שלחו לחבר

Sequential Vote Buying

Speaker
Jan Zápal
Date
03/11/2020 - 13:00 - 11:30
Place
Zoom https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82536086839
Affiliation
Economics Institute, Prague
Abstract

To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes.The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy is put to a vote or paid upfront. With transfer promises, the leader buys the votes of those least opposed at a cost near zero. With up-front payments, she does not necessarily buy the votes of those least opposed, and a vote can cost significantly more than zero. The leader is better off with up-front payments. We discuss several extensions including private histories and simultaneous offers.

Recording: To view the seminar recording, click here.

 

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 03/11/2020