Optimal Dynamic Inspection
Speaker:
Chang Zhao
Affilation:
Tel Aviv University
Semester:
Semester A
Date :
November 30, 2017, 11:30 - 13:00
Paper: http://zhaochangtau.weebly.com/uploads/1/0/8/4/108458087/repeated_inspection.pdf
We study a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one principal. Both agents may profit by violating certain rules, while the principal can inspect at most one agent in each period, inflicting a punishment on an agent who is caught violating the rules. The goal of the principal is to minimize the discounted number of violations, and he has a Stackelberg leader advantage. We characterize the principal's optimal inspection strategy.
Joint work with Eilon Solan.
Place:
Economics building (504), faculty lounge on the first floor
- Last modified: 27/11/2017