שלחו לחבר

BIU Game and Economic Theory Seminar 2021-2022 Semester A

Upcoming Lectures

Date Speaker Title
07/12/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Aix-Marseille University (Job talk:) Repeated Games with Switching Costs: Stationary vs History Independent Strategies
21/12/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Ryoji Sawa, University of Tsukuba TBD
28/12/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Jonathan Newton, Kyoto University TBD
04/01/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 Noam Hazon, Ariel University TBD
11/01/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 Yuval Heller & Ilan Nehama, Bar-Ilan University Evolutionary Foundation for Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion
08/03/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
15/03/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
22/03/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
29/03/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
05/04/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
26/04/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
03/05/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
10/05/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
17/05/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
24/05/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
31/05/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
07/06/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
14/06/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD
21/06/2022 - 13:00 - 11:30 TBD TBD

Previous Lectures

Date Speaker Title
30/11/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 No seminar (Hanukka) חנוכה שמח
23/11/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Shiri Alon, Bar-Ilan University Cardinality and Utilitarianism through social interactions
16/11/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Jean-Pierre Benoît, London Business School Belief Elicitation When More Than Money Matters: Controlling for "Control".
09/11/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Ronen Gradwohl, Ariel University Herd Design
02/11/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Ro'i Zultan, Ben-Gurion University of Negev Information, beliefs, and decisions
26/10/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Heinrich H. Nax, University of Zürich and ETH Zürich What and why noise matters? Experimental evidence for stochastic deviations from best response
19/10/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms
12/10/2021 - 13:00 - 11:30 Piotr Faliszewski, AGH University of Science and Technology Map of Elections: The Story So Far