Informative Certification and Inefficiency in Trade
This paper shows that informative certification may harm market efficiency. We consider a monopolistic certifier who offers to certify the quality of goods offered by partially informed sellers in a market with adverse selection. Initially optimistic sellers may obtain a certificate, learn that the quality of their good is low, and then trade on the market for uncertified goods. This worsens the adverse selection on the market for uncertified goods, thereby generating additional low trade equilibria while threatening the feasibility of equilibria with high trade. Due to an optimality effect, the certifier induces inefficient low trade equilibria if adverse selection is mild, as a low price for uncertified goods raises the demand for certification. For intermediate levels of adverse selection, a feasibility effect implies that the certifier’s profit-maximizing policy compromises trade in uncertified goods as certified low-quality goods crowd out uncertified trade.
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Last Updated Date : 11/11/2026