

JUN ZHOU
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RESEARCH FIELD

Antitrust, Industrial organization

POSITIONS

11.2016 - present Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
Visiting Fellow

06.2015 - 10.2016 Zhejiang Wanli University, Business School
Lecturer

10.2015 - 01.2016 Bruegel, Microeconomics Group
Visiting Fellow

02.2014 - 02.2015 Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Economics
Postdoctoral Research Fellow

08.2013 - 02.2014 HuaXia Bank of China
Senior Analyst

04.2010 - 06.2013 University of Bonn, Department of Economics
Postdoctoral Research Fellow

09.2008 - 09.2009 Geni-cap Lab, the Netherlands
Senior Research Associate

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION

2011 - present Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center
Junior Extramural Fellow

DEGREES

Ph.D., Economics, Tilburg University, Center for Economics Research, 2010.
M.Sc., Economics, Tilburg University, Center for Economics Research, 2004.
B.Sc., International Economics and Finance, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and
Business Administration, 2003.

PUBLICATION

“The Rise and Fall of Cartels with Multi-Market Colluders”, *Review of Industrial Organization*, March 2016.

REVISE AND RESUBMIT

“Evaluating Leniency With Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration”, 2016. Revision requested from *International Journal of Industrial Organization*.

OTHER RECENT RESEARCH PAPERS

'The Dynamics of Mergers among (Ex)Co-Conspirators in The Shadow of Cartel Enforcement' (with Leslie M. Marx)

Abstract: We investigate cartelists' merger behavior using the complete set of European Commission (EC) cartel decisions over a 28-year span and information on cartelists' merger activities over the last 30 years. We find that mergers occur frequently. But they cluster in a few particular industries and usually included only a minority of the cartel participants. The EC's leniency programs expedite merger. The EC's cartel settlement procedure delays merger. Voluntarily ceasing infringement does not affect merger timing; After caught in the act, co-conspirators merge at a substantially greater pace. The results shed light on the design of merger policies and enforcement programs against cartels.

'The Dynamics of Leniency Application and Cartel Enforcement Spillovers?'(Under Review)

Abstract: I study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission (EC) between 1996 and 2014. The start of an EC investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. The introduction of the EC's 2002 Leniency increases the rate of pre-investigation applications. My results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.

OCCASIONAL TEACHING APPOINTMENT

- 2007 Guest Lecturer on Auction Theory for 'Law and Economics of Regulated Industries: between Competition and Regulation' (Postgraduate Level, Faculty of Laws, University College London)

TEACHING

- 2007 - 08 Teaching assistant of Prof. Eric van Damme for 'Competition Policy and Deregulation' (Final Year Undergraduate Level, Tilburg University)
- 2005 - 06 Teaching assistant of Prof. Eric van Damme for 'Game Theory and Industrial Organization' (Final Year Undergraduate Level, Tilburg University); Teaching assistant of Prof. Eric van Damme for 'Law and Economics', (Postgraduate Level, Tilburg University)

CONFERENCE AND INVITED SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

- 2014 Tilburg Law and Economics Center (NL); Amsterdam Law and Economics Center (NL)
- 2012 European Association for Research in Industrial Economics Conference (IT); MaCCI Summer Institute on Competition Policy (DE)
- 2011 The 6th Annual Competition and Regulation European Summer School and Conference (GR); Annual Congress of European Economic Association (NO); Annual Meeting of American Law and Economics Association (USA); Faculty of Law, University of Haifa (IL)

SKILLS

- Language: Mandarin Chinese, English, Dutch
- Software: Mathematica, STATA, Latex, iFind, Microsoft Office

DATA

European Commission Cartel Discoveries 1964-2012

European Commission Merger Decisions 1990-2012

European Commission Abuse of Dominance Decisions 1974-2009

MISCELLANEOUS

citizen of P. R. China; permanent residence of the Netherlands; work permit for the Netherlands

HONOR

2008 Young Economist Award from European Economic Association

RECENT SCHOLARSHIPS, GRANTS AND SUCCESSFUL TENDER

2014 The Nordic Forestry, Veterinary and Agricultural University Network grant for teaching PHD Summer School “The Empirics of Economic Organizations and Transaction Costs” (competitive, joint with Konstantinos Karantininis)

2010 - 13 German Science Foundation Research Grant through Sonderforschungsbereich TR 15 for post-doctoral research program

2009 Winning tender from the UK Office of Fair Trading for research project “An Assessment of Discretionary Penalties Regimes”; Scholarship (competitive) for attending the 20th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory on the Economics of Contracts

AD HOC REFEREEING

The RAND Journal of Economics; International Review of Law and Economics; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; Journal of Legal Studies; Journal of Industrial Economics