means ‘submission’, suggesting restrictions on economic freedom. Empirical estimates confirm that Protestantism is most conducive to economic freedom, with Islam least conducive, with Catholicism in between.

Arye L. Hillman and Niklas Potrafke, 2018. Economic freedom and religion: An empirical investigation. Public Finance Review 46(2), 249-275. Special issue on ‘Economic Freedom and Race/Ethnicity’, Gary Hoover editor. CESifo working paper no. 6017 (July 2016)

 

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3. APPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM

The collapse of communism around 1990 was a momentous historical and rent-creating event that merited study. I was fortunate in having been invited in 1990 for an extended stay at the World Bank when the unit focusing on the transition from socialism was initiated and in being able in the 1990s to visit and study numerous countries in transition. The political-economy perspective explained much political behavior and economic outcomes in transition economics. In most countries, grand theft of state property (called privatization) was taking place, when the focus of external policy advice provided to the governments (the politicians) in the transition economies was on how to benevolently improve economic outcomes.

Arye L. Hillman, 1992. Progress with privatization. Journal of Comparative Economics 16, 733 – 749.

Arye L. Hillman, 1994. The transition from socialism: An overview from a political-economy perspective. European Journal of Political Economy 10, 191 – 225. Special issue, Festschrift in honor of Peter Bernholz, edited by Manfred Gärtner and Heinrich W. Ursprung.

There was self-interested political opportunism in the transition, starting from the top. This was not Moses taking his people to the Promised Land. Predictions regarding the success of transition to a high-income market economy depended on whether the prior political culture that was based on personal dispensation of privilege and rents would be retained.

Alan Gelb, Arye L. Hillman, and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1998. Rents as distractions: Why the exit from transition is prolonged. In: Nicolas C. Baltas, George Demopoulos, and Joseph Hassid (Eds.), Economic Interdependence and Cooperation in Europe, Springer, Heidelberg, 21 – 38.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2000. Political culture and economic decline. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 189-213. Reprinted in:

  • Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 – Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 219 – 243.

Arye L. Hillman, 2002. On the way to the Promised Land: ten years in the wilderness without Moses. Published in Russian (translated by Mark Levin). Economics and Mathematical Methods - Journal of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 38, 78 – 94.

Rather than contesting privileges and benefits bestowed by a central government, local political leaders could do better controlling their own populations directly. The word ‘transition’ implies a process with an endpoint but the ‘transition’ from socialism remained an ongoing process. I suggested an analogy with the metamorphosis of a caterpillar to a butterfly. In the case of the butterfly, transition is not observed, but a beautiful creature predictably emerges. Transition from socialism was observable but the outcome was not predictable and need not be beautiful. I studied why the transition from socialism had resulted in the creation of numerous states of the USSR when tendencies in Europe were towards unified policies. Again at the forefront of an answer were political privileges and rents.

Arye L. Hillman, 2003. Interpretations of transition. In: Nauro F. Campos and Jan Fidrmuc (Eds.), Political Economy of Transition and Development: Institutions, Politics, and Policies, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 23 – 40.

 Arye L. Hillman, 2005. Political institutions, jurisdictional boundaries, and rent creation. Keio Economic Studies, 42 nos. 1-2, 25 – 37. Special issue in honor of Professor Michihiro Ohyama, edited by Wilfred J. Ethier and Makoto Yano.

Around 1988 a transition from socialism was also beginning in Israel. The kibbutz in Israel is well-known as a successful application of collectivist principles. The foundations for the existence of the state of Israel were laid by the kibbutz system, which allowed defense of communities in a hostile environment and also avoided the low market wages through labor cooperation. Motivation overcame the moral hazard that required the coercion and near slavery of the communist system and resulted in the collapse of cooperative systems elsewhere. Collective ownership in Israel went far beyond the agricultural kibbutz. Nearly all means of production were collectively owned. Free-trade agreements with Europe and the United States that came into force in 1988 created social dilemmas because of inconsistency of socialist organization with import competition from profit-focused foreign producers. My 1988 paper described the economy-wide structure of collective ownership that would have to change if transition to a market-economy were to take place. The paper clearly placed me outside of the socialist establishment that still controlled the economy and the public service. There were very few other economists out there with me. There were personal costs because of benefits forgone from socialist patronage including consulting contracts and membership of boards of directors of the socialist enterprises (owned not by the state but effectively by the Labor Party. There could also be personal costs in an economics department otherwise composed of the Party faithful. Hayek was insightful in observing that the true motive for socialist organization of industry and society might be megalomania of politicians and public administrators (and academic deans) who want to control others. The economy of Israel made a successful transition from socialism and in 2020 Israel was a developed high-income economy.

Arye L. Hillman, 1988. Impediments to a competitive environment in Israel. Presented at Symposium on American-Israel Economic Relations in Honor of the 40th Anniversary of the State of Israel, New York (June 1988). With preface added January 2016.

Available from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arye_Hillman?origin=publication_li…

Arye L. Hillman 1991. Liberalization dilemmas. In Markets and Politicians: Politicized Economic Choice, Arye L. Hillman (Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht and Boston, chapter 10, pp. 189 – 207.

 

DEVELOPMENT FAILURE

Why, given all the resources that have provided through aid to poor countries, have successes of economic development been so few? The question becomes ideologically sensitive if the explanation for development failure is that aid resources are provided to governments that appropriate the resources for the benefit of politically-connected elite families or for the personal benefit of the autocratic rulers themselves. The sensitivity is that governments are being criticized instead of being exhorted to be benevolent and to follow advice that accompanies aid about to improve the lives of the poor. My research on development failure showed how political interest was an impediment to aid helping the poor to escape poverty. Much of the research was conducted at the International Monetary Fund where the Fiscal Affairs Division was concerned that corruption in aid-recipient countries made the aid given and the accompanying advice given ineffective. When it was suggested that I look at impediments to economic development because of corruption in government, I switched the topic to locations in which the strong simply take advantage of the weak. I called such circumstances those of a Nietzschean society, after the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. The source of strength of the strong was usually authoritarian control of government and the military. Corruption could not be said to be present because there was no rule of law that could designate corruption as illegal.

Arye L. Hillman, 2004. Nietzschean development failures. Public Choice 119(3), 263 – 280.

Arye L. Hillman and Eva Jenkner, 2004. User payments for basic education in low-income countries. In: Helping countries Develop: The Role of Fiscal Policy, Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, and Gabriela Inchauste (Eds.), International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 2004, pp. 233 – 264.

  • Non-technical version: How to pay for basic education: Poor children in poor countries, Economic Issues 33, 2004, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.

Baldacci, Emanuele, Arye L. Hillman, and Naoko Kojo, 2004. Growth, governance, and fiscal-policy transmission channels in low-income countries. European Journal of Political Economy 20, 517 – 549.

Reprinted in:

  • Helping countries Develop: The Role of Fiscal Policy, Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, and Gabriela Inchauste (Eds.), International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 2004, pp. 67 – 104.

Arye L. Hillman, 2007. Democracy and low-income countries. In José Casas Pardo and Pedro Schwartz (Eds.), Public Choice and Challenges of Democracy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K., pp. 277 – 294.

 

SUPREME VALUES

A step beyond authoritarian government is totalitarian government, which based on ideology controls the totality of people’s lives (or quite often ends people’s lives). Peter Bernholz has studied supreme values as underlying totalitarian government. The supreme values are defined by an ideological ranking of objectives that do not allow substitution among the objectives (known as lexographic preferences). The message is that, when confronting an adversary that has a supreme-value ideology, no prospect of compromise should be expected. Supreme values contradict the idea that soft diplomacy and persuasion can convince an adversary to stand down rather to engage in conflict.

Raphael Franck, Arye L. Hillman, and Miriam Krausz, 2005. Public safety and the moral dilemma in the defense against terror. Defense and Peace Economics 16(5), 347 – 364..

Arye L. Hillman, 2007. Economic and security consequences of supreme values. Public Choice 30, 259 – 280.

  • Also published as: An economic perspective on radical Islam. In Hillel Frisch and Efraim Inbar (Eds.), 2008. Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses, Routledge, London, pp. 44 – 69.

Arye L. Hillman, 2020. Harming a favored side: An anomaly with supreme values and good intentions. Public Choice.

 

PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

My interest in the study of supreme values combines with understanding prejudice and discrimination.  Absence of objective criteria for the evaluation of economic research allows subjectivism and bias in peer evaluation. The bias can reflect prejudice and result in academic exclusion. Heinrich Ursprung and I studied three cases of academic exclusion – of Alexander Del Mar, J.A. Hobson, and Gordon Tullock, all of whom challenged mainstream views of their time. Del Mar challenged the mainstream view on the role of money and monetary theory, but in addition was excluded because, with a belief in eugenics that prevailed at the time, Del Mar, in being Jewish, was declared by anti-Semites to be incapable of original thought. Hobson was regarded as a traitor to his class for advocating fair treatment for lower classes. Gordon Tullock’s proposal that rent seeking was a source of inefficiency implied that governments, rather than benevolently maximizing social welfare, created privilege through designation of beneficiaries of rents. Tullock thereby challenged the mainstream ideological view of government as benevolent and efficiency-seeking. Tullock’s paper introducing rent seeking was rejected by an editor of the American Economic Review who was an open avowed Maoist, and who at the same time as rejecting Tullock’s paper accepted a paper that attributed inefficiency to people who were not contributing to the social good because they were shirking (and who might require re-education to teach them to contribute according to ability). After initial academic exclusion, Alexander Del Mar, J.A. Hobson, and Gordon Tullock were in due course recognized for the originality and the merits of their ideas. Each however incurred personal costs because of prejudice.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. Academic exclusion: Some experiences. Public Choice, 167(1), 1-20.

The literature on prejudice against Jews and extended to the Jewish state provides extensive historical accounts of atrocities and hate. There has been less attention directed at explaining the foundations of the prejudice. Is the prejudice explained by economic or behavioral concepts? Behavioral explanations are envy, fear, and cognitive dissonance. The extent of prejudice found in a population appears related to whether luck or effort is perceived to be the primary determinant of personal success.

Arye L. Hillman, 2013. Economic and behavioral foundations of prejudice. In Charles Asher Small (Ed.), Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Netherlands, and Boston, MA, pp. 51-67.

Data on voting in the United Nations General Assembly between January 1990 and June 2015 reveal a preoccupation with one country, Israel, which appears in 65 percent of resolutions in which a country is named. The resolutions are perennial and consistently critical. With resolutions non-binding, UN General Assembly voting is expressive. We explain the prejudice in UN voting as primarily due to decoy voting, to deflect attention from autocrats’ violations of human rights of their people. A related study on voting on the United Nations Goldstone Report found significant differences between democracies and autocracies regarding whether self-defense against state-sponsored terror was a war crime.

 

Raphael N. Becker, Arye L. Hillman, Niklas Potrafke, Alexander H. Schwemmer, 2015. The preoccupation of the United Nations with Israel: Evidence and theory. Review of International Organizations 10(4), 413-437.

Arye L. Hillman and Niklas Potrafke, 2015. The UN Goldstone Report and Retraction: An empirical investigation. Public Choice 163(3), 247-266.

 

CHOOSING TO HAVE A KING

Thomas Hobbes in his book Leviathan (1651), sought to justify a leviathan or king with all-encompassing power. To justify his leviathan, Hobbes used the response of the prophet Samuel to the request by the tribes of Israel that a king be chosen to be pointed over them. Hobbes portrayed Samuel as supporting choosing a king. Hobbes however misrepresented Samuel who warned ‘you will regret the day that you appointed a king’. Hobbes’ father was a clergyman and he had access to the bible, including in English. Hobbes stopped short of including the sentence containing Samuel’s warning.

Hillman, Arye L., 2009. Hobbes and the prophet Samuel on leviathan government. Public Choice 141, 1 – 4.

Hillman, Arye L., 2009. Hobbes and Samuel: reply (to Geoffrey Brennan). Public Choice 141, 13 – 15.

 

 

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4.. RESEARCH AT THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

Edited volumes

Arye L. Hillman and Branko Milanovic (Eds.), 1992. The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1992/09/440179/transition-socialism-eastern-europe-domestic-restructuring-foreign-trade

Arye L. Hillman and Željko Bogetić (Eds.), 1995. Financing Government in Transition, Bulgaria: The Political Economy of Tax Policies, Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1995. Reprinted by Avebury Publishing, Brookfield, Vermont, 1996.

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1995/09/697061/bulgaria-financing-government-transition-political-economy-tax-policies-tax-bases-tax-evasion

 

Research papers

Arye L. Hillman and Adi Schnytzer, 1992. Creating the reform-resistant dependent economy: Socialist comparative advantage, enterprise incentives and the CMEA. In: Arye L. Hillman and Branko Milanovic (Eds.), The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade, The World Bank, Washington, DC, chapter 10, pp. 243 – 262.

Arye L. Hillman, Istvan Abel, and David Tarr, 1992. The government budgetary consequences of reform of the CMEA system of international trade: The case of Hungary. In: Arye L. Hillman and Branko Milanovic (Eds.), The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade, The World Bank, Washington, DC, chapter 12, 277-293.

Željko Bogetić and Arye L. Hillman, 1994. The tax base in the transition: The case of Bulgaria. Policy Research Working Paper number 1267, The World Bank, Washington, DC. Published in: Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 1994, 6, 267-282. Updated as: Bogetić, Željko and Arye L. Hillman, 1995. The choice of a tax system. In: Željko Bogetić and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Financing Government in Transition, Bulgaria: The Political Economy of Tax Policies Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., pp. pp. 33 – 46.

Arye L. Hillman, Lubomir Mitov and R. Kyle Peters, 1995. The private sector, state enterprises, and informal economic activity. In: Željko Bogetić and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.)Financing Government in Transition, Bulgaria: The Political Economy of Tax Policies, Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion, , The World Bank, Washington, D.C., pp. 47 – 70.

Arye L. Hillman, Manuel Hinds, Branko Milanovic, and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1997. Protectionist pressures and enterprise restructuring: The political economy of trade policy in transition. In: Trade and Tax Policy, Inflation and Exchange Rates, Assaf Razin and Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau (Eds.), Springer: Heidelberg, pp. 215 – 243.

 Arye L. Hillman, 2004. Poverty, inequality, and unethical behavior of the strong. Working Paper no 00/187, November 2000, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. Revised and published as Nietzschean development failures. Public Choice 119, 263 – 280.

Emanuele Baldacci, Arye L. Hillman, and Naoko Kojo, 2004. Growth, governance, and fiscal-policy transmission channels in low-income countries. European Journal of Political Economy 20, 517 – 549. Revised version of Working Paper no 03/237, December 2003, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. Reprinted in: Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, and Gabriela Inchauste (Eds.), 2004. Helping countries Develop: The Role of Fiscal Policy, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, pp. 67 – 104.

Arye L. Hillman and Eva Jenkner, 2004. User payments for basic education in low-income countries. In: Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, and Gabriela Inchauste (Eds.), 2004. Helping countries Develop: The Role of Fiscal Policy, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, pp. 233 – 264. Working Paper no 02/182, November 2002, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. Non-technical version: How to pay for basic education: Poor children in poor countries, Economic Issues 33, 2004, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.

Christian Bjørnskov, Željko Bogetić, Arye L. Hillman, and Milenko Popović, 2014. Trust and identity in a small post-socialist post-crisis society. Europe and Central Asia Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Policy Research Working Paper 6828, The World Bank, Washington DC.

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/17713/WPS682…

 


 

 

ALL PUBLICATIONS (CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

BOOKS

Arye L. Hillman, 1989/2001/2013. The Political Economy of Protection. Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur. Reprinted 2001 Routledge, London; 2013 by Taylor and Francis (Routledge), London https://www.crcpress.com/The-Political-Economy-of-Protection/Hillman/p/…

Arye L. Hillman, 2003/2009/2019 (3rd edition). Public Finance and Public Policy: A Political Economy Perspective on Responsibilities and Limitations of Government, Cambridge University Press, New York NY

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/public-finance-and-public-policy/F…

Other language editions: Japanese 2006, Keiso Shobo, Tokyo; Chinese 2006, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing; Russian, 2009, Publishing House of the State University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow; Greek, 2013, Papazisis publishers, Athens; Hebrew (electronic)

 

EDITED VOLUMES

Arye L. Hillman (Ed.), 1991. Markets and Politicians: Politicized Economic Choice. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston and Dordrecht. http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9780792391357

Arye L. Hillman and Branko Milanovic (Eds.), 1992. The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1992/09/440179/transition-socialism-eastern-europe-domestic-restructuring-foreign-trade

Arye L. Hillman and Željko Bogetić (Eds.), 1995. Financing Government in Transition, Bulgaria: The Political Economy of Tax Policies, Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1995. Reprinted by Avebury Publishing, Brookfield, Vermont, 1996.

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1995/09/697061/bulgaria-financing-government-transition-political-economy-tax-policies-tax-bases-tax-evasion

Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), 2008. The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK. http://www.e-elgar.com/shop/the-wto-and-the-political-economy-of-trade-policy

Roger D. Congleton, Arye L, Hillman, and Kai Konrad (Eds.), 2008. 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking. Springer, Heidelberg. Volume 1: Theory of Rent Seeking. Volume 2: Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice

http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783540791881

Roger D. Congleton and Arye L, Hillman (Eds.), 2015. Companion to Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK. https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/companion-to-the-political-economy-of-rent-seeking

 

JOURNAL ARTICLES

2020

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2020. Investigation in search of truth (introduction to a special issue in honor of the 90th birthday of Peter Bernholz). Public Choice, 1-6.

Toke Aidt, Arye L. Hillman, and Liu Qijun, 2020. Who takes bribes and how much? Evidence from the China Corruption Conviction Databank. World Development 133 (September) 104985.

Arye L. Hillman, 2020. Constitutional political economy: Ulysses and the prophet Jonah. Public Choice, 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00865-8

 

2015-2019

Arye L. Hillman and Niklas Potrafke, 2015. The UN Goldstone Report and Retraction: An empirical investigation. Public Choice 163(3), 247-266.

Raphael N. Becker, Arye L. Hillman, Niklas Potrafke, and Alexander H. Schwemmer, 2015. The preoccupation of the United Nations with Israel: Evidence and theory. Review of International Organizations 10(4), 413-437.

Arye L. Hillman, 2015. Rents and international trade policy. In: Roger D. Congleton and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Companion to Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, chapter 12, pp. 187-202.

Arye L. Hillman, 2015. Rent seeking as political economy. In: Roger D. Congleton and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Companion to Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, chapter 2, pp. 10-16.

Arye L. Hillman, Kfir Metsuyanim, and Niklas Potrafke, 2015. Democracy with group identity. European Journal of Political Economy 40, 274-287. In special issue on Behavioral Political Economy.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. Academic exclusion: Some experiences. Public Choice, 67, 1-20.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. Where are the rent seekers? Constitutional Political Economy 27(2), 124-141. Special issue in memory of Gordon Tullock.

Arye L. Hillman and Niklas Potrafke, 2018. Economic freedom and religion: An empirical investigation. Public Finance Review 46(2), 249-275. Special issue on Economic Freedom and Race/Ethnicity, Gary Hoover editor.

Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long, 2018. Policies and prizes. European Journal of Political Economy 54, 99-109. Special issue on The Political Economy of Public Policy.

Arye L. Hillman, 2019. Harming a favored side: An anomaly with supreme values and good intentions. Public Choice 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00750-z

 

2010-2014

Arye L. Hillman, 2010. Expressive behavior in economics and politics. European Journal of Political Economy 26, 404 – 419.

Arye L. Hillman, 2011. Expressive voting and identity: evidence from a case study of a group of U.S. voters. Public Choice 148, 249-257.

Arye L. Hillman, 2013. Economic and behavioral foundations of prejudice. In Charles S. Small (Ed.), Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity. Leiden, Netherlands, and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 51-67.

Christian Bjørnskov, Željko Bogetić, Arye L. Hillman, and Milenko Popović, 2014. Trust and identity in a small post-socialist post-crisis society. Europe and Central Asia Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Policy Research Working Paper 6828, The World Bank, Washington DC.

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/17713/WPS682…

 

2005-2009

Arye L. Hillman, 2008. Globalization and social justice. Singapore Economic Review 53, 173 - 189. Singapore Economic Review Public Lecture, September 2007.

Toke Aidt and Arye L. Hillman, 2008. Enduring rents. European Journal of Political Economy 24, 454 – 53.

Arye L. Hillman, 2009. Hobbes and the prophet Samuel on leviathan government. Public Choice 141, 1 – 4.

Arye L. Hillman and Miriam Krausz, 2007. Directed credits and corruption. In Rahul Gupta and Santap Sanhari Mishra (Eds.), Corruption: The Causes and Combating Strategies. The Icfai University Press, Hyderabad, pp. 73-81.

Arye L. Hillman, 2007. Economic and security consequences of supreme values. Public Choice 30, 259 – 280. Also published as: An economic perspective on radical Islam. In Hillel Frisch and Efraim Inbar (Eds.), Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 44 – 69. [64]

Arye L. Hillman 2007. Democracy and low-income countries. In José Casas Pardo and Pedro Schwartz (Eds.), Public Choice and Challenges of Democracy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K., pp. 277 – 294.

Arye L. Hillman, 2005. Globalization and the political economy of international trade policy. In: Sisira Jayasuriya (Ed.), 2005. Trade Policy Reforms and Development: Essays in Honor of Professor Peter Lloyd, Volume II, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K., pp. 3 – 22.

Arye L. Hillman, 2005. Political institutions, jurisdictional boundaries, and rent creation. Keio Economic Studies, 42(1/2), 25 – 37. Special issue in honor of Professor Michihiro Ohyama, edited by Wilfred J. Ethier and Makoto Yano.

Raphael Franck, Arye L. Hillman, and Miriam Krausz, 2005. Public safety and the moral dilemma in the defense against terror. Defense and Peace Economics 16(5), 347 – 364. (CEPR DP 4736, November 2004).

 

2000-2004

JoAnne Feeney and Arye L. Hillman, 2001. Privatization and the political economy of strategic trade policy. International Economic Review 42, 535-556.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2000. Political culture and economic decline. European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 189-213. Reprinted in: Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 – The Theory of Rent seeking. Springer: Heidelberg, pp. 219 – 243.

Arye L. Hillman and Otto Swank, 2000. Why political culture should be in the lexicon of economics. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 1 – 4.

Arye L. Hillman, Ngo Van Long, and Antoine Soubeyran, 2001. Protection, lobbying, and market structure. Journal of International Economics 54, 383 – 409.

Arye L. Hillman, 2002. Immigration and intergenerational transfers. In: Horst Siebert (Ed.), Economic Policy for Aging Societies. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht and Boston, pp. 213 – 26.

Arye L. Hillman, 2002. On the way to the Promised Land: ten years in the wilderness without Moses. Published in Russian (translated by Mark Levin). In Economics and Mathematical Methods - Journal of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 38, 78 – 94.

Chen, Kang, Arye L. Hillman, and Gu Qingyang, 2002. Fiscal re-centralization and behavioral change of local governments: from the helping hand to the grabbing hand. China Economic Quarterly 2, 111-130.

Chen, Kang, Arye L. Hillman, and Gu Qingyang, 2002. From the helping hand to the grabbing hand: Fiscal federalism in China. In: John Wong and Lu Ding (Eds.), China's Economy into the New Century: Structural Issues and Problems. World Scientific, Singapore, pp. 193 – 215.

Arye L. Hillman, 2003. Interpretations of transition. In Political Economy of Transition and Development: Institutions, Politics, and Policies, Nauro F. Campos and Jan Fidrmuc (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 23 – 40.

Arye L. Hillman, Ngo Van Long, and Antoine Soubeyran, 2003. Lobbying for tariff protection and allocation of entrepreneurial resources. In: New Developments in International Trade: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, Seiichi Katayama and Kaz Miyagiwa (Eds.), Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe, pp. 129 – 46.

JoAnne Feeney and Arye L. Hillman, 2004. Trade liberalization through asset markets. Journal of International Economics 64, 151-167. Reprinted in: Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), 2008. The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, pp. 173 - 189.

Arye L. Hillman and Eva Jenkner, 2004. User payments for basic education in low-income countries. In: Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, and Gabriela Inchauste (Eds.), 2004. Helping countries Develop: The Role of Fiscal Policy, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, pp. 233 – 264. Working Paper no 02/182, November 2002, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. Non-technical version: How to pay for basic education: Poor children in poor countries, Economic Issues 33, 2004, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.

Arye L. Hillman, 2004. Nietzschean development failures. Public Choice 119, 263 – 280. Revised version of: Poverty, inequality, and unethical behavior of the strong. Working Paper no 00/187, November 2000, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.

Emanuele Baldacci, Arye L. Hillman, and Naoko Kojo, 2004. Growth, governance, and fiscal-policy transmission channels in low-income countries. European Journal of Political Economy 20, 517 – 549. Revised version of Working Paper no 03/237, December 2003, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. Reprinted in: Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, and Gabriela Inchauste (Eds.), 2004. Helping countries Develop: The Role of Fiscal Policy, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, pp. 67 – 104.

 

1998-1999

Arye L. Hillman, 1998. Political economy and political correctness. Public Choice 96, 219-239. Presidential Address, European Public Choice Society, Prague, April 1997. Reprinted in: Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), 2008, Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2–Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 791 – 811.

Arye L. Hillman, 1999. Political culture and the political economy of central bank independence. In Mario Blejer and Marko Škreb (Eds.), Major Issues in Central Banking, Monetary Policies, and Implications for Transition Economies, Springer: Heidelberg, pp. 73 – 86.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1999. Foreign investment and endogenous protection with protectionist quid pro quo. Economics and Politics 11, 1 – 12.

Arye L. Hillman and Avi Weiss, 1999. A theory of permissible illegal immigration. European Journal of Political Economy 15, 585-604.

Arye L. Hillman and Avi Weiss, 1999. Beyond international factor movements: Cultural preferences, endogenous policies, and the migration of people, an overview. In: Jaime de Melo, Riccardo Faini, and Klaus Zimmermann (Eds.), Migration: The Controversies and the Evidence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, pp. 76 – 91.

Epstein, Gil, Arye L. Hillman, and Avi Weiss, 1999. Creating illegal immigrants. Journal of Population Economics 12, 3-21.

Epstein, Gil, Arye L. Hillman, and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1999. The king never emigrates. Review of Development Economics 3, 107 – 21. Reprinted in: Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), 2008. Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 – Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Springer: Heidelberg 2008, pp. 265 – 79.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1999. The trials and tribulations of banking in transition economies: A political economy perspective. In: Mario Blejer and Marko Škreb (Eds.), Financial Sector Transformation: Lessons from Economies in Transition, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 132 – 149.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1999. What is special about endogenous international trade policy in transition economies? In: Mario Blejer and Marko Škreb (Eds.), Balance of Payments, Exchange Rates, and Competitiveness in Transition Economies, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston and Dordrecht, 255 – 282.

 

1995-1997

Arye L. Hillman, Peter Moser and Ngo Van Long, 1995. Modeling reciprocal trade liberalization: The political-economy and national-welfare perspectives. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik (Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics) 131, 503-515.

Arye L. Hillman, Lubomir Mitov and R. Kyle Peters, 1995. The private sector, state enterprises, and informal economic activity. In Financing Government in Transition, Bulgaria: The Political Economy of Tax Policies, Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion, Željko Bogetić and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), The World Bank, Washington, D.C., pp. 47 – 70. S

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1996. The political economy of trade liberalization in the transition. European Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 40, 783 - 794.

Arye L. Hillman, 1996. Western economic theory and the transition: The public choice perspective. Economics and Mathematical Methods (Journal of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences) 32, 77-90. In Russian, translated by Mark Levin. Published in English in: Karl-Josef Koch and Klaus Jaeger (Eds.), 1998. Trade, Growth, and Economic Policy in Open Economies: Essays in Honor of Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau, Springer: Heidelberg, pp. 351 – 367.

Arye L. Hillman and Peter Moser, 1996. Trade liberalization as politically optimal exchange of market access. In: Matthew Canzoneri, Wilfred Ethier, and Vittorio Grilli (Eds.), The New Transatlantic Economy, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, pp. 295-312. Reprinted in: The Global Trading System, volume 2, Core Rules and Procedures, Kym Anderson and Bernard Hoekman (Eds.), I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, London and New York, 2002; The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 290 – 307.

Arye L. Hillman, Manuel Hinds, Branko Milanovic, and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1997. Protectionist pressures and enterprise restructuring: The political economy of trade policy in transition. In: Trade and Tax Policy, Inflation and Exchange Rates, Assaf Razin and Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau (Eds.), Springer: Heidelberg, pp. 215 – 243.

Alan Gelb, Arye L. Hillman, and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1998. Rents as distractions: Why the exit from transition is prolonged. In: Economic Interdependence and Cooperation in Europe, Nicolas C. Baltas, George Demopoulos, and Joseph Hassid (Eds.), Springer, 1998, 21 – 38. Paper for: Rents and the Transition, World Development Report Background Paper, The World Bank, Washington D.C., April 1996.

 

1993-1994

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1993. The multinational firm, political competition, and international trade policy. International Economic Review 34, 347 – 63.

Arye L. Hillman 1993. Socialist clubs: A perspective on the transition. European Journal of Political Economy, 1993, 9, 307 – 319.

Željko Bogetić and Arye L. Hillman, 1994. The tax base in the transition: The case of Bulgaria. Policy Research Working Paper number 1267, The World Bank, Washington, DC. Published in: Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 1994, 6, 267-282. Updated as: Bogetić, Željko and Arye L. Hillman, 1995. The choice of a tax system. In: Željko Bogetić and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Financing Government in Transition, Bulgaria: The Political Economy of Tax Policies Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., pp. pp. 33 – 46.

Arye L. Hillman, 1994. The transition from socialism: An overview from a political-economy perspective. European Journal of Political Economy 10, 191 – 225. Special issue, festschrift in honor of Peter Bernholz, edited by Manfred Gärtner and Heinrich W. Ursprung.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1994. Greens, supergreens, and international trade policy: Environmental concerns and protectionism. In: Carlo Carraro (Ed.), Trade, Innovation, Environment, Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 75 – 108.

Arye L. Hillman, 1994. The political economy of migration policy. In: Horst Siebert (Ed.), Migration: A Challenge for Europe, J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck, Tübingen, pp. 263 – 282.

 

1990-1992

Arye L. Hillman, 1990. Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry. Public Choice 67, 101-110.

Arye L. Hillman 1991. Liberalization dilemmas. In Markets and Politicians: Politicized Economic Choice, Arye L. Hillman (Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, chapter 10, pp. 189 – 207.

Arye L. Hillman, 1991. Market structure, politics, and protection. In: Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin (Eds.), International Trade and Trade Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 118 – 40.

James H. Cassing and Arye L. Hillman, 1991. Equalizing the cost of success: Equitable graduation rules and the Generalized System of Preferences. Journal of International Economic Integration 6, 40-51.

Arye L. Hillman, 1991. Some problems of statistical measurement of economic activity in the transition from planned socialism. In: Petr O. Aven (Ed.), Economies in Transition: Statistical Measures Now and in the Future, International Institute for Applied System Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 1991, 69-78.

Arye L. Hillman, 1992. Progress with privatization. Journal of Comparative Economics 16, 733 – 749.

Arye L. Hillman and Adi Schnytzer, 1992. Creating the reform-resistant dependent economy: Socialist comparative advantage, enterprise incentives and the CMEA. In: Arye L. Hillman and Branko Milanovic (Eds.), The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade, The World Bank, Washington, DC, chapter 10, pp. 243 – 262.

Arye L. Hillman, 1992. The transition from socialist trade to European integration. In: The EC after 1992 - Perspectives from the Outside, Silvio Borner and Herbert Grubel (Eds.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, pp. 61 – 79.

Arye L. Hillman, 1992. The transition from the CMEA system of international trade. In: Trials of Transition: Economic Reform in the Former Communist Bloc, Michael Karen and Gur Offer (Eds.), Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 271 – 289.

Arye L. Hillman, Istvan Abel, and David Tarr, 1992. The government budgetary consequences of reform of the CMEA system of international trade: The case of Hungary. In: Arye L. Hillman and Branko Milanovic (Eds.), The Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and Foreign Trade, The World Bank, Washington, DC, chapter 12, 277-293.

Arye L. Hillman, 1992. International trade policy in Israel: Another model, Public Choice, 1992, 74, 355-360.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1992. The influence of environmental concerns on the political determination of international trade policy. In: Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (Eds.), The Greening of World Trade Issues, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI,  pp. 195 – 220. Invited paper for a conference organized at the GATT (replaced by the WTO).

Arye L. Hillman, 1992. International trade policy: Benevolent dictators and optimizing politicians. Public Choice 74, 1-15. Plenary lecture, European Public Choice Society Annual Conference, Meersburg, April 1990.

 

1988-1989

Arye L. Hillman, 1988. Tariff-revenue transfers to protectionist interests: Compensation for reduced protection or supplementary reward for successful lobbying? Public Choice 58, 169 - 172.

Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1988. Domestic politics, foreign interests and international trade policy. American Economic Review 78, 729-745. Reprinted in: International Trade, J. Peter Neary (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1996; The Globalization of the World Economy: Trade and Investment Policy, Thomas Brewer (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1999, pp. 470 – 86; The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 99 -115

Arye L. Hillman, 1988. Impediments to a competitive environment in Israel. Presented at Symposium on American-Israel Economic Relations in Honor of the 40th Anniversary of the State of Israel, New York (June 1988).

Arye L. Hillman, 1989. Resolving the puzzle of welfare-reducing trade diversion: A prisoners' dilemma interpretation. Oxford Economic Papers 41, 452-455.

Arye L. Hillman and John Riley, 1989. Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1, 17-39. Reprinted in: Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 – The Theory of Rent seeking. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 185 – 207.

 

1985-1987

Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long, 1985. Monopolistic recycling of oil revenue and intertemporal bias in oil depletion and trade. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 597 – 624.

Arye L. Hillman and Joseph Templeman, 1985. On the use of trade policy measures by a small country to counter foreign monopoly power. Oxford Economic Papers, 37, 346 – 52. .

James H. Cassing and Arye L. Hillman, 1985. Political-influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas. Journal of International Economics 19, 279-290.

Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz, 1986. Domestic uncertainty and foreign dumping. Canadian Journal of Economics 19, 403-416.

Arye L. Hillman and Adi Schnytzer, 1986. Illegal activities and purges in a Soviet-type economy: A rent-seeking perspective. International Review of Law and Economics, June 1986, 6, 87-99. Reprinted in: Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 – Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai A. Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 545 – 557.

James H. Cassing, Arye L. Hillman, and Ngo Van Long, 1986. Risk aversion, terms of trade variability, and social consensus trade policy. Oxford Economic Papers 38, 234-242.

James H. Cassing and Arye L. Hillman, 1986. Shifting comparative advantage and senescent industry collapse. American Economic Review 76, 516-523. Reprinted in: The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 516 – 523.

Arye L. Hillman, Eliakim Katz, and Jacob Rosenberg, 1987. Workers as insurance: Anticipated government intervention and factor demand. Oxford Economic Papers, 39, 813-820. Reprinted in: The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. pp. 585–592.

Arye L. Hillman and Dov Samet, 1987. Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice, 54, 63-82. Reprinted in: Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 – The Theory of Rent seeking. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 165 – 184.

Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz, 1987. Hierarchical structure and the social costs of bribes and transfers. Journal of Public Economics, 34, 129-142. Reprinted in: The Economics of Corruption and Illegal Markets, Gianluca Fiorentini and Stephano Zamagni (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK 1999; in Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 – The Theory of Rent seeking. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 523 – 536.

 

1983-1984

Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long, 1983. Pricing and depletion of an exhaustible resource when there is anticipation of trade disruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 215 – 33.

Arye L. Hillman and Peter Swan, 1983. Participation rules for Pareto-optimal clubs. Journal of Public Economics [78]20, 55 – 76.

Franklin M. Fisher and Arye L. Hillman, 1984. The commodity composition of trade and the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in the presence of aggregate and commodity specific factor-intensity reversals. Journal of International Economics 17, 159-172. Reprinted in: Franklin M. Fisher (Ed.) Aggregation: Aggregate Production Functions and Related Topics, chapter 11, pp. 261 – 275, Harvester, Wheatsheaf and MIT Press, 1992.

Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz, 1984. Excise taxes, import restrictions, and the allocation of time to illegal activity. International Review of Law and Economics 1984, 4, 213 – 22.

Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz, 1984. Oil price instability and domestic energy substitution for imported oil. Economic Record, 1984, 60, 28-33.

Arye L. Hillman and Eliakim Katz, 1984. Risk-averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power. Economic Journal 94, 104-110. Reprinted in: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Charles Rowley, Robert Tollison and Gordon Tullock (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1988, pp. 81-90; The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking, Roger Congleton and Robert Tollison (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Oxford, 1995, pp. 243 – 249; The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Charles K, Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston and Dordrecht, pp. 81-90; Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 – The Theory of Rent seeking. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 97 – 103.

 

1980-1982

Arye L. Hillman, 1980. Observations on the relation between "revealed comparative advantage" and comparative advantage as indicated by pre-trade relative prices. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 116, 315 – 21.

Arye L. Hillman, 1980. Notions of merit want. Public Finance/ Finances publiques 35, 213 – 226.

Gideon Fishelson, Arye L. Hillman, and Se'ev Hirsch, 1980. Comparative performance of Israel's industrial exports in the EEC and U.S. markets. In The Economic Integration of Israel in the EEC, edited by Herbert Giersch, J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck: Tübingen, pp. 125 – 174.

Arye L. Hillman, Edward Tower, and Gideon Fishelson, 1980. On water-in-the-quota. Canadian Journal of Economics 13, 310 – 317.

Gideon Fishelson, Arye L. Hillman, and Se'ev Hirsch, 1980. The factor-content characteristics of Israel's trade in a multilateral setting. In: The Economic Integration of Israel in the EEC, edited by Herbert Giersch, J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck: Tübingen, pp. 175 – 198.

Arye L. Hillman, 1981. Unilateral and bilateral trade policies for a minimum-wage economy. Journal of International Economics 11, 407 – 413.

Mario I. Blejer and Arye L. Hillman, 1982. A proposition on short-run departures from the law of one price: Unanticipated inflation, relative price dispersion and commodity arbitrage. European Economic Review 17, 51-60. Reprinted (in Spanish): “Una explicacion de las desviaciones a corto plazo de la ley del precio unico: inflacion imprevista, dispersion de precios relativos y arbitraje commercial”. In Inflacion y varialibidad de los precios relativos, Mexico, DF, 1984, pp. 75 – 86.

Mario I. Blejer and Arye L. Hillman, 1982. On the dynamic non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the monetary model of the balance of payments. Journal of International Economics, August 1982, 13, 163 – 169. Reply, May 1985, 18, 381-382.

James H. Cassing and Arye L. Hillman, 1982. State-federal resource tax rivalry. Economic Record 58, 235 – 241.

Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long, 1982. Substitutes for a depletable resource and the monopolistic conservationist presumption. Australian Economic Papers 21, 193-199.

Arye L. Hillman, 1982. Declining industries and political-support protectionist motives. American Economic Review 72, 1180-1187. Reprinted in: The WTO, Safeguards, and Temporary Protection from Imports, Chad Brown (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2006; The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 43 – 50; Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 – Applications Rent Seeking in Practice. Roger D. Congleton. Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer, Berlin, 2008, pp. 105 – 112.

 

1977-1979

Arye L. Hillman, 1977. The Brigden Theorem. Economic Record, 53, 434-446.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1977.tb0030…

Elhanan Helpman, and Arye L. Hillman, 1977. Two remarks on optimal club size. Economica, 44, 293 – 96.

Gideon Fishelson and Arye L. Hillman, 1977. Inflationary government financing and the trade deficit: Evidence from Israel. In: Nadav Halevi and Ya'acov Kopf (Eds.), Studies in Economics 1977, Israel Economic Association, Jerusalem, August 1978, p. 94 – 107 (Hebrew).

Arye L. Hillman and Clark W. Bullard III, 1978. Energy, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and U.S. international trade. American Economic Review 68, 96-106. Reprinted in: Bertie Ohlin: Critical Assessments, John Cunningham Wood (Ed.), Routledge, London, 1997.

Arye L. Hillman, 1978. Symmetries and asymmetries between public input and public good equilibria. Public Finance/ Finances publiques, No. 3, 33, 269 – 279.

Arye L. Hillman and Se'ev Hirsch, 1979. Factor-intensity reversals: Conceptual experiments with traded goods aggregates. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 115, 272-283.

Gideon Fishelson and Arye L. Hillman, 1979. Domestic monopoly and redundant tariff protection. Journal of International Economics 9, 47-55.

Ruth W. Arad and Arye L. Hillman, 1979. Embargo threat, learning and departure from comparative advantage. Journal of International Economics 9, 265 – 75.

Arad, Ruth W. and Arye L. Hillman, 1979. The collective good motive for immigration policy. Australian Economic Papers, 18, 243-257.

Arye L. Hillman and Peter Swan, 1979. Club participation under uncertainty. Economics Letters 4, 307–12.

 

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Lecture on occasion of honorary doctorate University of Genova

‘Political economy’, March 5, 2016. Available at:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301613160_Lecture_on_Political_Economy_on_the_occasion_of_an_honorary_doctorate_from_the_University_of_Genova

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Comments and short papers

A note on the distribution of tariff proceeds, Economic Record 1970, 46, 117-19. David E. James co-author.

A generalized cost allocation scheme: Comment. In: Steven A. Y. Lim (Ed.), Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976, pp. 103 – 106.

The case for terminal protection for declining industries: Comment, Southern Economic Journal, July 1977, 43, 155-160.

The theory of clubs: A technological formulation. In Agnar Sandmo (Ed.), Essays in Public Economics, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington, Mass., 1978, 29 – 47.

Preemptive rent seeking and the social cost of monopoly power, International Journal of Industrial Organization, September 1984, 2, 277 – 281.

Producer and consumer interests, the state-owned pipeline, and public authority pricing of natural gas, Economic Record 1984, 60, 85-89.

Characterizing equilibrium rent-seeking behavior: A reply to Tullock. Public Choice 1987, 54, 85-87. Dov Samet co-author.

Comment on: The political economy of protectionism: Tariffs and retaliation in the timber industry. In: Robert E. Baldwin (Ed.), Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis, University of Chicago Press for NBER, 1988, pp. 364 – 368.

Comment on: Technology policy in the completed European market. In: L. Alan Winters and Anthony Venables (Eds.), European Integration: Trade and Industry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1991, pp. 161 – 164.

The economics and politics of Europe 1992. In Europe 1992: The Perspective from Israel, In Arye L. Hillman and Zvi Sussman (Eds.), Israel International Institute for Applied Economic Policy Review, Tel-Aviv, 1991, pp. 7 – 22.

Comment on: Capital controls in direct democracies. In: Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau (Ed.), European Integration in the World Economy, Springer, Heidelberg, 1992, pp. 772 – 774.

Comment on: Money and credit in the transition of the Czechoslovak Republic. In: Horst Siebert (Ed.), The Transformation of Socialist Economies, J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck, Tübingen, 1992, pp. 326 – 330.

Debate on the transition of post-communist economies to a market economy, Acta Oeconomica (Journal of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 1992, 44, 285 – 289.

Domestic politics, foreign interests, and international trade policy. Reply. American Economic Review, 84, 1476-78. Arye L. Hillman and Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1994.

Comment on: The philosophy of locational competition. In: Horst Siebert (Ed.), Locational Competition in the World Economy, J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck, Tübingen, 1995, pp. 17 – 25.

The legal system in the transition from social to private property: with reference to Hobbesian anarchy, Locke's natural right of freedom, and the rule of law. In Proceedings of Conference on Challenges and Opportunities for Economic Transition in Yugoslavia, Goran Pitić (Ed.) USAID, Economic Institute, Chesapeake Associates, 1998, pp. 64-89.

Hobbes and Samuel: Reply (to Geoffrey Brennan). Public Choice 2009, 141, 13 –15.

 

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Literature surveys

Fred Gruen and Arye L. Hillman, 1981. A review of issues pertinent to liquid fuel policy. Economic Record 1981, 57, 11-27.

Arye L. Hillman 1989. Policy motives and international trade restrictions. In Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau (Ed.), New Institutional Arrangements for the World Economy, Springer, Heidelberg, 1989, pp. 284 – 302.

Arye L. Hillman, 2001 (Italian). La politica del commercio internazionale per gli anni 2000: idee fondamentali e sviluppi. Il Futuro delle Relazione Economiche Internazionale, Saggi in onere di Fredrico Caffè, a cure di Giancarlo Corsetti, Guido M. Rey, and Gian Cesare Romagnoli, Franco Angeli, Milano 2001, pp. 27 – 63. (Translated by Maria Grazia Nicolosi).

Arye L. Hillman, 2003. International trade policy: Explaining departure from free trade. In: Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 129 – 138. Reprinted in: Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer, New York, 2008.

Arye L. Hillman, 2003. Trade liberalization and globalization. In: Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), 2003. Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 312 – 20. Reprinted in: Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer, New York, 2008.

Arye L. Hillman, 2008. The gains from trade and refusal to trade. In: Ngo Van Long, Makoto Tawada, and Binh Tran Nam (Eds.), Globalization and Emerging Issues in Trade Theory and Policy. A volume in honor of the 80th birthday of Murray Kemp, Emerald Group Publishing, pp. 193 – 208.

https://faculty.biu.ac.il/~hillman/books/2008_Hillman_Gains_from_trade_…

Roger D. Congleton, Arye L, Hillman, and Kai Konrad, 2008. Forty years of research on rent seeking: An overview. In: 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking. Springer, Heidelberg. Volume 1: Theory of Rent Seeking, Volume 2: Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice, pp. 1-44.

Arye L. Hillman, 2013. Rent seeking. In Michael Reksulak, Laura Razzolini, William F. Shughart, II (Eds.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (2nd Edition). Edward Elgar, Cheltenham U.K., pp. 307-330.

Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long, 2019. Rent seeking: the social cost of contestable benefits. In: Roger D. Congleton, Bernard N. Grofman, and Stefan Voigt (Eds.) Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, volume 1, chapter 25, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, pp. 489-518.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/161901/1/cesifo1_wp6462.pdf

Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman, 2019. The politics of international trade policy. In: Roger D. Congleton, Bernard N. Grofman, and Stefan Voigt (Eds.), volume 2, chapter 32. Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, pp. 653-683.

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Book reviews and review articles

Review of Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock and Leslie Young, ‘Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium’, Journal of Economic Literature, 1991, 29(1), 104-106.

Review of Gordon Tullock, ‘The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking’, Kyklos, 1991, 44(4), 657-659.

The World Bank and the persistence of poverty in poor countries. European Journal of Political Economy 2002, 18, 783 – 95. Extended review of: William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth, MIT Press, 2001.

Corruption and public finance: an IMF perspective. European Journal of Political Economy 2004, 20, 1067 – 77. Extended review of: Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. George T. Abed and Sanjeev Gupta, (Eds.), International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 2002.

Review of Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, and Michael M. Ting: ‘A behavioral theory of elections’, Public Choice 2012, 150, 391-394.

Review of Peter Bernholz, ‘Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values: History and Theory,’ Public Choice 2018, 176(3), 567-571.

Review of Stefan Voigt, ‘Constitutional Economics’, Public Choice, 2021

 

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Policy documents

A program for restructuring of the Histadrut sector of the economy of Israel, August 1989. With Yitzhak Goldberg et al Hebrew and English.

Macroeconomic policy in Hungary and its microeconomic implications. In European Economy, Economic Transformation in Hungary and Poland, Economic Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, March 1990, 43, 55 – 66.

The economy of Israel: Misinformation or disinformation? Prepared for the Office of the Economic Advisor, Prime Minister's Office, Israel, January 1992.

Social marginalization: The effects of trade and technology. Research Department, World Trade Organization, Geneva, February 1997.

Israel and Jordan in a new Middle East. In Proceedings of Symposium on Israel-Middle East Relations in the Year 2000, American-Israel Economic Corporation, New York, 1996, pp. 122 – 124.

The past as a guide to the future. In: The Progress of Israel's Economy: The 50th Anniversary of the State of Israel, edited by Mordecai Hacohen, American-Israel Economic Corporation, New York, 1998.

 

 

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Last Updated Date : 12/01/2021